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Climate change exists both as a symptom and as a cause of many social ills. It is as urgent as it is 
complex. Climate change is being addressed internationally through mechanisms heavily 
influenced by neoliberal globalisation and based around market mechanisms for the trading of 
carbon dioxide as a commodity, such as the Kyoto Protocol. This has contributed to increasing 
de-politicisation of the climate change issue. Contestation of neoliberal solutions to climate 
change has resulted in the birth of climate justice principles which unite action against the 
systemic causes of climate change. At the heart of action on climate change are young people- 
historically active citizens and advocates for radical change. In the context of de-politicisation 
and a post-political carbon consensus, young activists have been influenced by dominant 
neoliberal discourse. 
 
This research will explore the repercussions of a post-political carbon consensus in producing 
youth-led spaces of contestation in Aotearoa New Zealand. The case study for this research, 
youth-driven organisation Generation Zero, advocates for post-political carbon consensus by 
running campaigns on changes to the national Emissions Trading Scheme and other policy-based 
work. In this thesis, I will describe the extent to which young people within Generation Zero are 
influenced by the neoliberal discourse and the implications this has for the role of climate justice 
and radical activism. This research will contribute to the literature around the de-politicisation of 
climate change as it describes the impact that this has on youth activism and thus the opportunity 
for future spaces of dissent. 
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"If you go to one demonstration and then go home, that’s something, but the people in power can 
live with that. What they can’t live with is sustained pressure that keeps building, organizations 
that keep doing things, people that keep learning lessons from the last time and doing it better the 
next time." -Noam Chomsky 
 
This research is dedicated to the international youth climate movement 
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Chapter 1: Setting the scene 
 
Did You Hear? 
That is the sound of your world falling apart. 
It is the sound of our resurgence. 
The day that was the day, was night. 
And night will be the day that will be the day. 
Democracy! 
Liberty! 
Justice!  (Subcomandante Marcos, Zapatista Army of National Liberation) 
In late 2010 I found myself in Acteal, a small village in the the municipality of Chenalhó, 
Chiapas, Mexico. It was the 22
nd
 December, the anniversary of the Acteal Massacre of 1997. The 
massacre was carried by the paramilitary group Mascara Roja and resulted in the loss of 45 
villagers who were gathered in a church for prayer. It was thought to be motivated by Mascara 
Roja’s perception of and disdain for Acteal’s support for the Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation, a revolutionary group that is committed to putting land into indigenous control, 
living autonomously out of the reaches of neoliberal globalisation whilst maintaining a non-
violent defensive. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation became world-renowned for their 
part in the anti-globalisation, indigenous rights and anti-neoliberal movements, among others 
(Starr & Adams, 2003; De Angelis, 2000). The strength, courage and commitment to a new 
world were apparent that day in 2010 as villagers and visitors discussed the possibilities for a 
world without neoliberalism, a path that the Zapatistas had begun to carve. Chanting and songs 
of defiance rang across the valley, tears were shed for the lost and a new world was imagined. In 
the air was the heady scent of possibility, struggle and resistance. They spoke about how their 
communities would meet the challenges of climate change. This was my first introduction to what 
a future without neoliberal globalisation could look like, a world where capitalism was contested 
in everyday life and people lived in peaceful resistance.                                                 
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 In late 2011 I found myself at the United Nations Climate Change Negotiations in Durban, 
South Africa. It was 10
th
 December and the negotiations were almost over. The environmental 
NGOs present were largely dissatisfied with progress being made (for more on the civil society 
reaction to the Durban negotiations, see Banerjee, 2012). It became easier and easier to block 
out the voices of negotiators from my mind, instead focussing on the voices of youth, indigenous 
peoples and others from civil society who are calling for “No REDD” and decrying the use of 
market mechanisms and the privatisation of nature in this “failing system.” Members of civil 
society in the Global South, facing the effects of climate change, expressed great frustration and 
desperation. The negotiations became embroiled in political game play, no longer about climate 
change, but who could get away with doing the least. So we, the tired and disillusioned, an 
eclectic collection of activists, occupied the front hall of the conference centre and disrupted the 
negotiations process for around half a day. We chanted and sang for the marginalised, for youth, 
indigenous peoples and the activists working hard to fight climate change in our home countries. 
It was a true display of global solidarity. After being removed by security, two things dawned on 
me: I would no longer be a part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change’s system and that my faith in that system was completely gone- the change necessary to 
solve climate change would have to come from the grassroots, from the ground up.  
1.1 What motivated this study? 
After witnessing the down fall of the Durban climate negotiations, and the ones that have gone 
before them, my trust in the ability of the United Nations process and the solutions that it called 
for had diminished. Our action at Durban, named Occupy COP17, aimed to contest the 
negotiations process and connect the injustices of the negotiations with the Occupy Movement, 
which arose from the injustices of an economic crisis. Occupy movement participants organise 
occupations or protests in their communities or at places significant to social and economic 
inequalities and organise using flat hierarchical structures (Guzman-Concha, 2012). It was my 
personal experiences of Durban and of resistance to neoliberalism in Chiapas that inspired this 
study. This study was further motivated by the spate of recent social movements using radical 
action techniques, such as Occupy, springing up all over the world. From the Arab Spring came a 
variety of movements around the world for anti-austerity, indigenous sovereignty, student rights, 
anti-corporate greed and other causes. These actions also included the student movements of 
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Canada, Chile and Mexico, Idle No More in Turtle Island (Canada) and anti-tar sands action in 
North America. Here in Aotearoa New Zealand, student activism, Occupy and Idle No More 
have been present but not to the scale of their international counterparts. So what is the potential 
for these movements of resistance and radical change in current day Aotearoa New Zealand? 
This research will explore the perceptions of activism of youth here in Aotearoa New Zealand 
and discuss the potential for young activists to take radical action, like what has been displayed 
overseas.  
Significantly, the current generation of youth are facing one of the biggest global issues of our 
time- climate change. Climate change issues stem from the very roots of our society, yet 
according to some theorists including Swyngedouw and Žižek, a post-political carbon consensus 
is forming which seeks to address climate change as an issue solely of emissions (Swyngedouw, 
2007; 2009; 2010). This theory of the post-political carbon consensus refers to the prevalence of 
solutions to climate change that serve the dual purpose of perpetuating neoliberal growth and 
capital production whilst using policy and technological approaches to address carbon emissions 
(Swyngedouw, 2009).  
The post-political carbon consensus theory will be contextualised within neoliberal discourse 
which according to Hayward (2012) has resulted in a neoliberal generation, due to the 
dominance of neoliberal thought during the lifetime of this generation. In this context, youth of 
today are considered embedded in the post-political, subject to it and shaped by it. 
According to theorists such as Swyngedouw (2009), Mouffe (2005), Rancière (2010) and Žižek 
(2008), the post-political carbon consensus undermines opportunities for dissent of the social and 
economic status quo, or what is referred to as the “properly” political. With climate change 
becoming increasingly urgent, this thesis seeks to understand the connections between 
entrenched neoliberalism and the possibility of a post-political carbon consensus in Aotearoa 
New Zealand. In particular, this research will explore how a post-political carbon consensus may 
affect perceptions of different forms of activism, particularly radical activism that contests the 
economic and social status quo. As a contribution to the literature, this study ties together the 
theory of the post-political carbon consensus, ideas around neoliberalism and youth activism. 
This research explores if the post-political carbon consensus influences how youth think about 
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and engage in climate change activism in Aotearoa New Zealand and what this may mean for 
creating spaces for radical activism or “properly” political moments. 
1.2 Post-political carbon consensus and the role of the “properly” political 
moment 
The approaches activists take to the climate change issue vary greatly, from those who advocate 
for technological or policy-based solutions to those who believe that the solutions to climate 
change will come from the grassroots and communities. As mentioned previously, this study is 
largely based around the theory of the post-political consensus. Swyngedouw (2007) and Žižek 
(2008) coined the term to describe their observations of climate change discourse.  
According to Swyngedouw (2009), the dominance of neoliberal, policy-based, technocratic 
mechanisms for dealing with environmental issues has contributed to an overall post-political 
condition. A post-political carbon consensus is said to result from the acceptance that 
representative democracy and neoliberal capitalist economic systems can solve overarching 
systemic problems such as climate change with solutions identified and legitimised by the 
scientific consensus (Swyngedouw, 2010). The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC)
1’s Kyoto Protocol is a key example of a mechanism that would 
support a post-political carbon consensus as the Protocol is reliant on accounting and 
management rules as a global solution to climate change. The Kyoto Protocol sets emissions 
targets for countries based on their historical contribution to climate change and projected future 
                                                             
1
 “In 1992, countries joined an international treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
to cooperatively consider what they could do to limit average global temperature increases and the resulting climate 
change, and to cope with whatever impacts were, by then, inevitable. By 1995, countries realized that emission 
reductions provisions in the Convention were inadequate. They launched negotiations to strengthen the global 
response to climate change, and, two years later, adopted the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol legally binds 
developed countries to emission reduction targets. The Protocol’s first commitment period started in 2008 and ended 
in 2012. The second commitment period began on 1 January 2013 and will end in 2020. There are now 195 Parties 




emissions. It also provides frameworks for national and international carbon markets and the 
privatisation of carbon.  
As the UNFCCC (2013) states “at the very heart of the response to climate change, however, lies 
the need to reduce emissions. In 2010, governments agreed that emissions need to be reduced so 
that global temperature increases are limited to below 2 degrees Celsius.”  The Kyoto Protocol 
addresses climate change as a technical and scientific issue of emissions and does not address the 
root causes of climate change, such as those identified by Žižek (2008, 279) as “unevenly 
distributed power relations, of the networks of control and influence, of rampant injustices and 
inequalities.” Theorists who maintain that a post-political condition exists, such as Swyngedouw, 
Rancière and Žižek, claim that the Kyoto Protocol and other consensual solutions to climate 
change undermine the propensity for radical alternatives (Swyngedouw, 2007). Moreover, the 
consensual condition may perpetuate the status quo because it privileges solutions that do not 
disrupt the political, social and economic status quo.  
Hence, a post-political carbon consensus is said to undermine what theorists including 
Swyngedouw, Rancière and Žižek refer to as the “properly” political. Rancière (1998, 11) 
defines the “properly” political as “when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the 
institution of a part of those who have no part.” In other words, a “properly” political moment is 
an act of dissent to the status quo which does not engage or legitimate these social, political or 
economic systems. Theorists, including Rancière (2001), Žižek (2008) and Swyngedouw (2009), 
discuss the role of dissensus in a democracy and suggest an alternative radical democracy that 
places the political moment or dissensus at the heart of creating the necessary change in a 
political-ecological process. “Democratic politics is therefore, always disruptive and 
transformative” (Swyngedouw, 2009, 607). Thus according to Swyngedouw (2010), climate 
change requires a systemic shift that can only be addressed through “properly” political moments 
and radical change which disrupt the consensual condition. The Occupy COP17 action is an 
example of a “properly” political moment, where the United Nations process was disrupted in 
order to highlight the issues that the process failed to address. As an action, it not only 
momentarily halted the negotiations process, but provided an opportunity to raise the voices of 
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the grassroots who are otherwise largely ignored within the negotiations, such as youth, 
indigenous peoples and those from the Global South.  
This study utilises post-political consensus approach to climate change discourse because it has 
been used to portray the influence of neoliberal ideology on governance and describes conditions 
where opportunities for the “properly” political have been subverted. As an approach, the post-
political carbon consensus recognises the role of power structures in creating consensus and 
removing or marginalising dissenters. This is a particularly relevant area of literature to refer to 
because it identifies the power structures inherent within climate change discourse, which is 
appropriate given this study’s use of a Foucaldian discourse analysis, which looks at the role of 
power through language.  
1.3 The urgency of climate change 
It is clear that multiple discourses and contexts influence how climate change is approached as 
an issue. This has contributed to the inherent complexity faced when addressing climate change. 
Climate change is often referred to as a “wicked” problem due to its multiple causal factors and 
the indistinguishable boundaries of cause and effect (Ritchey, 2005). It affects social and 
environmental contexts differently, and has had multiple solutions posed in different contexts 
involving diverse actors. Social disagreement and uncertainty around the outcomes and solutions 
further alter the ability of stakeholders to address the problem (FitzGibbon & Mensah, 2012). 
“Wicked” problems are “ill-defined, ambiguous and associated with strong moral, political and 
professional issues” (Ritchey, 2005, 1). In part due to the complexity of the issue, the 
negotiations have failed to produce a global, legally-binding agreement with scientifically 
adequate emissions reductions targets
2 
(Banjeree, 2012). Many countries are beginning to feel 
the impacts of climate change through extreme weather in their communities As a result, many 
                                                             
2
 “It is beyond dispute that there have been no global reductions, and estimates tend towards there having been a 
40% increase in emissions since 1990, the year selected as a baseline for reductions under the Protocol. Climate 
change negotiations have never fixed a global emissions reduction target that would yield a tolerably mitigated rise 
in global temperatures...Nevertheless, this trajectory of emissions obviously cannot meet any of the targets that 




governments, businesses and non-government organisations are choosing to act through local 
and national level legislation. 
1.4 ‘Third way’ politics 
One approach to addressing climate change adopted by many governments involves the 
application of Giddens’ ‘third way’ politics theory. Anthony Giddens, a sociologist, went on to 
be influential in putting his theory into practise. ‘Third way’ politics has been a widely adopted 
approach across the world by governments led by Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and 
Helen Clark. This theory was based around the idea that neoliberal ideals should be incorporated 
into governance and policy in order to facilitate economic growth and entrench neoliberalism 
into societal norms (Giddens, 1998). Giddens’ ‘third way’ politics forms a key example of the 
way neoliberal theory has been put into practise. This is particularly pertinent to this study as it is 
applicable to the process of neoliberalisation in Aotearoa New Zealand described in Chapter 3.  
As a state-led method, ‘third way’ politics actively includes business and civil society in 
reaching collective solutions on issues such as climate change. Giddens (2009) refers to this as a 
“political and economic convergence”. Further, the ‘third way’ political approach suggests that 
“political parties should go beyond the rhetoric of ‘left’ and ‘right’ on the issue of climate 
change” (Dabhi, 2012, 247). Hence, as an approach, it supports the perpetuation of neoliberal 
discourse and would contribute to the formation of a post-political carbon consensus. ‘Third 
way’ politics actively avoids conflict and dissensus.  
According to commentator Dhabi (2012, 242-243), ‘third way’ politics is “an attempt to create a 
political framework that addresses the concerns of social justice and equality embedded in an 
economic system based on the logic of free market” (Dhabi, 2012, 242-243). Hence, this study 
focuses on where the theories of ‘third way’ politics and the post-political carbon consensus 
intersect and the influence this may have on activist engagement with politics.  
Unlike ‘third way’ politics, both addressing climate change at the root causes and contesting the 
use of capitalist and neoliberal inspired solutions is important to advocates of climate justice. 
The concept of climate justice will provide a key framework in this study because it 
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demonstrates the active pursuit of the “properly” political and can provide examples of how 
activists are addressing the root causes of climate change through their actions.  
1.5 Climate justice 
Climate justice advocates work towards solutions to climate change that are not technocratic or 
managerial in nature. The movement for climate justice has grown out of dissatisfaction with the 
solutions being offered by the United Nations and at state level, such as the Kyoto Protocol, 
described in Chapter 2. Climate justice also came out of conflict between organisations over the 
support that some ‘mainstream’ non-governmental organisations were giving to these solutions. 
Climate justice activists identified a need to bring together other justice and climate change 
related struggles around the world.  
Climate justice is described by Bond (2010b) as a bringing together of the ‘global justice 
movement’ with radical environmentalism. The global justice movement stemmed from the 
Zapatista solidarity network in the 1990s which was one of the first to make use of the internet to 
encourage global support for a local struggle. This meant that while at the same time highlighting 
similar struggles globally, movements could draw attention to the impact of the ideology that 
underlies the struggles at these localities. Global justice movements embody the principles of 
social and environmental justice which include “economic equity, cultural liberation, and the 
political participation of people of colour at all levels of decision making” (Dawson, 2010, 326). 
The climate justice movement transfers these principles to the climate change issue. Primarily, 
climate justice highlighted the concept of historical responsibility involves the idea that climate 
change was caused by industrialised countries but the world’s poor will bear the cost and feel the 
impacts most severely. As Dawson (2010, 508) notes “Climate justice seeks to transform the 
relationship between society and the climate crisis…politicising divides between the 
beneficiaries of ecological degradation and those who bear its costs, merging ecological and 
social issues.”  
Climate justice provides a key example of a movement building around an understanding of what 
Rancière, Žižek and Swyngedouw refer to as the “properly” political. Climate justice activists 
contest solutions to climate change that commodify carbon and create “green” business 
opportunities to perpetuate the economic, political and social status quo. Such solutions support 
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capitalism through what Harvey (2003) calls “accumulation by dispossession” which implies the 
accumulation of public resources, wealth and therefore power in the hands of an elite few. 
Accumulation by dispossession has been sustained by neoliberalism, for instance through the 
privatisation of air and water. Climate justice presents “a complex challenge to capitalism’s 
internal logic of commodification and neoliberal policy expansion” as a way of addressing 
climate change (Bond, 2010a, 22). 
According to the climate justice approach, solutions to climate change must address the root 
causes of climate change: unequal power relations and the economic and social systems that 
support these. In an attempt to move the climate change conversation away from global and state 
led solutions, empowerment and solidarity with communities on the frontlines of climate change 
became the focus for groups and communities around the world (Chatterton et al, 2012). The 
climate justice approach is particularly important to this study as it describes how “properly” 
political moments and radical action can be used to address the root causes of climate change.  
1.6 Aotearoa New Zealand context and the neoliberal generation 
As noted earlier, youth have been central to recent politicised action globally that has sought to 
disrupt dominant power relations and imagine alternative futures. It was both the observation of 
these movements emerging around the world, the inspiration of Zapatista solidarity and my first 
hand experience of the failure of the United Nations processes that has strengthened a personal 
understanding for the important role that grassroots radical activism plays in social change.  
This study will explore how radical political action on climate change is perceived by what Nairn 
et al (2012) refers to as the neoliberal generation of Aotearoa New Zealand. This is a generation 
who have grown up under the strong influence of neoliberalism and for the purposes of this 
study, is what defines “youth”. This research addresses the need to explore the future of youth-
led radical activism on climate change, in light of recent increases in youth-led radical activism 
around the world and the perceived influence of neoliberalism on both the lives of youth and 
climate change.  
This research focuses specifically on youth involved in action on climate change. Notably, youth 
are acting for climate justice around the world, with movements growing noticeably in Canada 
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and the United States around opposition to fossil fuel extraction projects, such as the Keystone 
XL tar sands pipeline (Fossil Free Canada, 2013). In general, youth are active across a variety of 
climate change action tactics (youthclimate.org, 2012). With vested interest in their future well-
being and the tradition of student activism, ever growing numbers of youth are choosing to take 
action on climate change across the world. This is also evident in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
However, climate justice organisations, particularly those that are youth driven or with large 
numbers of youth members, anecdotally appear to be few and far between.  
An Aotearoa New Zealand context to this study is very important because it offers an 
opportunity to explore what the further impacts of neoliberalism might be on youth activists, 
expanding on research by Hayward (2012) around children and environmental citizenship. 
Hayward (2012) looks at the impacts of neoliberalism on environmental education and children’s 
perceptions of citizenship in Aotearoa New Zealand. She finds that children are most often 
educated to be consumer-citizens but there are opportunities for children to explore issues of 
justice and equality in relation to environmental issues.  
1.7 Research Objectives and contribution to the literature 
Tactics taken within action on climate change are as diverse as the movement itself. Actions are 
roughly categorised in this study as institutional or radical. This categorisation has been used 
despite recognition of the complexity and depth of each action or tactic that is used, what it 
might represent and what it may aim to achieve. Often what a tactic or action intends to achieve 
may be represented by both categories. The term institutional is used to describe actions that 
engage with formal participation pathways, engagement with matters of technical or managerial 
relevance, such as changes to policy. Radical actions are often in the form of non-violent direct 
actions such as blockades or occupations and aim to “politicise” climate change, create conflict 
and address the issue by its root causes by challenging power structures.  
This research explores the relevance of both institutional and radical actions to youth activists 
taking action on climate change, particularly radical action. As this research is based in Aotearoa 
New Zealand, the influence of neoliberalism will be a particular focus to this research. Aotearoa 
New Zealand underwent one of the most rapid and severe neoliberalising processes in the world.  
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Thus, my overall research objective is to: 
 Explore how members of Generation Zero perceive the climate change issue and the 
methods to addressing it, given the neoliberal context of Aotearoa New Zealand. 
To address this research objective the following questions are posed in relation to a case study of 
a youth action group Generation Zero (discussed further below). 
1. How do members of Generation Zero perceive the causes and solutions to climate change? 
2. How do members of Generation Zero perceive the roles of radical and institutional political 
action in solving climate change? 
3. Do the perceptions of members of Generation Zero reflect the arguments around the existence 
of a post-political carbon consensus? If, so what are the implications of these perceptions on 
future spaces for radical action? 
Hence, this research will explore how youth involved in Generation Zero perceive the causes and 
solutions of climate change and whether these perceptions support the existence of the post-
political carbon consensus. This will in turn help to build an understanding of the perceived role 
of radical activism and how this may affect future spaces for radical activism. This research will 
contribute to literature around the post-political carbon consensus and offer insight into the role 
of activism in perpetuating, supporting and dissenting the post-political condition. Further, it will 
contribute a perspective that is unique to Aotearoa New Zealand, given the rapid and entrenched 
nature of neoliberalism in this country. By highlighting the particular role of youth activists, this 
study compliments research conducted by Hayward (2012) around the role of children as 
environmentally-aware citizens in a neoliberal context. Further, this study contributes to the large 
body of literature surrounding the influences that neoliberalism has had on wider society.  
1.7.1 Case study: Generation Zero 
Members of Generation Zero’s Wellington group were chosen as the case study for this research. 
Generation Zero is a group consisting of entirely young people actively working to address 
climate change in Aoteaora New Zealand. Generation Zero has hundreds of volunteers, members 
and supporters around the country, based mostly out of universities. Generation Zero aims to 
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enact political change through inclusive and non-radical means. Members organise speaker 
events with climate change experts, leadership trainings to upskill fellow members, witty and 
slightly obscure stunts such as a “Funeral for Business As Usual” and “Operation Exposure.” 
Generation Zero’s facebook page describes the organisation as: 
A movement of young New Zealanders uniting to ensure our future well-being is not 
undermined by political decisions made today on climate change and fossil fuel policies. 
We are the generation that must oversee the transformation to a zero carbon world 
(Generation Zero, 2012a).  
Generation Zero focuses on positive, solutions-based campaigning (Generation, Zero, n.d). A 
non-partisan organisation, Generation Zero aims for broad based political support for policies 
that reduce New Zealand’s carbon emissions (Generation Zero, n.d). Generation Zero’s website 
states that: 
The means to solve the climate and energy crises largely already exist. We cannot afford 
to wait for some magical techno fix, and nor do we need to. The barriers to taking action 
today are not technical. What is lacking is a clear sense of direction and urgency towards 
a zero carbon future, and the political will to implement the changes that are desperately 
needed. The first step towards solving the problem is for our society and our political 
parties to acknowledge what is required to deliver us hope for a positive future: a credible 
climate plan with responsible targets, and a carbon pricing scheme that sees today’s bills 
being paid today. Generation Zero will campaign hard to see that our political parties face 
up to this reality (Generation Zero, n.d). 
Generation Zero may represent how activist groups can play a part in supporting and 
perpetuating part of the post-political carbon consensus. The solutions to climate change which 
Generation Zero work on are largely based on policy changes and thus support existing 
structures of the nation state. Generation Zero’s decision to approach climate change in this way 
(whether deliberate or subconscious) and the perspectives on climate change that have influenced 
this form the basis of this research.  Generation Zero, as a case study group represents a group 
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within the wider ecosystem of organisations and communities acting on climate change. It may 
also shed light on how citizens in general view their role within a democracy. 
In total, nine members of Generation Zero were interviewed for this research. Research 
participants were all based in Wellington in order to minimise the costs of this research. 
Wellington is also my hometown and I am very familiar with the activist territory here. I also 
consider many of my research participants as part of my community, thus it provides a logical 
environment to centre my research. However, it is recognised that there are issues that may arise 
as a result of these close connections. These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
This research focuses solely on members of Generation Zero in order to gain an in-depth and 
comprehensive understanding of the perspectives of each individual and how this has translated 
into the work that the group does as a whole. Through conducting semi-structured interviews, 
this research aims to highlight diversity and complexity in these perspectives. Participants were 
initially asked to share their perspectives on the climate change issue and what they believed to 
be the causes and the solutions to the problem. Each participant then discussed their views 
around the role of different forms of political action on climate change, focusing in particular on 
radical political action. Overall, the interview process intended to gain an understanding of what 
young people involved with Generation Zero feel to the most effective or necessary ways of 
acting on climate change. A discourse analysis was conducted of the statements made by 
members of Generation Zero.  
1.8 Thesis structure 
This thesis will address the three aforementioned research questions through a discourse analysis 
of statements made by members of Generation Zero during semi-structured interviews. The 
introductory chapter has provided an outline of the thesis context and the motivations behind the 
research. Chapter 2 will then provide an overview of the literature surrounding the post-political 
carbon consensus, ‘third way’ politics and the climate justice approach to climate change. 
Chapter 3 will present an overview of the context of this research- current and past activism in 
Aotearoa New Zealand and overseas, as well as the impact of neoliberalism on this current 
generation of youth. Chapter 4 will describe the post-structuralist approach taken for this 
research and qualitative methods used to collect data and analyse findings. A post-structuralist 
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approach takes into consideration language choice and how this shapes both knowledge and 
society.   
The subsequent analysis chapters 5 and 6 will address research questions 1,2 and 3 respectively, 
using Foucaldian discourse analysis to consider meanings and representations constituted 
through Generation Zero’s website, facebook page and press releases. Chapter 5 will discuss 
how Generation Zero members perceive the causes of climate change and how these translate 
into the solutions needed given the impact of neoliberal discourse. Chapter 6 explores how 
perceived causes and solutions influence the action taken on climate change by members of 
Generation Zero and the propensity for young people to engage in radical forms of political 
action. Research participants’ desire to “mainstream” action on climate change will also be 
discussed in the context of the post-political carbon consensus. The final chapter will conclude 
by tying together findings from each chapter and providing recommendations for future study. 
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Chapter 2: A post political carbon consensus? 
2.1 Introduction 
Shell plays a more eco-sensitive tune, eco-activists of various political or ideological 
stripes and colours engage in direct action in the name of saving the planet, New Age 
post-materialists join the chorus that laments the irreversible decline of ecological 
amenities, eminent scientists enter the public domain to warn of pending ecological 
catastrophe, politicians try to outmanoeuvre each other in brandishing the ecological 
banner, and a wide range of policy initiatives and practices, performed under the motif of 
‘sustainability,’ are discussed, conceived and implemented at all geographical scales 
(Swyngedouw, 2010, 216).  
This statement highlights the diversity of actors involved in climate change, from scientists to 
politicians to a number of sectors of civil society. Swyngedouw (2010) also notes the irony of 
Shell, a major petroleum corporation, being attentive to “eco” concerns, given the role that they 
have played in creating climate change and a raft of other environmental issues. When it comes 
to addressing climate change, a multitude of discourses and opinions exist. For some, addressing 
climate change provides an opportunity to maintain or enhance the status quo, for others it is an 
opportunity to create revolutionary change that will shake the existing capitalist system at its 
foundations. Climate change is both as a symptom and as a cause of many social ills and as such 
is both urgent and complex. This research brings together a diverse literature situating climate 
change within some of these wider discourses of political theories and geographies of activism.  
Climate change, purportedly the biggest environmental and social justice issue of our time, is 
inherently political and an ever imminent threat for many, especially in the Global South. It is 
being addressed nationally and internationally through policy and United Nations governance 
mechanisms. Such mechanisms are heavily influenced by neoliberal globalisation (Bond & 
Dorsey, 2010; Bond, 2011e; Chatterton et al, 2012). For instance, the Kyoto Protocol guides 
international, national and local level climate change policy in a number of countries and is 
based around market mechanisms for the trading of carbon dioxide as a commodity (Bond, 
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2011e). The proliferation of the use of market mechanisms and the privatisation of CO2 has 
created discontent among dissenters of neoliberal globalisation. From this discontent came the 
concept of “climate justice” and a set of principles which underpin action on climate change 
taken by communities and organisations around the world (Bond, 2010; Bond, 2011e; Bond & 
Dorsey, 2010; Chatterton et al, 2012). Globally young people are adopting the concept of 
“climate justice” and a diversity of other approaches to climate change. As a consequence of 
youth taking action there has been a recent flurry of social movements with youth at their core, 
including the Arab Spring, the Occupy movement and student movements.  
The Kyoto Protocol and the related carbon market/pricing mechanisms have influenced young 
people’s perceptions of action. This research will explore the relevance of Swyngedouw’s post-
political carbon consensus to youth taking political action on climate change. It is argued that the 
consensual condition removes opportunities for dissent to the economic and social systems that 
have created the consensus. Thus it is important to explore not only the nature of the condition, 
but also what influence such a condition may have on producing future youth-led spaces of 
dissent.   
  
This chapter will explore the literature and theory that argues that there has been a de-
politicisation of climate change and a post-political carbon consensus. Through highlighting the 
influence of neoliberalism and ‘third way’ politics, this literature review will argue that globally 
a post-political carbon consensus does exist. Further, this chapter will explore the influence of 
the consensual condition on spaces for dissent and contestation of current social and economic 
systems. These spaces of dissent are referred to by Rancière (2001), Mouffe (2005) and others as 
the “properly” political.  
2.2 De-politicisation  
Erik Swyngedouw has referred extensively to the “post-political carbon consensus” which 
applies the ideas of radical democracy to climate change (Swyngedouw, 2007). Rancière, 
Mouffe, Žižek and other political theorists have contributed to the radical democracy literature 
which describes the “properly” political as a space of conflict and dissent which most 
importantly realises the opportunity for alternative imaginaries. It has been recognised that the 
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post-political consensus undermines these opportunities for dissent by shifting consensus to the 
forefront of democracy (Swyngedouw, 2010). Swyngedouw (2010)’s post-political carbon 
consensus stems from the idea that neoliberal, technical and governance approaches to climate 
change have been combined to create consensus on action on climate change amongst various 
actors including government, business, the media, scientists and others. How the consensual 
condition is said to undermine the “properly” political will be explained in the remainder of this 
chapter.  
Swyngedouw’s theory of the post-political carbon consensus forms a key framework used 
throughout this thesis as it provides a context around which to explore the role of radical action 
on climate change, given Swyngedouw’s explicit assumption of the role of consensus in 
removing opportunities for radical action on climate change. Swyngedouw (2010) and Chatterton 
et al (2012) suggest that a post-political or de-politicised framing of climate change has been 
consolidated by the role of policy and democratic politics on addressing climate change. General 
environmental problems, as noted by McCarthy & Prudham (2004), Castree (2008) and Purcell 
(2009), are increasingly being solved through market-based mechanisms and technocratic 
solutions, creating what Swyngedouw refers to as a consensus-based politics. A consensus-based 
politics is heavily influenced by Giddens’ ‘third way’ approach to politics. ‘Third way’ politics 
seeks to create a “centre” (that is, neither left nor right) politics that incorporates neoliberalism as 
a strong influence on policy making (explored further in Section 2.3).  
Purcell (2009) also discussed the role of neoliberalism in democracy and argued that democracy 
is increasingly being used to support neoliberalism and this is resulting in consensus-based 
politics. According to Purcell (2009, 141), the influence of neoliberal doctrine has removed 
opportunities to “challenge existing relations of power.” Neoliberalism has become a dominant 
hegemony that “has increasingly shaped state policy to benefit capital rather than citizens” 
(Purcell, 2009, 141), which not only produces policies that perpetuate inequalities but entrenches 
ideology that places capital at the fore. These norms and ideals will be discussed further in 
Chapter 3. According to Purcell (2009), neoliberalism has contributed to a consensual politics by 
co-opting “proper” politics into neoliberal ideology and therefore closing out the possibility of 
fewer moments of dissent. Despite this, Purcell (2009, 144) highlights that even though 
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neoliberalism is a dominating discourse it “is not invincible... counter-projects are possible; 
indeed they are inevitable.” 
A lack of dissent due to neoliberal hegemony is one contributor to a consensus-based politics. 
According to Swyngedouw (2010), consensus around the need for action on environmental 
issues such as climate change also stems from a scientific consensus. For example, climate 
change is framed by Swyngedouw (2010) as a global issue with the legitimisation of scientific 
consensus, thus requiring political action. Scientific consensus has formed around the need to 
address excess greenhouse gas emissions, largely due to the work of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change. The scientific consensus is widely accepted as being politically neutral and 
thus free of the bias of the political left or right. As Swyngedouw (2010, 217) assumes it is 
generally undisputed that:  
 
the changing atmospheric composition, marked by increasing levels of CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, is largely caused by anthropogenic activity, 
primarily (although not exclusively) as a result of the burning of fossilized or captured 
CO2 (in the form of oil, gas, coal, wood) and the disappearance of CO2 sinks and their 
associated capture processes (through deforestation for example).  
 
It is generally accepted that if these reductions are not achieved then disaster is imminent 
(Swyngedouw & Heynen, 2003). With consensual scientific certainty around the threat to human 
well-being, the issue becomes one of concern across the political spectrum and “scientific 
expertise becomes the foundation and guarantee for properly constituted politics/ policies” 
(Swyngedouw, 2010, 217). In other words, scientific consensus through use of expert knowledge 
has become the basis and justification for taking consensual political action on environmental 
issues, such as climate change.  
 
Rancière (1998) suggests consensus-based politics is comprised of “policing”, “policy making” 
and the reduction of such activities to a particular “mode of governing” (Swyngedouw, 2009, 
605). “A mode of governing” implies that issues are addressed through pre-determined 
governance mechanisms leaving no space for alternative imaginaries. Rancière (2001, 9) 
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describes policy as being an aspect of “the police”: “The police is not a social function but a 
symbolic constitution of the social. The essence of the police is neither repression nor even 
control over the living. Its essence is a certain manner of partitioning the sensible.” The police 
order described by Rancière is a partitioning of the sensible, or the hierarchical ordering and 
categorisation of social activities. The role of the “properly” political challenges this hierarchy 
and disrupts the social order. 
As components of the police order, Swyngedouw (2010) notes that the dominant approach to 
environmental issues appears to be the use of management and accounting tools. Swyngedouw 
(2010, 225) refers to these as “techno-managerial planning, expert management and 
administration.” For example, in Aotearoa New Zealand the Resource Management Act 1991 
forms the major piece of environmental legislation that is used to manage the environment 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2013) through land, air and water quality policy. The Resource 
Management Act relies on local government officers for the main mechanisms to regulate 
resource use. The use of technological or managerial techniques is seen as politically neutral and 
thus reduces opportunities for dissent. It is grounded in dominant rational discourses of 
environmental management, science, planning and economic development. Furthermore, the 
recognition of the role that these tools play in perpetuating an economic and political status quo 
and the hierarchical social order may make them tools of the post-political condition.  
 
A further tool of the post political condition is arguably Giddens’ (1998, 2000) ‘third way’ 
politics. According to Swyngedouw (2007, 30) he has “been a key intellectual interlocutor of this 
post-political consensus.” Giddens’ ‘third way’ politics has been influential both in theory and 
practice through the incorporation of neoliberalism into governance and policy. The ‘third way’ 
political approach thus provides a basis to the argument for a consensual condition. A consensual 
condition addresses climate change as an issue of excess emissions through co-operation 
between the nation state, business and civil society. The connections between the ‘third way’ 
politics and de-politicisation of climate change will be discussed in the following Section 2.3. 
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2.3 ‘Third way’ politics 
Anthony Giddens coined the term ‘third way’ politics in order to describe the state of social 
democracy in the 1990s. As a sociologist, he was highly influential and his theories went on to 
shape governments globally, including Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and Helen Clark’s respective 
governments (Dabhi, 2012). Through ‘third way’ politics Giddens (1998) endorsed the 
incorporation of neoliberal ideals into governance and policy. He also theorised that a merging of 
left and right politics into a progressive centre politics was important to deal with social and 
environmental issues and to encourage economic growth. 
‘Third way’ politics were developed to meet the needs of a globalising world (Giddens, 2008).  
‘Third way’ political discourse accepts the inevitability of neoliberalism and aims to fit social or 
“left-of-centre” goals of inclusion and equality into economic growth models (Dabhi, 2012). 
Further, both free market growth logic and government intervention have an equally strong role 
in ‘third way’ politics and technocratic solutions, though short term and incomplete solutions, are 
recognised (Dabhi, 2012).   
 
Sustainable development is also an important aspect of third way politics. The role of markets in 
protecting the environment is prominent (Dabhi, 2012). Giddens’ (1998) suggests that without 
government regulation and policy, environmental protection cannot happen but in the interests of 
a globalising world, where national borders are becoming ever blurred, this may be increasingly 
irrelevant. Thus, under Giddens’ conceptualisation markets and technological developments play 
an important part in maintaining “sustainable development” (Dabhi, 2012; Giddens, 1998; 
Swyngedouw, 2010). Dabhi (2012) critiques Giddens’ approach and notes that he does not 
question modernisation and economic growth in sustainable development, despite known 
criticisms (Dabhi, 2012).  
Giddens (2008) has written a series of recommendations on how governments should proceed on 
climate change policy, noting the importance of balancing state-led and market- based solutions 
to climate change. He considers the following four issues: 
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1. Management of risk: Giddens (2004) highlights the importance of managing of the long 
term risks of climate change and energy security. He also notes the importance of 
building consensus around the policies that are used to manage such risks.  
2. Long-term planning: Giddens (2008, 4) asks policy makers to consider how:  
market-orientated approaches [can] be balanced with state-centric ones in coping 
with vital issues of mitigation and adaptation, such as carbon pricing, the role of 
regulation, energy efficiency, transport and land use, the promotion of specific 
technological innovation by government, and lifestyle and behavioural changes 
3. The need for a political and public consensus for action on climate change: Giddens 
(2008, 4) challenges policy makers to create consensus around the need for policy to 
address climate change in the long term, given the “democratic penchant for partisanship 
and short-termism”.  
4. Social justice: For Giddens (2008) it is important that any climate change policies 
instigated address equity issues and do so in a way that ensures the costs of climate 
change are not worn by the world’s poor. He (2008, 4) asks: “What are the prospects of 
ensuring that western democracies can be persuaded to carry the economic and political 
burden of climate change instead of countries in the developing world?”  
 
Clearly in his recommendations, Giddens supports the use neoliberal solutions to climate change 
in a way that would strengthen and perpetuate the post-political carbon consensus. Particularly, 
through his perception of the need to address climate change as a long term issue, Giddens 
forecloses the need for conflict in favour of an overall consensus. Giddens advocates for climate 
change to be addressed not as a “‘left-right’ issue and [but rather] should thus transcend all forms 
of party politics.’” (Dabhi, 2012, 244). He terms this “political transcendence” (Dabhi, 2012).  
Further, Giddens had a strong influence in roll out neoliberalisation, or the introduction 
neoliberalism into policy and governance. Peck & Tickell (2002, 384) describe roll out 
neoliberalism as “the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, 
modes of governance, and regulatory relations. [Roll out neoliberalism] is this more recent 
pattern of institutional and regulatory restructuring.” For example, as a part of roll out 
neoliberalism in Aotearoa New Zealand Roger Douglas realised that “incentives to invest and 
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earn profits would require a lower tax burden, especially on companies. That would be achieved 
by cuts to government spending, streamlining of state sector administration, and selling state 
assets to repay debt” (Kelsey, 1993, 19). Further analysis of neoliberalism in Aotearoa New 
Zealand will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
As a key facilitator of the merging of policy and neoliberalism, Giddens’ theories, when applied 
to government restructuring, play an active role in the formation of what political theorists such 
as Žižek, Rancière and Mouffe and critical geographers such as Swyngedouw refer to as the 
post-political consensus. Hence, the work of Giddens is particularly important to this study. 
Giddens’ third way politics highlights the role of neoliberalism within a consensual politics. 
Further, it  as supports the case for the existence of the post-political consensus due to the 
influence that Giddens’ work has had in politics globally, particularly in the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Giddens’ third way politics has been notably influential to social 
democratic parties. According to Peck & Tickell (2002, 384) this roll out represents “the 
attainment of a more aggressive/proactive form of contemporary neoliberalization” (Peck & 
Tickell, 2002, 384). 
 
Further, the role of the state in Giddens’ ‘third way’ politics is to act as a ‘top-down agency’ that 
ensures all groups in society work together and incorporate both business interests and formal 
civil society participation such as consultation and voting processes. Giddens’ (2008) assumes 
that the state will have the means and methods to address climate change through regulating CO2 
and meeting the needs of all its stakeholders including business and civil society equally. 
However, Giddens (1998) also suggests there is an increased possibility for NGOs, social 
movements and other members of civil society to play an important role within policy-making 
beyond voting. He names this role of civil society a ‘sub-politics’ and sees it as relegated to a 
sphere separate from policy-making. He notes that civil society can perform functions that 
complement government policy making, but not entirely replace it.  
Authors such as Dabhi (2012) have highlighted critiques of Giddens’ third way politics’ 
approach to addressing climate change. Many of these critiques reflect Swyngedouw’s concerns 
around consensual politics. According to Dabhi (2012), Giddens’ ‘third’ way politics does not 
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identify a role for radical action or the “properly” political within democracy, particularly 
through his advocacy of a centre politics. This fails to recognise the role of the politics of the left 
on issues of social equality in the current day: 
If we consider that the politics of the ‘left’ is a politics of emancipation – one 
that tries to bring about social equality – then this ideology of ‘left-right’ is even more apt 
today where we are seeing massive protests around the world against corporate greed in 
the form of, for example, the Occupy movement (Dabhi, 2012, 245) 
 
Dabhi (2012) also points out the need to address the social, economic and political structural 
causes of climate change, as the ‘third way’ seems to ignore these structural problems” (Dabhi, 
2012, 247). Accordingly, Giddens’ is seen to address climate change as a standalone issue of 
greenhouse gas emissions in order to avoid political conflict or left-right politics. Further, Dabhi 
(2012) suggests that Giddens does not recognise the role that power relations may have between 
“state, businesses and civil society... that will eventually translate into public and economic 
policies” (Dabhi, 2012, 246). 
 
This section has demonstrated how Giddens’ ‘third way’ politics has been applied to climate 
change. It is clear that ‘third way’ politics is an approach that plays a significant role in the 
formation of what Swyngedouw, Žižek, Mouffe and others refer to as a post-political consensus. 
Gidden’s influential theory and work shall form a key focus of this research as it is a current and 
widely adopted approach both in theory and practise that highlights how neoliberalism has 
become a part of policy making. Giddens has also made recommendations for national level 
climate change policy makers that highlight the role of neoliberal market mechanisms in 
addressing the issue. Due to the proliferation of Giddens’ theory into practise it is pertinent to 
this study which aims to explore the impacts that some of Giddens’ ideas may have had on 
creating a post-political carbon consensus and as a result reducing dissent amongst youth 
activists of the neoliberal generation. The components of the post-political carbon consensus will 
be explored in the following section. 
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2.4 Post-political carbon consensus 
A post-political condition, as referred to in Section 2.2, is described by Mouffe (2005) and 
Swyngedouw (2007) as an approach that stifles the “properly” political and restricts 
opportunities for dissent. Swyngedouw (2007, 24) suggests “postpolitics rejects ideological 
divisions... the postpolitical condition is one in which consensus has been built around the 
inevitability of neoliberal capitalism as a moral foundation.” In other words, any social or 
environmental change that occurs within the post-political condition will be restricted to the 
confines of the existing social and economic systems. In the case of climate change, Bond 
(2010a & 2011b) highlights that most political action being taken on climate change maintains a 
social and economic status quo and maintains the dominance of neoliberal discourse. The Kyoto 
Protocol provides a key example of this (Chatterton et al, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2010). 
 The Kyoto Protocol has become a dominant mechanism for addressing climate change under 
mainstream discourse. Under the Kyoto Protocol countries are obligated to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions to below 1990 levels (Sharife, 2009). The Kyoto Protocol relies upon mechanisms 
such as offsetting schemes and carbon prices to regulate emitter activities. Swyngedouw (2010, 
227) refers to the Kyoto Protocol as replacing “political institutions of government” with a 
“public-private” body, where market mechanisms have been legitimated through policy. As a 
result carbon dioxide has become a commodity that enters the private sphere of markets. Hence, 
the Kyoto Protocol neoliberalises governance and the institutions that control and govern the 
Kyoto Protocol are complex and technomanagerial (Swyngedouw, 2010).  
With the role of government within the Kyoto Protocol to manage the relationship between 
markets and policy, Žižek (2002, 303) argues that government becomes “deprived of its proper 
political dimension.” To be deprived of a “properly” political function assumes that the Kyoto 
Protocol acts to perpetuate Swyngedouw’s concept of a consensual condition by privileging and 
legitimising the commodification of CO2.  In this view, he argues climate change has become an 
issue of markets, capital exchange and a:  
complex governance regime organized around a set of technologies of governance that 
revolve around reflexive risk-calculation, self-assessment, interest-negotiation and 
intermediation, accountancy rules and accountancy-based disciplining, detailed 
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quantification and benchmarking of performance (Swyngedouw, 2010, 220) 
 
General consensual acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol as the primary means of addressing climate 
change, coupled with the scientific consensus that has catalysed the need to address climate 
change as an issue solely of greenhouse gas emissions, has resulted in the reduction of spaces for 
dissent on contestation of theses economic systems. Although it should be acknowledged that a 
number of countries no longer participate within the Kyoto Protocol, including Aotearoa New 
Zealand, it is likely that any successor will be entrenched in a similar system.  
 
Swyngedouw (2010) refers to the concept of the “fetishization of CO2” and role it has played in 
the apocalyptic imaginaries that have been shaped around a global warming scenario.  Through 
the fetishization of CO2, CO2 is presented as the “antagonist” that can be managed, manipulated 
and controlled through neoliberalised policy measures which count CO2 as a commodity 
(Chatterton et al, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2010).  Fundamentally, commodified CO2 becomes:  
The fetishized stand-in for the totality of climate change fatalities and, therefore, it 
suffices to reverse atmospheric CO2 build up to a negotiated idealized point in history, to 
return to climatic status quo ex-ante. An extraordinary techno-managerial apparatus is 
under way, ranging from new eco-technologies of a variety of kinds to unruly complex 
managerial and institutional configurations, with a view to producing a socio-ecological 
fix to make sure nothing really changes (Swyngedouw, 2010, 222). 
For political theorists and philosophers such as Rancière, Mouffe, and Žižek, the post-political 
condition does not address social and environmental issues adequately. This is because the 
“carbon consensus” suppresses opportunities to shift the social and economic systems which 
have, according to these theorists, resulted in historical injustices, inequalities, and unequal 
power distributions (Swyngedouw, 2010; Žižek, 2008).  
This research will argue for the existence of a post-political carbon consensus. There is 
compelling evidence in how neoliberalism solidifies a post-political carbon consensus and 
influences the solutions to climate change. Further, the urgency and seriousness of climate 
change has seemingly created an opportunity for innovative new forms of capital accumulation, 
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with businesses around the world investing in biofuels, biochar and other technological solutions 
(Swyngedouw, 2010).   
McCarthy (2013, 19) disputes the theory of the post-political carbon consensus, by suggesting it 
is a “potentially analytically flat, totalizing, and inadequate” framing. By referring to climate 
politics in the United States, McCarthy suggests that a post-political carbon consensus is not as 
rigid and entrenched as theorists claim. For example, McCarthy (2013, 23) states “they [US 
politics] do not compartmentalize problems for management, instead seeing virtually every 
specific issue-e.g., light bulb standards- as a significant front in all-encompassing struggle over 
the relationship between state and subject.” McCarthy (2013, 12) questions “whether 
contemporary environmental politics are really so lacking in antagonism, alternative visions, and 
other elements of ‘‘proper’’ politics as many analysts of the post-political condition claim.” 
Here, McCarthy argues that theorists such as Swyngedouw undermine the possibilities for 
activism that contests or opposes neoliberal globalisation and similar economic structures. 
McCarthy (2013) also notes the difficulties in achieving a “properly” political moment as it is 
impossible to detach oneself from the economic and social systems of which activism is 
embedded, stating “we do such political activism a great disservice by contending that it 
somehow does not count as ‘‘proper’’ politics, or that it is inevitably co-opted or complicit in the 
reproduction of the status quo” (McCarthy, 2013, 24).  
 
McCarthy (2013) provides examples of moments where activists have challenged economic and 
social systems such as neoliberal globalisation, for instance the Occupy COP17 protest that was 
referred to at the beginning of Chapter 1. Evidently, McCarthy (2013) substantiates the idea that 
a post-political condition is not as steadfast and entrenched as Swyngedouw has theorised. 
McCarthy cautions against the widespread application of Swyngedouw’s concept of a post-
political carbon consensus. He urges for “more modest and consciously situated claims regarding 
the state of contemporary ‘‘politics’’ writ large” (McCarthy, 2013, 23). McCarthy’s caution is 
important to this research because it takes into consideration the possibilities for future spaces of 
dissent and does not assume that the post-political condition is absolute and certain for eternity.  
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2.4.1 Consensus and conflict 
The antagonism and fetishization of CO2 is problematic as it removes conflict that theorists such 
as Rancière, Žižek and Swyngedouw perceive as necessary for a “proper” democratic politics. 
Rancière (2001, 11) suggests that “a demonstration is political not because it takes place on a 
specific locale and bears upon a particular object but rather because its form is that of a clash 
between two partitions of the sensible.” Thus it is the presence of the conflict that creates the 
politics and realises opportunities for alternative social and economic futures.  
 Politicisation is the term used by Swyngedouw (2007) to describe the process of entering 
politics. He does not mean the politics of governments, but rather refers to politicisation as when 
an issue, such as climate change, becomes recognised as “inescapably interconnected with a 
multiplicity of global forces from which it is impossible to escape...” (Swyngedouw, 2007, 30). 
In other words, to truly address the root causes of climate change one must contest and alter the 
forces that are creating climate change at its very roots. In contrast, the post-political consensus 
is defined by Swyngedouw (2007, 26) as a lack of “radical dissent, critique, and fundamental 
conflict.” Ideally, in the “properly” political, conflict creates an alternative trajectory for the 
future devoid of systemic injustices (Swyngedouw, 2007).  
It is theorised that the consensus systematically and purposefully marginalises opportunities for 
disruption or dissent (Purcell, 2009; Swynegdouw, 2009). For example, democratic involvement 
may be used to quell conflict through offering a means of participation (Purcell, 2009; Walters, 
2004). But this form of participation is constrained and for non-elites and tends to be reduced to 
a debate of technicalities within governing institutions, accountancy or technology 
(Swynegdouw, 2009; 2010). For Swyngedouw (2009, 609), this “announces the end of politics, 
annuls dissent from the consultative spaces of policy making and evacuates the properly political 
from the public space.”  
Swyngedouw (2009, 615) also considers that under a post-political condition, protests and other 
expressions of resistance can be co-opted into deliberate forms of participation with 
institutionalised outcomes or "relegated to a domain outside the consensual postdemocratic 
arrangement." In other words, protest can either be replaced with institutionally legitimated 
participatory measures, such as consultations, or they are considered illegitimate and therefore 
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ignored. Similarly, Purcell (2009, 141) notes that “neoliberalism seeks actively to co-opt and 
incorporate democratic resistance. Both liberal and deliberative forms of democracy are being 
enlisted to support the neoliberal project.”  Purcell (2009, 143) suggests that that the hegemonic, 
universal nature of neoliberalism that has resulted in this co-option and that the “ongoing 
struggle to maintain neoliberalism’s dominance” has meant that resistance is actively 
discouraged.  
Swyngedouw (2009, 615) refers to Cooke and Kothari’s (2001) “tyranny of participation” which 
means that people:  
 
become either instituted through public–private stakeholder participatory forms of 
governance, succumbing to the ‘tyranny of participation’... or are radically marginalized 
and framed as ‘radicals’ or ‘fundamentalist’ and, thereby, relegated to a domain outside 
the consensual postdemocratic arrangement. 
 
 This propensity for relegation is what makes the “properly” political so rare, as opportunities for 
dissent are actively ignored and discouraged.  
2.5 The “properly” political and neoliberalism 
McCarthy & Prudham (2004, 278) note the role of environmentalism in resisting neoliberalism, 
stating that environmental concerns have been “the most passionately articulated and effective 
political sources of response and resistance to neoliberal projects.” The authors refer to the 
impact that neoliberalism has had on creating some yet worsening other environmental and 
resource concerns. Simultaneously, through the proliferation and entrenchment of neoliberalism, 
McCarthy & Prudham (2004, 279) highlight that: 
 
Many environmentalists have adopted elements of neoliberal ideology and discourse, 
reflecting and reinforcing neoliberal hegemony. ‘‘Free-market’’ environmentalism, once 
an oxymoron, has proliferated since the Reagan-Thatcher years, in forms such as 
tradeable emission permits, transferable fishing quotas, user fees for public goods, and 
aspects of utility privatization. Meanwhile, neoliberal ventures have increasingly 
39 
 
assimilated environmentalism through key discursive shifts, such as the growing 
convergence of sustainable development with green capitalism... and a vast tide of 
corporate green-wash.  
 
Thus, McCarthy & Prudham (2004, 276) also recognise the convergence between 
environmentalism and neoliberalism, noting the commonalities of environmentalist narratives 
playing the “game” of neoliberal discourse. In this framing, the post-political consensus stifles 
choice and opportunity for re-imagination. Swyngedouw (2009) claims that consensus redefines 
freedom to what is socially and normatively accepted. Further, Purcell (2009) and Žižek (2008) 
theorise that such freedoms and “alternative trajectories” are limited to being reactionary within 
existing social constructs of power and privilege. Žižek (2002) argues that the “properly” 
political is a necessary part of a radical democracy that puts power in the hands of its people and 
enables people to determine a just future. Within a post-political carbon consensus, the neoliberal 
solutions handed down from elites in response to an issue such as climate change do nothing 
more than perpetuate the systems of unequal power, control, injustice and inequalities by failing 
to address the system at hand (Swyngedouw, 2009; Žižek, 2002).  
Under a post-political consensus, debate occurs over technicalities, management of 
predetermined “legitimate” stakeholders and the “arrangement of policing” (Žižek, 2008, 279). It 
is, according to Rancière (2010, 6), not a “quarrel over which solutions to apply to a situation but 
a dispute over the situation itself.” In other words, conflict should lie deeper than simple 
decisions over. Rather the conflict lies with the ability for the people to defend the commons and 
thus the power structures that determine the situation (Rancière, 2010). McCarthy (2013) argues 
that the term “properly” political compartmentalises activism in different localities and presents a 
narrow definition of the “properly” political. He (2013) argues that, theorists such as 
Swyngedouw, have created rigid classifications for the “properly” political and created a 
seemingly consensual condition, free of dissent. The following section will explore Rancière, 
Žižek, Purcell and Swyngedouw’s notions of the “properly” political in relation to activism. 
Further, it will suggest the implications that the definitions set out by these theorists may have 
for the possibility of alternative futures.  
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2.6 The “properly” political and activism 
By Rancière’s definition the “properly” political is about reclaiming the freedoms that have been 
denied through the elitist governance of the police order or the post-political consensus. Further 
he theorises that “political moments” occur when those individuals and institutions with 
marginalised or excluded voices transgress or resist the police and the socio-economic order that 
created them (Swyngedouw, 2007). According to Žižek (as referred to in Swyngedouw, 2007, 
23) something becomes: 
political when a particular demand (cutting greenhouse gases, stopping the exploitation of 
a particular resource and so on) starts to function as a metaphoric condensation of the 
global opposition against Them, those in power, so that the protest is no longer just about 
that demand, but about the universal dimension that resonates in that particular demand...  
In other words, to Žižek (2002), the “properly” political comes about when the dominant 
hegemony under which an issue came to be is the subject of conflict rather than the issue itself. 
Under this definition, the “properly” political is not about making demands or requests of the 
police governance or leaders, but asserting a claim to alternative imaginaries (Swyngedouw, 
2007; 2009). According to Purcell (2009) and Swyngedouw (2007) the properly political must 
oppose the neoliberal discourse/the post-political at its core. As noted above, dissensus and 
conflict are central to the properly political as they provide mechanisms for radical change and a 
space for the contestation of the discourses that perpetuate the status quo (Rancière, 2010; 
Swyngedouw, 2009): “Genuine politics is about the recognition of conflict as constitutive of the 
social condition, and the naming of the socioecological spaces that can become” (Swngedouw, 
2007, 25).  
“Properly” political moments are spaces of contestation for those who are margnialised with "no 
name or no place" whose activities begin to reflect an alternative ideal of equality and liberty on 
their own terms (Swyngedouw, 2009, 616; Žižek, 2002). Under a consensus situation, equality 
and liberty are recognised and defined by the dominant hegemony, hence the “properly” political 
redefines the constraints of these freedoms.   
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Žižek (2002) suggests that under the post-political condition, radical forms of environmental 
activism are "unending" and ineffective in their attempts to dislodge power structures and the 
dominant hegemony as they ultimately end up participating within the very system that they look 
to disrupt. Rancière (1998) states that only a rupture of the status quo can create the “properly” 
political. Thus, according to Rancière and Žižek, a “properly” political moment is rare. However, 
this theory ignores everyday and individualised changes that occur in political subjectivities, 
particularly through consciousness raising.  
Overall, according to Swyngedouw , Žižek and others, a post-political consensus revolving 
around neoliberal globalisation heavily restricts the will for the “properly” political. When CO2 
is the perceived antagonist, rather than the systems of power and privilege that have caused it 
there is little need to disrupt the current social order. Thus, climate justice advocates suggest that 
the the role of the climate justice movement in creating the “properly” political and contesting 
the predominant consensus is key to the displacement of our economic and social systems. 
Further, in respect to climate change, climate justice principles act to contest the dominating 
attributes of the post-political condition. A growing global movement consisting of diverse 
organisations and communities, climate justice looks to the root causes of climate change and 
intends to catalyse systemic change as a solution to climate change. The following section will 
describe in more depth the principles of climate justice and how they present a challenge to the 
post-political carbon consensus. The existence of the climate justice movement supports 
McCarthy’s (2012) argument that the theory of post-political carbon consensus is generalised 
and does not take into consideration actions that are taken against the consensual condition, such 
as the climate justice movement.  
2.7 Climate justice 
Evidently, climate justice is used to frame an alternative form of political action on climate 
change to the neoliberalised solutions of a post-political carbon consensus. Climate justice, in its 
many forms, seeks to achieve what political theorists such as Rancière, Žižek and Mouffe refer 
to as the “political.” The climate justice movement is thus important to this study as it presents a 
challenge to Swyngedouw’s supposed post-political condition, provides alternative localised 
trajectories for the future and supports McCarthy’s (2013) more nuanced view. Further, the 
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climate justice movement in Aotearoa New Zealand and overseas is an example of the use of 
radical action within the post-political condition. This research will explore how relevant climate 
justice is to the youth of Aotearoa New Zealand assuming the dominance of the post-political 
condition over the climate justice alternative highlighted by Swyngedouw (2010). Hence, this 
research will contribute to a gap in the literature that exists around how the post political carbon 
consensus shapes how youth think about and engage in climate change activism in Aotearoa 
New Zealand and what this means for creating opportunities or space for “properly” political 
moments.  
According to Bond (2010a, 22) climate justice presents “a complex challenge to capitalism’s 
internal logic of commodification and neoliberal policy expansion” and a challenge to de-
politicisation through deliberate antagonism, solidarity and understanding of the commons 
(Chatterton et al, 2012). For climate justice activists, emissions reductions must be achieved in 
recognition of the unequal social impacts of emitting activities such as fossil fuel extraction and 
also through addressing the systemic “causes” of climate change- institutionally and structurally, 
including corporate control over governments, neoliberal globalisation, colonisation, imperialism 
and marginalisation (Bond, 2011b; Bond & Dorsey, 2010; Dawson, 2010; Goodman, 2009).  
Climate justice is a relatively recent concept, described by Bond (2010b) as a bringing together 
of the ‘global justice movement’ with radical environmentalism. The global justice movement 
stemmed from the Zapatista solidarity network in the 1990s. The Zapatistas resistance catalysed 
global support for a local struggle and recognised the similarities of struggles around the world 
(Bond, 2010b; Dawson, 2010; De Angelis, 2000). Movements were able to draw attention to the 
impact of the ideology that underlies the struggles at these localities. Global justice movements 
embody the principles of social and environmental justice which include “economic equity, 
cultural liberation, and the political participation of people of colour at all levels of decision 
making” (Dawson, 2010, 326). Climate justice movements transfer these principles to the 
climate change issue. Climate justice is a way of perceiving the climate change issue that 
recognises that the causes and solutions to climate change have the most direct ramifications for 
the most vulnerable people in the world (Bond, 2010a; Dawson, 2010).  
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Climate justice theorists critique many of the solutions being offered to climate change as being 
“technical-redistributionist, Third Worldist, Keynesian, or global elitist experiences and 
aspirations” (Bond & Dorsey, 2010). This echoes the ideas of theorists such as Swyngedouw and 
Žižek, discussed above regarding mechanisms that have created a post-political carbon 
consensus. Climate justice activists are united around a loose set of principles underpinned by 
the inadequacies of neoliberal market based approaches to the climate change issues, such as the 
UNFCCC body and carbon markets (Bond, 2011b; Bond & Dorsey, 2010; Dawson, 2010; 
Goodman, 2009). Generally, climate justice activists agree that neoliberal solutions to climate 
change are simply perpetuating the economic and social systems that created climate change. 
Additionally, the emissions reductions proposed by the UNFCCC body are said to be too minor 
and incremental to halt or slow the impacts of climate change (Campbell, 2013).  
Many climate justice focussed activists and organisations are committed to maintaining 
solidarity with indigenous communities, many of whom are opposed to the “false solutions” 
being imposed upon these communities (Bond, 2010a; Goodman, 2009). “False solutions” can 
refer to solutions that do not address the root causes of climate change but simply pass the 
burden of emissions to a developing country (Bond, 2011b; Goodman, 2009). One example of a 
solution that is often referred to as false is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM):  
 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a form of carbon trading provided by the 
Kyoto Protocol. The scheme allows governments and corporations from Annex 1 
countries - i.e. rich countries required to reduce emissions below 1990 levels - to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions elsewhere if they can do so at a lower cost. The CDM 
generates financing for projects that are supposed to lower GHG emissions, such as 
conversion of landfill methane to electricity (such as Bisasar) or planting of timber to 
serve as a carbon sink (Sharife, 2009, 95).  
 
Clean Development Mechanisms are controversial for a number of reasons. Some argue that 
CDM projects act to reward polluters and many do not actually reduce emissions. Dabhi (2012, 
246) suggests that “tools such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) simply transfer the 
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ecological crisis to Southern countries so that the Global North does not have to compromise its 
way of life.” Further, Dawson (2010) critiques: 
there are a number of fairly obvious scams associated with the CDM. So-called carbon 
sinks are... nothing more than a temporary solution, which, by suggesting that emissions 
have been nullified, actually encourage further emissions. Under CDM... corporations 
can both emit more greenhouse gases and also profit from the production of these gases. 
(Dawson, 2012, 329) 
According to Bond & Dorsey (2010) another example of a “false solutions” which climate 
justice advocates campaign on is mega hydro power projects: 
 Indigenous communities along the Klamath River forced Pacificorp Power company to 
agree to ‘Undam the Klamath’ by the year 2020, in order to restore the river’s natural 
ecosystems, salmon runs and traditional land-use capacity. For decades, Indigenous 
communities have been calling out false solutions - pointing to the fact that energy 
technologies that compromise traditional land-use, public health and local economies 
cannot be considered climate solutions. 
Hence, the term “false solution” is a generalised term used to describe solutions to climate 
change that have unjust effects on society’s poor or oppressed. As a form of critique, it is 
“sensitive to relations of unequal global geometries of power and how these intersect with 
relations of class, race, gender, generation, indigenous rights and socio-nature” (Chatterton et al, 
2012, 5). Climate justice, as it is referred to in this research, is a diverse and spatially dispersed 
series of movements sharing similar core principles or value systems. Climate justice activists 
tend to operate within a number of social movements and the tactics and strategies used in 
defence of climate justice are as diverse as the people involved (Bond, 2010b).  
2.7.1 Climate justice and activism  
As acts of resistance, climate justice activists often organise protests and direct actions in an 
attempt to move the climate change conversation away from global and state led solutions, 
towards empowerment and solidarity with communities on the frontlines of climate change. 
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Radical actions may not always represent “properly” political moments. However they are 
usually designed to create conflict and actively contest the post-political consensus.   
For many climate justice activists around the world, this has meant taking up the direct action 
and protest tactics of other resistance, social and environmental justice movements (Dawson, 
2010). Direct action tactics have been a key part of climate justice struggles over the last few 
years including the “Nigerian and Ecuadorian oilfields, Australia’s main coal port, Britain’s coal-
fired power stations and main airport, Canada’s tar sands, and US coalfields and corporate 
headquarters” (Bond, 2011a, 2).  
2.7.2 The growth of the climate justice movement 
Climate justice as an active concept was established more formally through the formation of a 
number of coalitions and organisations such as the Durban Group for Climate Justice and 
Climate Justice Now! (Bond, 2010b; Bond & Dorsey, 2010). At the 2007 United Nations 
Climate Change negotiations in Bali, Climate Justice Now! was formed as a result of ideological 
factions within the Climate Action Network (the main NGO umbrella group), which was 
becoming increasingly sympathetic to the carbon market based solutions being presented at the 
negotiations (Bond 2010b; Bond & Dorsey, 2010; Chatterton et al, 2012). 
 Another turning point that saw growth in the climate justice movement was the United Nations 
Climate Change negotiations in Copenhagen, 2009 (COP 15).  COP 15 failed to deliver on the 
global agreement that would legally bind nations into emissions reductions and also produced an 
impressive display of the force of corporate interest in the negotiations (Bond, 2010b; Chatterton 
et al, 2012). While consensus did not exist over the nature of the agreement, there was a 
consensual condition surrounding the framing of the issue as one of CO2 and the use of techno-
managerial fixes for climate change. According to Chatterton et al (2012, 3): 
 
There was the space of corporate and business interests that turned the summit into an 
opportunity to present big technology, science and market-based solutions to climate 
change. These green capitalist accumulation strategies were embodied in the 




In contestation, the negotiations also saw the collective strength of collaboration between social 
and environmental justice activists from the left under the banner of “Climate Justice Action” 
(Bond, 2010a).  This included anarchists, anti-globalisation activists, youth, NGOs, grassroots 
groups, social movements such as Via Campesina (small scale farmers and peasants network), 
socialists, unions and a wide range of civil society actors (Bond, 2010a). Thus the negotiations 
(and other conference gatherings) provided an opportunity for the articulation of a set of climate 
justice-based demands. These demands represented solutions to climate change that the 
movement want to see, beyond the negotiation process outcomes, for example:  
 
 Leaving fossil fuels in the ground and investing in appropriate energy efficiency 
and community-led renewable energy... rights-based resource conservation that enforces 
Indigenous land rights and promotes peoples’ sovereignty over energy, forests, land and 
water (Bond, 2010b, 20). 
 
Following the failure of the Copenhagen negotiations, the Cochabamba summit, supported by the 
Bolivian Government and President Evo Morales, brought together indigenous peoples from all 
over Latin America to discuss climate justice and to contest the United Nations climate change 
negotiations process through a series of demands (Russell et al, 2012). The Cochabamba Summit 
also brought attention to the plight of climate refugees and demanded the costs of adaptation be 
met by Annex 1 countries (Panayotakis, 2012). Cochabamba was based on the need to address 
the power relations within climate change politics- give voice to the vulnerable, indigenous 
peoples and many of the countries of the Global South that are being marginalised (Panayotakis, 
2012). As a deliberate act of contestation, the Cochabamba Summit leveraged the voices of those 
being affected by climate change and their call for change in economic systems that perpetuates 
their marginalisation (Panayotakis, 2012).  
2.7.3 Antagonism, commons and solidarity  
As mentioned previously, rather than forming one social movement, climate justice principles 
are brought to life by diverse networks, communities, organisations and social movements 
(Chatterton et al, 2012). Chatterton et al (2012) refer to the three main tenets of climate justice as 
antagonism, commons and solidarity. This is a concise way of differentiating the climate justice 
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movement from the ‘third way’ and other neoliberal or mainstream approaches to the climate 
change issue. Further, Chatterton et al (2012)’s three attributes play an important role in this 
study because they outline the values that one perceives as important in order to consider 
advocating climate justice principles or radical action on climate change. By providing an outline 
of three possible motivations for taking radical/climate justice action on climate change, 
Chatterton et al (2012) offer insight into the perspectives of climate justice advocates. Further, as 
this research seeks to explore youth perspectives on climate change and how this may influence 
spaces for radical action, it is relevant to consider these principles that encompass a climate 
justice perspective.  
The first attribute is the recognition of a systemic antagonism such as the unequal global/local 
power relations or capitalist growth. Different climate justice networks will have recognised 
varying antagonists. However, unlike more mainstream approaches which place carbon 
emissions and scientific processes as causes of climate change at the centre of debate, climate 
justice movements recognise the role of political antagonists underlying the political carbon 
consensus (Chatterton et al, 2012). To identify systems such as capitalist growth or power 
relations as the antagonist allows for action to occur in dissent of the post-political carbon 
consensus which recognises carbon emissions as the sole antagonist (Chatterton et al, 2012). 
Therefore, to identify a systemic antagonist allows for actions to become “properly” political. 
Swyngedouw (2007, 32) suggests that “the “enemy” or the target of concern is... continuously 
externalized. The enemy is always vague, ambiguous, and ultimately vacant, empty, and 
unnamed” (Swyngedouw, 2007, 32). In other words, it is an important part of climate justice to 
recognise a systemic antagonist, otherwise actions risk entering the post-political condition. 
However, the systemic antagonist, such as capitalist growth or neoliberal globalisation is 
relentlessly difficult to name and measure. Thus it is a relatively difficult target for activists.  
The Free Association (2010) refer to a reoccurring lack of recognition of capital and 
neoliberalism as the antagonist root cause of climate change. They argue that social movements 
should recognise neoliberalism as an antagonist and act in ways that counteract neoliberal ideas. 
According to Swyngedouw (2007) and Rancière (1998) social movements are said to enter the 
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post-political condition when they are supporting neoliberal and technocratic solutions and fail to 
recognise these mechanisms as a part of the cause.  
The second main tenet of climate justice according to Chatterton et al (2012, 10) is the belief that 
the commons must be defended against resource “dispossession from poor, peasant and 
indigenous people.” Mechanisms of resource commodification and privatisation are potential 
antagonists because they disrupt the commons that are sustained by communities in order to 
allow long term and regenerative support to collective livelihoods (Chatterton et al, 2012).  
Finally, solidarity is an important aspect of the climate justice approach. These universal 
struggles are often brought together through acts of solidarity. “Solidarity means fighting for our 
own autonomy at the same time as we struggle against corporations and the relationships of 
capital that exploit people everywhere” (CJA, 2010, 1). Solidarity is the recognition of the need 
to connect those fighting common battles in spatially and culturally different contexts 
(Chatterton et al, 2012). It is particularly important in the fight for climate justice as it actively 
brings together groups and movements in recognition that the systemic causes of climate change 
are also the causes of many other struggles. Solidarity in practise epitomizes the struggle for 
power that social movements are built upon– the support of local struggles by others across the 
world is a display of how solidarity can shift politics (Chatterton et al, 2012). According to 
Chatterton et al (2012) solidarity is able to counteract assumptions that localisation of struggles 
is inward facing and isolating. Further, practising solidarity can help to “develop a broader 
critique of the forces at play shaping localities” (Chatterton et al, 2012, 13). Thus solidarity can 
help to build broad alternatives for local situations but increase the collective strength of 
alternatives that contest neoliberalism and a post-political consensus.   
2. 8 Summary 
This literature review has revealed the increasing portrayal of climate change as a de-politicised 
issue. Many commentators have recognised the role the Kyoto Protocol and other neoliberalised 
solutions to climate change have played in forming a post-political carbon consensus. Thus the 
systemic causes of climate change are being overlooked in favour of policy-based mechanisms. 
Climate justice principles have provided a space for dissent and active opposition to the root 
causes of climate change, including neoliberal globalisation. Connecting thousands of 
49 
 
communities and organisations around the world in solidarity, climate justice acts to oppose the 
solutions proposed by the United Nations and other political elites in favour of the solutions that 
create conflict and space for radical change. 
There is little empirical exploration of the nature of the consensual condition and its effect in 
removing opportunities for dissent. This research will fill a gap in the literature that exists 
surrounding the role of youth activists in perpetuating the post-political carbon consensus. Hence 
the research will provide an analysis into how relevant the post-political condition is to youth 
climate change activists and the extent to which post-political carbon consensus has or has not 
altered perceptions of the “properly” political.  
The following chapters will explore the relevance of climate justice to the youth of Aotearoa 
New Zealand given the sheer strength of the neoliberal discourse that is contributing to the de-
politicisation of climate change in Aotearoa New Zealand. The following chapter will explore 
the neoliberal context of this generation as well as the condition of activism both in Aotearoa 
New Zealand and globally. It will also introduce Generation Zero- an entirely youth-driven 





Chapter 3: Neoliberalism and youth activism 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the global and local context for this study. Globally, youth around the 
world are taking action on climate change and other social and environmental issues through a 
number of social movements. It is pertinent to question: how is this action reflected in Aotearoa 
New Zealand? In particular, noting the potential influence of the neoliberal ideology within 
which activists are working. Despite the extensive neoliberal restructuring in the 1980s, Aotearoa 
New Zealand has a rich history of social justice and environmental activism which provides the 
historical context for many of today’s activists, who are influenced by campaigns such as 
Nuclear Free New Zealand and Save Manapouri. The extent to which this context has affected 
climate change action that case study group Generation Zero’s members take will be touched on 
throughout this study.  
3.2 Global context: recent social movements and young people 
For this research, it is relevant to explore the history of past and current social movements 
around the world which influence and inspire activists. Some commentators have particularly 
noted the role of youth in current day movements around the world:  
 
The past 12 months have furnished numerous other examples of young people – even 
children as young as eight – becoming involved in popular protest around the world. 
Every newspaper presents a kaleidoscope of rebellion, dissatisfaction and anger 
prosecuted in large part by young people, and sometimes with reference to the notion of 
‘youth’ and ‘generation’. (Jeffrey, 2011, 145) 
 
Similarly, the influence of well-known historical movements is important to consider. The 
Zapatista resistance in the 1990s spawned global solidarity networks and the anti-globalisation 
movement around the globe, and resulted in resistance and solidarity becoming two of the key 
facets of new social movements. The Zapatista movement created an opportunity for local 
struggles to unite and work towards the creation of an alternative imaginary to neoliberal 
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globalisation (Routledge, 2009). The consolidation of climate justice networks has occurred 
around translocal days of action, which provide opportunities for groups and communities facing 
similar struggles around the world to unite around synchronised acts of solidarity. Similarly the 
anti-globalisation movement and global justice networks also used days of actions and 
international conferences, such as the G8 summit in Seattle, as convergence spaces (Chatterton et 
al, 2012; Halvorsen, 2012; Routledge, 2009). Convergence spaces manifest as points of 
interaction between groups, individuals, communities and movements for the purpose of 
collaborating, strategising, planning and the recognition of a common struggle (Routledge, 
2009). Convergence spaces may be longer term or fleeting, however they play an important role 
in growing global movements and highlighting the interconnections of different themes and 
issues (Routledge, 2009).  
 
In recent years a new wave of social movements has arisen. The Arab Spring represented the 
beginning of widespread and public unrest and eventually ousted several regimes from power. 
The Arab Spring inspired the Occupy movement that began on Wall Street as a result of 
injustices of the economic crisis and slowly spread across the Western world, including the main 
centres of Aotearoa New Zealand (Constanza-Chock, 2012). Almost simultaneously the 
Indignados in Spain, #yo soy 132 in Mexico, the tent protests in Israel, anti-austerity protests 
across Europe and the student movements against fee rises in Ottawa, Canada, Britain and Chile 
sprang up (McIntyre, 2012). Students also protested the privatisation of education in Europe, 
South Africa and Sri Lanka (Jeffrey, 2011). Protests, occupations, rallies and demonstrations 
captured media attention which spurred further waves of action around the world. Social media 
and the internet played a notable role in not only raising awareness of the unrest but in the 
organisation of some of the mass mobilisations that took place around the world. A key example 
of this being #yo soy 132 in Mexico, a protest around the role of media in democracy which 
began as a twitter hashtag and resulted in some of the biggest street protests in Mexico to date 
(Constanza-Chock, 2012; McIntyre, 2012).  
 
Students tend to be savvy social media users and are an important factor in these broad social 
movements (Guzman-Concha, 2012; Jeffrey, 2011). Many student movements, such as those in 
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Chile and Mexico, resulted in more wide spread movements which looked to address other more 
systemic issues: 
Contesting inequalities in the education system, the movement [student movements] soon 
evolved into a challenge to the authoritarian character of political institutions, sharing 
similar goals with protests elsewhere around the world—including radical economical 
and political democratization (Guzman-Concha, 2012, 1).  
According to Jeffrey (2011, 147): 
The Tunisian uprising in turn sparked further protests across the Middle East and North 
Africa, most notably in Egypt, where a partly youth-led movement used social media and 
direct protests to force the authoritarian leader Hosni Mubarak from power. These 
uprisings were not straightforwardly ‘youth’ mobilizations. They involved people of 
different ages... but young people were important in the Arab Spring.  
 
A number of commentators have noted that students are once again the political force they have 
been historically. Jeffrey (2011, 147) states, “children and youth have been highly visible in 
recent mobilization around the world...Young people appear to be acting as true ‘alchemists of 
the revolution’, as they have done in the past.” They have large numbers, existing organisations, 
access to technology and social networks which enables quick and efficient co-ordination 
(Guzman-Concha, 2012; Jeffrey, 2011). Another factor that drives these social movements is the 
recent financial crisis which has meant that austerity measures are being used more widely with 
detrimental effects on people worldwide (Halvorsen, 2012). The financial crisis has meant 
changes to student support, fee increases for university education, fewer jobs available for youth, 
increased student debt and general feelings of unrest as youth face an uncertain future 
(Halvorsen, 2012). Compounded by environmental issues, including climate change, young 
people worldwide are recognising the issues resulting from neoliberalism, capitalism and 
corporate control (Jeffrey, 2011). While many of these movements (other than Occupy) did not 
actively mention similar struggles around the world, it is clear that there is a pattern of increased 
political opposition to corporate control and  inequalities gaining pace around the world, each 
struggle “rooted in their local circumstance and politics” (Pickerill & Krinsky, 2012, 6). Some of 
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these movements present a paradox to the framing of the post-political consensus, as they 
highlight the desire but difficulty in achieving the “properly” political. In some instances, such as 
the Arab Spring, it could be argued that the demand for western-constructed forms of democracy 
does not subvert systems. However, given the localised context of the action it is important to 
consider that perhaps the “properly” political and henceforth the post-political consensus is 
different in every locality and therefore the opportunities to contest dominant systems are locally 
diverse. Thus, this study explores the localised context of Aotearoa New Zealand.  
 
 Many protests and movements are driven by students who see a need for change in the social 
and economic power structures of society and out of concern for their futures. It is concern for 
their future that commonly drives youth activism on climate change (youthclimate.org, 2012). 
Thus it is important to consider how youth of Aotearoa New Zealand fit into global patterns of 
youth-driven radical action and mass mobilisation, in particular in relation to climate change. 
3.2.1 Youth climate change activism around the world 
Aside from involvement in movements addressing social and environmental issues, it is relevant 
to this research to explore what young people are doing specifically around climate change. 
Given the lag time of the impact of carbon dioxide emissions, youth and future generations will 
be feeling the true force of climate change, economically, socially and environmentally. This will 
provide broader context for youth activism on climate change in Aotearoa New Zealand and 
provide a basis from which to analyse the diversity in forms of political action on climate change 
taken by young New Zealanders. 
Climate change activism driven by young people is often collectively referred to by youth 
engaged globally as the “international youth climate movement” (youthclimate.org, 2012). 
Geographically diverse regions are represented by the international youth climate movement, 
which includes the newly formed Arab Youth Climate Movement, the African Youth Initiative 
on Climate Change, the Australian Youth Climate Coalition and many more across the Global 
North and South. One opportunity that youth organisations, youth representatives of NGOs and 
many other young people use to converge is the annual United Nations Climate Change 
Conferences. Hundreds of youth attend the negotiations every year and represent global youth as 
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the constituency “YOUNGO” (youth NGOs). It is in this setting that this movement has 
established a broad overarching vision that represents a series of general policy asks:   
Youth envision a world with a safe and stable climate. In this world, unmitigated 
pollution of the shared atmosphere is no longer acceptable. Developed countries have 
paid the full debt of their historical emissions burden on the climate by facilitating and 
financing necessary adaptation measures in developing countries. Also financed by 
developed countries, global innovation has been harnessed, and effective renewable and 
energy efficient technologies have been developed and equitably distributed throughout 
the world. Having addressed climate change through a strong global agreement, and free 
from the added pressure of a more dangerous climate, we are now able to turn our full 
attention to the world’s other pressing issues including food security, water & sanitation, 
health care, education and freedom (youthclimate.org, 2012).  
Increasingly, young people working on climate change are meeting away from the United 
Nations Climate Change Conferences and seek to find other solutions to climate change. 
Dissatisfaction mainly stems from the lack of progress being made at negotiations in creating 
legally binding emissions targets (Banjeree, 2012). Following COP 17, Banjeree (2012, 1769) 
noted “green groups claimed that the agreement did not cover binding emissions cuts, a major 
objective of COP meetings, and hence COP17 was a failure.”  Bond (2011c, 3) proclaimed 
“failure is the only way to summarize sixteen years of talk by United Nations negotiators from 
national states influenced by fossil-fuel-dependent capital [and] neoliberal multilateral agencies.” 
Further, some youth believe that the channels for youth involvement, for example interventions 
made at the end of negotiation sessions, are inadequate. As Banjeree (2012, 1764) highlights 
“being allowed to participate in negotiations as a legitimate stakeholder does not mean that all 
participants have similar capabilities in making their voices heard.” One example of an 
alternative gathering of youth is the Global Power Shift event happening in Istanbul in June 
2013. Youth from all over the world will gather to learn, share and mobilise climate movements 




Youth climate activists around the world engage in a number of different forms of activism, from 
lobbying on policy measures to more radical actions. For example, SustainUS in the United 
States work on “proactive education and advocacy at the policy-making level and at the 
grassroots” (SustainUS, n.d.) while the Canadian Youth Climate Coalition works on a campaign 
called Fossil Free Canada which aims to build a movement for divestment from fossil fuels 
(Fossil Free Canada, 2013). Youth-based organisations and networks often collaborate with 
“adult” non-government organisations and take their cues from their campaigns. Some examples 
of well-known (non-youth based) organisations that specifically support climate justice 
principles include; Carbon Trade Watch, Friends of the Earth, Global Justice Ecology Project, 
Indigenous Environmental Network, Rising Tide UK/North America, La Via Campesina 
peasants’ movement and Durban Group for Climate Justice. Some youth-based organisations are 
becoming increasingly powerful political lobby groups, for example, the Australian Youth 
Climate Coalition (AYCC). The AYCC has over 70,000 members and counts one of its major 
successes as driving a coalition of organisations to lobby successfully for a carbon tax in 
Australia (AYCC, 2013). AYCC’s uniquely “positive” brand of climate activism has thrust 
climate change into the public spotlight and provided inspiration for youth movements around 
the world, including Generation Zero in Aotearoa New Zealand. The following two sections will 
explore environmental and social movements, as well as climate change focused groups in 
Aotearoa New Zealand.  
3.3 Environmental and social movements in Aotearoa New Zealand 
It is relevant to discuss the history of environmental and social movements in Aotearoa New 
Zealand in order to understand the context of current day activism for youth and others. 
Furthermore, this study will explore if issues are being addressed in new and different ways than 
they have historically. 
Aotearoa New Zealand has a long and proud history of social and environmental movements that 
have shaped this country. The anti-nuclear, anti-war, women’s suffrage and anti-apartheid 
movements are demonstrative of Aotearoa New Zealand’s political activism (Curtin & Lacey, 
2007). It was these movements that enabled New Zealand to become connected with global 
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organisations such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, which set up branches in New 
Zealand (Curtain & Lacey, 2007). 
Environmental activism for conservation reached a peak in the 1960s and 70s with the 
establishment of groups such as Forest and Bird and Ecology Action in Aotearoa New Zealand 
and campaigns, most notably the Save Lake Manapouri campaign (Downes, 2000; Mills, 2009). 
Biodiversity conservation is a poignant issue for many New Zealanders due to the unique 
ecology of Aotearoa New Zealand and the effect that the introduction of foreign species since 
colonisation and urbanisation has had on native and endemic biodiversity (Downes, 2000). It is 
still something of an ongoing battle most recently seen through campaigns such as the ‘Save 
Happy Valley’ campaign and a campaign to save the Denniston Plateau from proposed coal 
mining. Mainstream public support was also built around resistance to Government plans to mine 
Schedule Four conservation land. The announcement of these plans led to thousands of people 
mobilising through marches in central Auckland and other centres and writing submissions to 
central Government. According to Mills (2009, 684), “there has been some argument... as to 
whether contemporary environmental movements derive from such past concerns, or represent 
reactions to more recent events, such as degradation in the environment, and international 
activism.”  
Many of these environmental/conservation movements and social movements such as the anti-
apartheid movement had strong support and involvement from students and young people, a 
pattern which has been emulated around the world (Hirsch, 1993). Nevertheless, Curtain & 
Lacey (2007) note that fewer and fewer from this current generation of youth are becoming 
politically active. Although Curtain & Lacey (2007) describe political action through means such 
as voting and joining political affiliate groups, they also note a general lack of youth interest 
around politics, including the politics of carbon neutrality in Aotearoa New Zealand. This 
follows a global trend of youth political apathy but contradicts patterns of rising youth dissent 
and non-traditional means of political involvement. Perhaps this is indicative of growing 
understanding and recognition amongst youth for the need to resist and create conflict given the 
unique set of issues this generation of youth faces and their systemic causes.  The 
aforementioned recent campaigns represent the combination of conservation and traditional 
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environmentalist messages with the issue of climate change. Hence, it could be argued that these 
newer campaigns represent Aotearoa New Zealand’s past movements against environmental 
degradation coming together with global issues of concern. Thus this study will explore how this 
historical context is relevant to youth climate change activism here in Aotearoa New Zealand.  
3.4 Climate movement in Aotearoa New Zealand 
Given Aotearoa New Zealand’s history of addressing environmental and social justice issues it is 
pertinent to explore how New Zealanders are addressing climate change. Thus, this section will 
explore the civil society reaction to climate change in Aotearoa New Zealand.  
The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is Aotearoa New Zealand’s primary policy 
tool for addressing rising carbon emissions. Much controversy has plagued the ETS since its 
introduction in 2002, particularly surrounding the role of agricultural emissions in the scheme 
(Donald & Kerr, 2012). Most recently, Aotearoa New Zealand withdrew from the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (Radio New Zealand, 2012). Essentially, Aotearoa 
New Zealand’s government has an inadequate plan to responsibly reduce emissions in 
accordance with our per capita emissions
3
. Consequently, emissions in Aotearoa New Zealand 
are currently growing, most significantly in the transport sector (Ministry for the Environment, 
n.d.).  A number of NGOs, businesses, business lobby groups (such as Pure Advantage), the 
Labour Party and the Green Party of Aotearoa have expressed concerns with Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s commitment to addressing the climate change issue. The Green Party of Aotearoa 
stated:  
By emaciating our own emissions trading scheme and renouncing any legal obligation to 
cut emissions in this decade New Zealand now rivals Canada for the worst climate 
change policy in the world. All other developed countries and many developing 
countries, including major emerging economies, have more visionary and effective 
policies (Graham, 2013). 
                                                             
3
 “New Zealand now appears to be a long way from meeting its Kyoto Protocol targets at least in terms of domestic 
action... Gross emissions (before accounting for forest sinks) have continued to increase since the late 1990s and in 
2006 were about 20% above the 1990 baseline” (Boston, 2007, 16).  
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A grassroots movement of organisations, communities and individuals taking action on climate 
change is slowly building but is in its relative infancy. A key point of growth in this activity was 
prior to the 15
th 
annual United Nations Climate Change Negotiations in Copenhagen (Chatterton 
et al, 2012). Chatterton et al (2012, 2) refer to these as the Copenhagen mobilisations, a 
“culmination of diverse forms of translocal organising.” Prior to the negotiations, groups around 
the world organised in anticipation of the negotiations and the deal that they were expected to 
produce. Chatterton et al (2012, 2) highlights the diverse and widespread organising, “for 
example, on 24 October 2009, a global day of action organised by the “350 campaign” saw 5200 
actions in 181 countries unite in a call for an equitable and meaningful solution to the climate 
crisis.” Further, the negotiations themselves saw thousands of members of civil society converge, 
with five spaces for civil society to gather in (Chatterton et al, 2012). This provided an 
opportunity for civil society to network and work together (Chatterton et al, 2012).  
 
A small number of organisations in Aotearoa New Zealand campaign and work directly with the 
climate change issue. The last few years have seen the introduction of climate change as a core 
concern in the campaigns of large organisations such as Greenpeace New Zealand, exemplified 
by the “Sign On” campaign around the setting of a “40% emission reduction target” for New 
Zealand at the Copenhagen Climate Change Negotiations (Greenpeace, 2010) and Oxfam New 
Zealand which focuses on the impacts of climate change on poverty (Oxfam, 2000-2013). Coal 
Action Network Aoteaora (CANA) “recognises coal as the primary threat to Earth’s climate 
system. CANA promotes climate justice by advocating and acting for a just transition to an 
Aotearoa free of coal mining and use” (CANA, n.d.).  A multitude of other organisations also run 
campaigns around climate change, focusing their campaigns around poignant issues such as 
fossil fuel extraction, transport and the emissions trading scheme. Examples of these 
organisations include Climate Defence Network, WWF New Zealand, Ora Taiao: New Zealand 
Climate and Health. 350 Aotearoa, as part of the global movement 350.org, addresses climate 
change with a globalised perspective and aims to raise awareness of climate change and what can 
be done about it (350 Aotearoa, n.d.). In general, organisations (both those that are development 
focused and those that are environment focused) within New Zealand tend to view climate 
change through a scientific or policy-oriented lens. For example, “WWF advocates 
for government to do its bit to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to safe levels. We have a vision 
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for a low carbon New Zealand and to make it happen we are working with government, business 
and individuals” (WWF New Zealand, n.d.). Much of the mainstream rhetoric surrounds policy 
measures and New Zealand’s role in International Negotiations. For instance, Oxfam New 
Zealand focuses on a global solution for climate change: “Oxfam is part of the tck tck tck global 
campaign, calling for an ambitious, fair and legally binding climate change treaty” (Oxfam, 
2000-2013).  
There are few organisations that actively use climate justice rhetoric or align with climate justice 
principles. A number of anti-mining organisations operate under a similar understandings of the 
need for systemic change and an opposition to market-based solutions. One example of this is 
Coal Action Network: “Coal Action Network Aotearoa (CANA) is a group of climate justice 
campaigners committed to fighting the continuation of coal mining in Aotearoa New Zealand” 
(Coal Action Network Aotearoa, n.d). Other organisations were set up specifically to work on 
climate justice; for example, Climate Justice Aotearoa, Climate Justice Wellington (largely 
inactive) and Climate Justice Taranaki: “a community group dedicated to justice, resistance, 
education and positive action at the front lines of climate change” (Climate Justice Taranaki, 
n.d.).  
Climate justice is just as relevant to Aotearoa New Zealand as it is overseas. While Aotearoa 
New Zealand may feel relatively few impacts of climate change in comparison, the rising cost of 
food, oil and other commodities will create justice issues within Aotearoa New Zealand as it is 
the poorest and most vulnerable that will feel the effects of this the most. Climate change will 
thus exacerbate existing inequalities and widen the gap between the rich and the poor. The cost 
of rising sea levels and any natural disasters Aotearoa New Zealand might face will impact the 
poorest the most (CJA, 2012).  
Fossil fuel extraction are particularly pertinent climate justice issue in the Aotearoa New Zealand 
context as fracking, lignite mining, deep sea oil drilling, coal mining and other forms of 
extraction are risks for our environment (CJA, 2012). Extraction activities present justice issues 
because of the unequal environmental effects are unequally felt by the economically and socially 
marginalised (CJA, 2012). Further, extraction activities are sometimes in breach of land rights or 
indigenous sovereignty (Bond & Dorsey, 2010). False solutions also have a large role to play and 
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are expected to be an increasingly important campaign subject for climate justice-concerned 
organisations. False solutions (as referred to in Section 2.6) are solutions which do not address 
the root causes of climate change but simply pass the burden of emissions to a developing 
country (Bond, 2011b; Goodman, 2009).  
 
Another important aspect of climate justice in Aotearoa New Zealand considering how climate 
change specifically affects Māori: 
As with other indigenous peoples, climate change will unfairly affect Māori more than 
many others in Aotearoa because Māori live close to the environment e.g. fishing, gather 
kai and are often... lack[ing] the means of protection from economic crises, natural 
disasters or new disease outbreaks. Climate justice... [is about] acknowledging that Māori 
have a lot of knowledge about how to live sustainably on this land and for how our 
communities can re-organise and support each other... stand in solidarity with them by 
rebuilding your own sustainable communities so that we can resist climate pollutors and 
capitalism together – Tuhi- Ao, climate justice activist (CJA, 2012, 5).  
As previously mentioned, climate justice activists often use direct action and aim to address 
unequal power relations through their actions and how they are organised. Across the spectrum 
of actions, strategies and tactics groups can engage in, youth are often a part of these actions on 
climate change. The next section will explore the kinds of actions and strategies youth taking 
action on climate change in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
3.4.1 Youth climate change activism in Aotearoa New Zealand  
For this study, it is important to discuss the spectrum of climate change action that youth in 
Aotearoa New Zealand are involved with. This indicates how youth are meeting the challenge of 
climate change and what kinds of solutions youth see as most effective. Generation Zero, the 
case study for this research, forms a part of this climate change movement, and thus the overall 
role that Generation Zero plays in this movement shall be explored.  
Youth activism on climate change is as diverse as their “adult” counter-parts and represents a 
variety of strategies and visions for addressing climate change. Within the Aotearoa New 
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Zealand context, there are relatively few groups that are entirely youth-focused. A number of the 
aforementioned organisations that work on climate change do involve youth in their action. 
However, Generation Zero is the only entirely youth-run climate change organisation. 350 





2012), a conference that brought together 700 young people from around Aotearoa New Zealand, 
Australia and the Pacific Islands with the intention of catalysing a youth climate change 
movement by providing skills and inspiration (Power Shift NZ-Pacific, 2013). The conference 
also saw the launch of two campaigns 100% Possible and 100% Possible To Be Heard which 
intend to enact local scale climate solutions and raise awareness of the impacts of climate change 
in the Pacific Islands respectively (Power Shift NZ-Pacific, 2013). Generation Zero was heavily 
involved in marketing and recruiting young people to attend this conference. 
Generation Zero’s approach to the climate change issue is policy-based. They aim to make 
change through institutional political means and empowering young people to be an active part 
of the political process (Generation Zero, n.d.). From this focus it appears that the climate justice 
approach does not align with Generation Zero’s organisational strategy. Generation Zero will be 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4. Further, the remainder of this thesis will explore 
Generation Zero’s policy-based approach and the influence that Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
neoliberal context may have had on this.  
The neoliberal nature of some of the solutions that are endorsed by Generation Zero will be 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. However, the following section considers the role that 
neoliberalism has played in shaping aspects of the lives of current day youth. McCarthy & 
Prudham (2004, 275) refer to the “various parallels and tensions between neoliberalism and 
environmentalism”. Further McCarthy & Prudham (2004) highlight the lack of literature that has 
explored the interrelations between the two ideologies, something which this study aims to 
address. The following section also draws out some of the important effects of neoliberalism on 
the wider social and political landscape of Aotearoa New Zealand.  
3.5 Neoliberalism in Aotearoa New Zealand 
Uniquely, the current generation of youth have grown up completely immersed in neoliberalism. 
Aside from having political and economic implications, it has created a discourse of social norms 
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and practises that impact many aspects of our lives (Hayward, 2012; Larner, 2000; Nairn et al, 
2012; Peck &Tickell, 2002). Thus, the neoliberal context of this current generation of youth will 
shape the future of activism that youth engage in, and the ways in which youth perceive the 
effectiveness of action and its role in the democratic society.  
Prior to 1984, Aotearoa New Zealand’s economy was in a state of disarray with high levels of 
government borrowing and a reliance on agriculture and protected foreign markets, including 
Great Britain (Larner & Craig, 2005). Aotearoa New Zealand was one of the most protected 
economies in the world under then Prime Minister Muldoon, at a time when the rest of the world 
began liberalising their economies (Bray & Walsh, 1998; Larner & Craig, 2005). As these 
international economies began restructuring they became more open to international trade in an 
attempt to become more profitable (Larner & Craig, 2005). They followed a general pattern that 
aimed to increase the size and efficiency of the economy by removing some of the Government’s 
responsibility for capital and placing it in the hands of the market (Bray & Walsh, 1998). In this 
context, Aotearoa New Zealand embarked on a significant programme of reform. The change of 
Government in 1984 allowed the changes to begin: 
Their blueprint for change required less government, the privatisation of state assets and 
businesses... reduced public expenditure, and rolling back the welfare state. Excess 
productive capacity would have to be liquidated, the existing labour force entrenched, 
and new, efficient technology introduced (Kelsey, 1999 16). 
Roger Douglas’ as finance minister under Lange’s Labour Government instigated some of the 
most radical and rapid reform seen globally, known as Rogernomics (Kelsey, 1999). This was 
justified by the declining economy and a sense of urgency and fear built by the government and 
other external actors. To deal with the declining economy, radical changes were made over a 
short period, with little consultation of affected parties and those outside of Douglas’ inner circle 
(Bray & Walsh, 1998; Larner, 2000). This was known as the ‘blitzrieg’ approach (or “lightening 
strike”) due to its “surprise announcement and “rapid implementation” (Kelsey, 1999, 27). This 
was example of the shift away from social democratic values and a shift to the Centre Left that 
typifies ‘third way’ politics, despite being prior to Giddens’ influence. Generally, there was little 
resistance to the discourse that would go on to define a generation. Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
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previously protected economy became one of the most open, internationalised and deregulated 
economies in the world (Larner, 2000). The economy began to diversify and look beyond its 
previous agricultural focus (Larner & Walters, 2000). Rogernomics saw the closure of a number 
of small local businesses unable to compete with international trading partners. Many farmers 
and rural land owners were unable to compete without the previously high subsidies that were 
supporting the agricultural industry (Larner & Walters, 2000). Unemployment increased and 
many small communities were left without their supporting industries as investment went into 
less labour intensive industries. Furthermore, a large number of government-owned enterprises, 
such banks and the postal service, were sold to overseas investors (Larner & Walters, 2000).  
Overall, the restructuring under Rogernomics had a detrimental social impact. The hardest hit 
were low income families, rural communities dependent on agricultural subsidies, single 
mothers, beneficiaries and Māori (Kelsey, 1999; Larner, 2000). The rhetoric of “short term pain 
for long term gain” (Kelsey, 1999, 11) was irreversibly affecting the vulnerable in society, yet 
there was very little resistance to neoliberal policy change. The logic of liberal economists was 
that while tax reductions increased the ability of the wealthy to become wealthier, thus 
increasing inequalities and eventually the benefits of this wealth would trickle down (Kelsey, 
1999). This trickle down is not professed to happen through hand outs or welfare, but rather 
through motivation and innovation (Larner, 2005), “welfare, they argued, had undermined 
workers’ motivational commitment to market exchange and the achievement ideology” (Kelsey, 
1999, 15). A liberal economy aims to maximise participation and efficiency in the marketplace 
and thus according to Kelsey (1999) ensure that individuals are rewarded for initiative, 
innovation and taking risks. As the needs of the market become tantamount within social norms, 
so too does the promotion of “self-restraint and community sacrifice” (Kelsey, 1999, 15). 
Therefore inequalities become a fault of not only the individual’s ability and capacity but their 
propensity to be “lucky”. As a result “inequality is accepted as an inevitable and necessary 
condition of a free market in which there is no predictability, and of a society where progress is 
achieved by providing rewards for initiative” (Kelsey, 1999, 16).   
Further, Larner (2005) encourages the pursuit of research into neoliberalism that acknowledges 
“the paradoxes that characterize neoliberalising political formations” (Larner, 2005, 12). 
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Academics must recognise the complexities inherent within the discourse and its wide-reaching 
implications and paradoxes (Larner, 2000). In doing this research, the context of neoliberalism is 
used to highlight the complexities and considerations of youth involved in activism with the 
intention of re-creating their future. It has fundamentally shaped their vision of what is possible 
and how it should be achieved.  
The changes and reforms that have occurred under neoliberalism were rapid and deep-seated and 
took place within the context of global shifts towards neoliberalism, they are considered 
hegemonic by many commentators including McCarthy & Prudham (2004). Commitment to 
neoliberal ideals and the global market are strongly held by industry, politicians and private 
players and the entire economy has been reformed to meet the needs of the free market. But for 
the neoliberal generation, neoliberalism is the only reality they have ever known and thus the 
ideals have been embedded in their upbringing, through education, work lives and their role as 
citizens within a neoliberal democracy. Peck & Tickell (2002) refer to the “strength in the 
transformative and durable nature of neoliberalism both economically and politically. 
Neoliberalism has  demonstrated an ability to absorb or displace crisis tendencies” (Peck & 
Tickell, 2002, 400). As a result, it has infiltrated and affected all aspects of our society’s 
operation and “become a commonsense of the times” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, 381). Neoliberalism 
has created a politics where “the outcome is not homogeneity, but a constantly shifting landscape 
of experimentation, restructuring, (anti)social learning, technocratic policy transfer, and partial 
emulation” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, 396). Thus there has been little effective resistance to 
neoliberalism and the discourse has remained strong (Peck & Tickell, 2002). It is the complexity 
of the politics created by neoliberal discourse that will explored in this research. These 
characteristics facilitate the perpetuation of the broad consensus and a neoliberal political 
economy (as discussed in Chapter 2). Hence this research will fill a gap in the literature that 
exists surrounding the role of neoliberalism within activism and how this may be used to support 
a post-political condition.  
 
Larner (2005) recognised that it was not simply economic and political changes that 
neoliberalism brought in. Neoliberalism, as a discourse, altered perceptions of what was common 
sense and shifted social relations. Larner (2005, 12) states “neoliberalism is a social project that 
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seeks to create a reality that it suggests already exists”. For example, neoliberalism has also 
allowed the concept of “freedom” as defined as the right of the individual to control the activities 
they engage in and thus their future through these activities (Kelsey, 1993). This is opposed to 
notions of freedom that imply “‘freedom to’ enjoy positive outcomes” (Kelsey, 1993, 16) or 
freedom of expression. Thus neoliberal reforms not only had an economic influence but also an 
impact on social norms and perceptions of rights and “freedoms” (Kelsey, 1999). An entire 
generation have grown up under neoliberalism and its associated social norms, often known as 
the “neoliberal generation,” “children of the market” or “consumer-citizen[s]” (Hayward, 2012; 
Nairn et al; 2012; Larner, 2000). How has neoliberalism shaped their experiences and 
perceptions of the role of activism in addressing climate change? 
3.6 The Neoliberal Generation 
Hayward (2012) and Nairns et al (2012) both refer to the impact of neoliberalism specifically on 
children and young people. Their respective books cover the role that neoliberalism has played in 
shaping values, including perceptions of employment, ambition, citizenship and education 
among other important aspects of the formative years of youth. Both refer specifically to the 
values associated with neoliberalism beyond the economic and political implications, which 
forms the focus of this research. Further both texts are set within the unique Aotearoa New 
Zealand context in which neoliberalism was rolled out rapidly and radically and resulted in little 
opportunity for critique. Hayward (2012, 12) notes that: 
The shift to citizenship as personal responsibility has been exacerbated by the spread of 
neoliberal economic theory. While differing from country to country, neoliberalism can 
be conceived as an economic policy and ideological project that seeks to extend market 
values in public life.  
Hayward (2012) discusses in depth the impact that neoliberalism has had on the neoliberal 
generation and the perception that this generation has of citizenship, particularly political 
citizenship in relation to environmental issues. Hayward focuses on the role that neoliberal 
ideology has had on how children are taught to interact with global and moral issues and thus 
choose to take action. She argues that we are seeing in relation to environmental issues, a shift 
further away from collective, politicised action towards action that focuses on the role of the 
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individual, particularly the role of the consumer. Hayward asserts that environmental education 
that our young generations are being exposed to does not fully equip them to be critical of the 
neoliberal system or to think holistically about the intersections between sustainability, 
ecological concerns and other issues such as poverty and domestic violence. Current popular 
environmental education on waste issues and recycling are suggested to be inadequate as they 
simplify solutions to problems that require a deeper understanding of the interconnections 
between social and environmental issues to truly address them. Despite the fact that neoliberal 
policy has had a hand in creating some of the “largest consumers and polluters per capita on the 
planet” (Hayward, 2012, 4), there are few opportunities within environmental education to see 
their role as citizens beyond neoliberal actors. There is a  complacency within addressing such 
issues not as political issues which require a democratic imagination, but as issues that require 
“more efficient, market-based solutions, more responsibility, not more democracy” (Hayward, 
2012, 5).  
According to Hayward (2012), the dominating importance of the market and private property 
rights to society has undoubtedly had an effect on the perceptions of children towards what is 
valued and what is important. Much literature points to concerns that young people now “equate 
‘good citizenship’ with habits of private responsibility and ‘ethical consumption’ in ways that 
leave the underlying drivers of environmental and social problems unchallenged” (Hayward, 
2012, 21). This reflects the privileging of individualism within neoliberalism and the idea that 
each individual is responsible for “her or his own behaviour and destiny” and thus determine 
their own influence on the environment (Kelsey, 1993, 16).  
For Hayward (2012), the internalising of neoliberal values is of most concern when it involves 
the compromise of other values such as those based around community and collectivism that 
have been replaced with these new forms of individualised citizenship. Citizenship that relies 
upon behaviour change from each individual and does not allow or promote criticism or analysis 
of the politics of power at systemic level fails to address the reality of “complex, interconnected 
problems” (Hayward, 2012, 12).  
Hayward argues that as neoliberal actors, youth have been conditioned to see themselves as 
private individual actors, whose power lies in the ability to “adopt pro-environmental 
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behaviours” (Hayward, 2012, 7). Further, neoliberal discourse has affected how environmental 
issues are portrayed. Environmental issues tend to be viewed through a psychological lens which 
has allowed the moulding and shaping of messages to a moral and individualistic framing. A 
psychological and individualistic framing of environmental issues is said to have compromised 
the political approach to such issues. By teaching young people to perceive issues as being 
political, according to Hayward, allows citizens to gain the agency needed to make larger, more 
widespread systemic change. Hayward suggests that neoliberalism and as a result “consumer-
citizenship”: 
Inadvertently narrows our vision of citizenship, reducing the potential of political agency 
to the aggregation of personal values choices, aspirations and psycho-social interactions 
with the natural world, obscuring the political potential of citizens collaborating and 
reasoning together to create alternative pathways and forms of public life (Hayward, 
2012, 8).  
This notion reflects the post-political condition raised in Chapter 2, as it demonstrates the 
privileging of solutions that do not address the social, political and economic systemic causes of 
issues (Swyngedouw, 2010). Instead, solutions that do not shift the status quo or create political 
conflict are the norm. Hayward warns against “the temptation to withdraw from our rapidly-
degrading and disappointing world in favour of “do it yourself” independent green living” 
(Hayward, 2012, 5-6) which essentially fails to address any of the root causes of environmental 
or social issues, in fact making such inequalities worse by creating a “green privileged elite” 
(Hayward, 2012, 5-6) and distracts from the solutions which will address the underlying 
systemic causes.  
Furthermore, Hayward recognises a reliance upon market based mechanisms contributing to a 
lack of political framing of environmental issues. As a result of neoliberalism, market tools are 
seen as the solutions to our problems “including fiscal incentives, tax deductions for home 
insulation and carbon trading” (Hayward, 2012, 8). As neoliberal market-oriented actors, one 
benefit of a financial incentives scheme is that we can be encouraged to act in certain ways by 
profit. This presents the question: would we act to the benefit of the environment if no financial 
incentives were offered? Hayward (2012) concedes that market solutions also do not address the 
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systemic causes of environmental issues as noted by practitioners of the climate justice approach. 
They not only reduce complex issues down to economic issues but ignore the role that citizens 
could have in creating community led solutions. With issues becoming increasingly complex, 
agency, collaboration, imagination and democracy are required to solve them. This is far beyond 
what Hayward believes we are teaching our young people, which is that “good citizens recycle 
and vote, are dutiful, obedient, resourceful and resilient” (Hayward, 2012, 12).  
Similarly, Nairn et al (2012) explore the implications of neoliberalism on the generations born 
after 1984, referred to as the neoliberal generation. Rapid and radical neoliberal policy reform 
has thus influenced this generation’s “identities and futures” (Nairn et al, 2012, 11) and reflect 
how they make the transition from school to adult lives. Neoliberal discourse has affected how 
attitudes toward consumption and have made products increasingly important to young people’s 
identities. Often heralded as materialistic (the ‘Me Generation’), this hides the impact of 
increasing inequalities on the experiences on some of this generation. 
Secondly, Nairn et al (2012) note the measures of success and learner identities within the 
neoliberal generation. Participants generally characterised successful learners “in terms of hard 
work and good behaviour that would be rewarded in the acquisition of school and post-school 
qualification” (Nairn et al, 2012, 111). This is once again the ideal that individuals are 
responsible for their own futures and therefore this is where the power for change is perceived to 
be held- at the individual level rather than in the system or the collective. This “complicated 
version of freedom” (Nairn et al, 2012, 12) involves becoming  a risk taker or accepting 
exploitative or free labour (such as internships) in order to “get a foot in the door” (Nairn et al, 
2012, 12). 
Overall, in their commentaries of the effects of neoliberalism on this youthful generation, Nairns 
et al (2012) and Hayward (2012) analyse the impact of neoliberal economic policy on attitudes 
toward the future and active citizenship. Both Nairn et al (2012) and Hayward (2012) note the 
prevalence of individualistic behaviour evident in taking responsibility for one’s self. This in turn 





Historically, Aotearoa New Zealand has a diverse and established history of activism on social 
and environmental issues. In recent years, movements around the world have sought to address 
climate change- seen as the ultimate environmental and social issue of this generation of youth. 
However, our current local and global context has affected youth activism and perceptions of 
change. Within the “youth climate movement” and amongst climate change organisations and 
movements in general, diversity has sometimes arisen as a result of fundamentally different 
ideological viewpoints. According to Nairn et al and Hayward, neoliberalism has affected how 
today’s youthful generation perceive different aspects of their lives and how they can make 
change. This research seeks to explore what this means for radical action on climate change such 
as that which is advocated for by the climate justice movement.  
This context presents attributes of what Swyngedouw, Žižek and other theorists refer to as a 
post-political condition. According to Hayward (2012), as a result of the influence of 
neoliberalism, young environmentally concerned citizens are more likely to engage with a 
consensual approach. However, Hayward (2012) expresses concern about not only a lack of 
engagement with the “properly” political (or close to “properly”) but with forms of engagement 
with political institutions such as voting.  
The following Chapter 4 will cover the methods and approach used in this study to analyse the 
perceptions of research participants. The remainder of this thesis will explore how participants 
perceive climate change causes and solutions and how these perceptions may be influenced by 
the concept of the neoliberal generation. Moreover, this research will explore how the dominant 
neoliberal discourse may have shaped perceptions of the “properly” political or radical action on 
climate change through building the post-political condition.   
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Chapter 4: Research approach and methods 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will introduce the case study group used for this research and outline the methods 
used to collect and analyse research data. The purpose of this research is to explore and 
understand the perspectives members of Generation Zero have in relation to addressing climate 
change. Generation Zero, as a youth-driven climate change organisation, provided the ideal case 
study example. A post-structural approach to this research was taken, with qualitative research 
methods employed to gain data. The implications of my positionality as a researcher and an 
activist in this study will be discussed in relation to the analysis methods chosen. To gather data, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with ten young people and discourse analysis used to 
recognise themes and dynamics within the interview transcripts. This chapter will explore in 
more depth the methods and the justifications for these choices.  
4.2 Research approach: post-structuralism 
This study takes a post-structuralist approach. The justification for this choice was that post-
structural approaches use language to understand society and the creation of knowledge 
(Murdoch, 2006). By taking a post-structural approach allowed for the role of positionality 
within knowledge construction to be considered (Panelli, 2004). Further, a post-structural 
approach is appropriate given the relevance of how different systems and socially-constructed 
knowledge interact with the complexity of the climate change issue. A post-structuralist 
approach implies that reality is dynamic as a result of changing cultural, economic, social and 
political conditions and thus immeasurable (Dwyer & Limb, 2001).  This idea is appropriate for 
this study as it assumes that the data gathered is influenced by systemic forces and carries 
multiple and dynamic meanings.  
4.3 Positionality as a researcher 
Considering positionality allows for an understanding of “the impact of explicit and implied 
power structures on the research process, the relationships between the researcher and those 
researched, and the transfer of knowledge” (Chacko, 2004. 51). My positionality within this 
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research is that of a middle-class, university-educated female. I am 22 years old and a third 
generation New Zealander of Chinese descent. My positionality undoubtedly affects my 
research. In this instance I am peers with my research participants. All research participants are 
of a similar age, university educated or currently studying at a university, based in Wellington 
and identify as middle class and able bodied. Four of the participants identify as male and five as 
female. This contextual make-up mirrors the general make-up of the Wellington Generation Zero 
group. Further, these attributes allow me to consider the identities of the research participants as 
similar to my own (though by no means identical, given the large role that gender and ethnicity 
play in positionality). All of research participants identify as European or Pakeha, something 
which differentiates my positionality as a researcher from that of the participants. It was unclear 
to me what implications gender and ethnicity may have on this research, other than perhaps 
subtle power relations and differences of experience. The majority of research surrounding the 
impact of positionality on researchers and research participants looks at situations “where the 
researcher is in a more powerful position than the participant” (Mullings, 1999, 338). Having a 
number of similar identity attributes may have worked to reduce power imbalances between 
myself and research participants. However, Mullings (1999) notes the influence of gender in 
creating an “asymmetrical distribution of institutional power between men and women” which 
“has implications for the sort of information and insights that interviews produce” (Mullings, 
1999, 339). Further, the positionality of my participants has clear implications for this research in 
terms of discourse and privileging of knowledge, given their educational backgrounds. 
As a 22 year old researcher, and a member of the neoliberal generation, neoliberalism has 
undoubtedly shaped and influenced my postionality in many ways. However, the impact of 
neoliberalism on my views is not entirely as described by Hayward (2012) and Nairn et al 
(2012), due to my critical and radical perspective of the climate change issue. This understanding 
has implications in making me an “insider” and “outsider” to my own research (Mullings, 1999) 
as participants may share a similar understanding or oppose these perspectives, thus I am 
inherently conflicted.  
A similar “insider/outsider” tension exists around my personal involvement with activism and 
political issues. My participation in a number of climate change groups such as Climate Justice 
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Wellington, 350 Aotearoa and Generation Zero was a huge influence on my selection of this 
particular research topic and meant that I had a strong pre-existing awareness and knowledge of 
the issues surrounding climate change activism. Further, my involvement with the case study 
group, Generation Zero, and its members span a number of years beyond this research. Thus as 
both a researcher and an activist within my own “community,” my positionality has implications 
for the process of knowledge creation. It creates an intricate set of circumstances, which 
highlights what Chacko (2004) suggests is the inability to separate personal interests and 
experiences from research. Mullings (1999) also refers to the complexities inherent in being 
considered an insider, yet also an outsider to research participants’ social groupings. Mullings 
(1999, 340) notes that “researchers can never be fully located on one side or the other of the 
insider/outsider boundary.” It is thus important to recognise the advantages and disadvantages 
being partially both an insider and outsider. 
One advantage of my involvement is that there mutual understanding and open-mindedness 
between myself and my research participants, given that we discuss climate change issues on a 
regular basis. Conversely, some differences in opinion existed between myself and my research 
participants. However, I aimed to minimise the impact of this on my participants’ responses by 
allowing the interview space to be for participants to express their opinions, rather than my own.  
Ideally, one should strive to create an impartial research environment in recognition of the 
complexities and assumptions created by the insider/outsider positionality and “create a space 
during interviews that allows interviewees to share information freely” (Mullings, 1999, 340). 
This is opposed to disregarding the researcher’s partial insider status in favour of perceived 
objectivity or neutrality which is very difficult to accomplish.  
However, I believe my role within the organisation and with the people involved in my research 
meant that there was an added degree of honesty and “authenticity” due to my previous 
immersion in the field/research environment (Chacko, 2004). This meant my experiences can be 
considered more “authentic” and thus further legitimated by dominant western scientific 
discourse. In recognising my role also as an “outsider,” I encouraged a degree of critical 




4.3.1 Scholar activist 
In addition to being a part of the community or “field environment” that I was researching, being 
a researcher and activist presents another set of issues and identities to consider. As previously 
acknowledged one must be sensitive to differing views and experiences as well as changing roles 
and identities from peers to researcher and researched and the implications that this may have on 
the tone of the research. I believe my experience as a researcher balanced nicely with my 
personal relationships with my research participants as it meant interviews maintained a 
conversational tone and helped to break down some of the barriers between activists and scholars 
(Chatterton, 2008). However, interviewees respected my need to ask particular questions as a 
researcher, perhaps in part due an understanding built through their own academic activities.  
The key issue faced by scholar activists is the attempt to bring activism and academic discourse 
together meaningfully despite the barriers that exist between the “rigid” academic institution and 
the “organic” process of social change (Chatterton, 2008, 424). This was largely inapplicable to 
this research as the research participants are or were a part of the academic institution; they never 
questioned why I would study activism and rather saw it as a way to legitimise their views and 
theories of change. In many ways, my research instead highlights many of the complications of 
activism and perceived dichotomies created by an academic lens. 
I used academic framing and discourse theory to deconstruct dominating discourses within 
climate change issues and at the same time offer the activist community some insights to 
consider. In a sense, as an activist scholar, one feels a sense of responsibility to use their research 
to assist or offer critique to fellow activists, to make space for activists to analyse their own 
discourse. Similar to my own research, Chatterton (2008, 426) aimed to bring radical ideas to 
audiences that may not ordinarily consider them:  
I want to galvanize dissent, normalize critique, and make radical alternatives seem like 
real possibilities for our times. There are always possibilities for radicalising public 
debates, be they in our workplaces (disputes with management, supporting junior 
members of staff, challenging corporate restructuring and management diktats, 
introducing radical ideas into our teaching) or outside (helping groups with campaign 
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strategies, showing solidarity to those in resistance, attending events and demonstrations, 
lobbying and defending for particular causes).  
Within Foucauldian discourse analysis, the positionality of the researcher and the research 
subjects is given important consideration as the power relations between each party will 
influence the knowledge created through the research. Though Rose (1997 in Waitts, 2010, 225) 
warns “that it may impossible to ever fully locate oneself in a research project” it is an important 
consideration when conducting discourse analysis. Thus this research utilised qualitative 
methods to gather data that describe the perceptions of youth and related discourses.  
4.4 Qualitative Methods 
This study was conducted using qualitative methods, as these are founded on the assumption that 
knowledge is constructed, in keeping with the post-structuralist approach (Dawyer & Limb, 
2001).  Qualitative research methods were utilised to understand the perceptions and opinions of 
Generation Zero members. Qualitative research methods were most appropriate to this research 
as they allow each participant to present a contextualised story of their perceptions. Such 
methods produce an in-depth and complex understanding of each research participant’s point of 
view (Creswell, 2009).  The focus on depth of understandings, as opposed to breadth of data, 
allowed for a more thorough analysis of the factors influencing participants’ perceptions. 
Methods comprised of exploring the case study of Generation Zero through conducting semi-
structured interviews and a discourse analysis of the interview transcripts.  
4.5 Case study: Generation Zero 
The case study for this research is the youth climate change organisation Generation Zero. 
Generation Zero is self-described as “a movement of young New Zealanders uniting to ensure 
our future well-being is not undermined by political decisions made today on climate change and 
fossil fuel policies. We are the generation that must oversee the transformation to a zero carbon 
world” (Generation Zero, n.d.). Generation Zero was formed in 2011 in a process which I was 
involved in. Following its formation, I volunteered for the organisation for approximately a year 
before withdrawing my involvement significantly. Comprised mainly of university students from 
Auckland, Dunedin and Wellington, Generation Zero has dozens of active volunteers and 
hundreds of cyber supporters around the country. Generation Zero aims to encourage concern for 
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climate change through climate change solutions based campaigns and awareness-raising. 
Members organise speaker events with climate change experts, leadership trainings and 
workshops, write press releases, discuss issues with local politicians and hold stunts such as a 
“Funeral for Business As Usual” and “Operation Exposure.” Operation Exposure saw dozens of 
members in Wellington board trains in their underwear to “expose” an unequal transport 
spending between roads and public transport. A non-partisan organisation, Generation Zero aims 
for broad based political support for policies that reduce New Zealand’s carbon emissions.  
The current generation in charge is passing the buck to the future…If we allow this to 
continue, young New Zealanders will not only inherit massive ecological debt and a 
country further reliant on fossil fuels, we will also be lumbered with a hidden financial 
debt because of our country’s failure to meet its international commitments. The 
Government’s main response to addressing climate change – the Emissions Trading 
Scheme – is actually a mechanism to shift most of the costs to a future generation… Yep, 
that’s us. As Generation Zero, not only do we have the most to lose from bad decisions 
today, we have the most to gain from taking action to protect our future (Generation 
Zero, n.d.). 
Generation Zero primarily frames climate change as an issue of intergenerational justice and 
refers to the injustice as being the financial burden that will be placed on future generations 
should current leaders continue to ignore the issue of climate change. However, the issue is 
framed locally and made relevant to the members’ demographic. Thus the focus of campaigns 
tends to be decision makers at local and central government.  
Generation Zero was selected as a case study for this research as they are entirely youth operated 
and thus members are from the neoliberal generation. Neoliberalism is both inherent and 
observable within Generation Zero’s campaigning and critique and thus they make an ideal case 
study that highlights the complexities of activism that shuns many aspects of neoliberalism but 
embraces others. The following section will discuss the methods used within this research and 




4.6 Interview process 
Data for this research was collected using qualitative methods: open ended semi structured 
interviews and analysis of various documents produced by Generation Zero. Interviews allowed 
me to explore complex and conflicting ideas organically and how they might be related to a 
diversity of experiences (Dunn, 2010). Interviews also allow research participants to explore and 
reflect on their own world views (Dunn, 2010). Accordingly, the questions asked during the 
interview process referred directly to the research questions this thesis is based upon. Research 
questions one, two and three were all addressed through separate sections of interview questions 
concerning the causes and solutions of climate change and political action on climate change 
respectively. For the interview schedule, see Appendix Three. 
Overall, nine young people were interviewed for approximately an hour each. All interview 
participants were existing contacts established through prior involvement in Generation Zero. 
Fortunately, general interest in this research meant there was no difficulty in sourcing interview 
participants. Participants had varying degrees of involvement in respect to level of engagement 
and time committed to Generation Zero in Wellington. For instance, some members were 
involved with the overall strategy of Generation Zero and the National Steering Committee that 
oversees campaigns and actions. Other members only attended the Generation Zero weekly 
meetings and/or events organised. 
Ethics approval for the interviews was granted on 16 July 2012 by Victoria University of 
Wellington Ethics Committee (see Appendix Four). Interviews were conducted after each 
participant received an information sheet outlining the intentions of this research (Appendix 
One) and signed a consent form that gave permission to use information gained through the 
interviews for this thesis (Appendix Two). Participants also gave permission to have their 
interviews audio-recorded. Accordingly, participants remain anonymous throughout this study 
and are referred to as Participants A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I.  
All interviews were conducted face-to-face, as the lack of ability to read expression and facilitate 
open conversation during computer-mediated or telephone interviews would be detrimental to 
this research (Dunn, 2010). This research required participants to share their opinions and 
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perceptions which they may be uncertain and unclear on or may be controversial. Thus it was 
necessary to be able to meet face-to-face.  
Each interview began with a number of orientation questions, to get a sense of each participant’s 
background and knowledge. Further, these questions allowed participants to place themselves 
into the context of my research, relax and also helped create rapport between myself and the 
participant as the following questions would require a lot of theoretical or “big picture thinking” 
(George & Stratford, 2010). During each interview I explained what I meant by terms such as 
“radical action” or “political action.” I was open to and received questions and critique of these 
definitions which I was able to incorporate within analysis. It was also important given the 
subject matter to use mainstream and “easily understood language” (Dunn, 2010, 105). 
Other considerations made when planning my research was to ensure that I did not create 
defensiveness around the forms of action that the individual or the organisation was taking. I 
aimed to minimise this by wording my questions neutrally, not implying that one method of 
political action was superior to another or suggesting that Generation Zero ought to conduct their 
campaigns differently. This is particularly important given my initial role as a member of 
Generation Zero as well as my known involvement in different climate justice groups since then. 
I was able to use my knowledge of the issue of climate change activism to create meaningful 
conversation and articulate my own openness to their opinions. 
Questions were open-ended and designed to provide insight into participants’ opinions and 
experiences. Participants did not receive the questions first and interviews were semi-structured 
as opposed to unstructured or structured. A topic guide (see Appendix Three) was used to focus 
the interviews but the conversation was allowed to diverge if interesting, relevant threads 
emerged. This minimised the chances of participants trying to predict the response required and 
allowed for thoughts and insights to naturally progress. In other words, semi-structured 
interviews allowed for discovery of “what is relevant to the informant” (Dunn, 2010, 103). 
Further, this method of interviewing allows interviewees to frame issues in their own ways, 
which was important for conducting a discourse analysis (Dunn, 2010).  
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4.7 Discourse analysis 
Foucaldian discourse analysis of the interview transcripts help to gauge the themes and issues 
presented by participants. This technique was also used to analyse Generation Zero press 
releases, website content and facebook page content. Discourse analysis using the guidelines set 
out by Foucault, recognises the importance of power within relationships both between the 
researcher and the researched and within the researched (Waitt, 2010). A discourse analysis 
explores what has created and influenced particular realities and how we have come to 
understand through knowledge systems (Waitt, 2010). This is particularly pertinent to this study 
which deals with the way neoliberal discourse has created knowledge and norms through power 
relations.   
Foucauldian discourse analysis uses the ideas of Michel Foucault as a lens through which to 
examine how discourse is created through perceived ‘truths’ or “how particular knowledge 
becomes common sense and dominant, which simultaneously silences different interpretations of 
the world” (Waitt, 2010, 217). Namely, forms of knowledge become privileged as “‘truthful’ or 
‘factual’ knowledge” whilst others are “excluded or silenced” (Waitt, 2010, 225). Foucault 
explored the influence of social contexts, control and power relations on creating such perceived 
‘truths’ and knowledges. This is turn affects what people believe to exist “and determine what 
they say (attitudes) and do (practices)” (Waitt, 2010, 218).  
Essentially, Foucault argued that to have actual “truth” is impossible and it is the power relations 
between social groups that influence what is “accepted and repeated” as “valid, legitimate, 
trustworthy, or authoritative” (Waitt, 2010, 234) and what is ignored. However, Foucauldian 
discourse analysis is widely acknowledged, including by Foucault himself, to be epitomised by 
complexity and have no one set definition.  
Foucauldian discourse analysis requires approaching materials with “ ‘fresh’ eyes and ears” 
(Waitt, 2010, 223). This sentiment was particularly pertinent to this study given my own role 
within the community studied and the number of discussions around the ideas presented in the 
study that pre-dated the research period. In order to do justice to the discourse analysis, all 
preconceptions “must be held in suspense…we must show that they do not come about by 
themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of which must be known and the 
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justifications of which must be scrutinized” (Foucault, 1972, 25 in Waitt, 2010, 224). 
 
The intention of this study is to explore the social contexts which have formed knowledge and 
“truths” as a result of the influence of neoliberalism within climate change issues. Therefore, one 
must consider what Foucault refers to as “discursive structures” that create “normative meanings, 
attitudes, and practices” (Waitt, 2010, 233) that limit what we know to be possible. Western 
scientific knowledge and the creation of binaries and hierarchies such as “rationality/irrationality, 
man/woman, mind/body, straight/gay, masculine/feminine, and humanity/nature” (Waitt, 2010, 
233) are examples of knowledge that has become accepted as “truth”. Knowledge privileging is 
relevant to this research because it reflects different discourses and framings of the climate 
change issue. This research aims to uncover different perceptions and discourses around climate 
change and activism and thus it is important to consider the implications of knowledge binaries 
and hierarchies. 
Waitt (2010)  highlights that discursive structures seem to appear as fixed norms and common 
sense: 
[However] they are fragile and continually ruptured. Hence, there are always possibilities 
for meanings, attitudes, and practices to change or be challenged. Therefore, an essential 
part of doing discourse analysis is to be alert to possible contradictions and ambiguities in 
text (Waitt, 2010, 235). 
This sentiment is highly relevant given the inherent complexities of climate change discourse.  
4.8 Coding 
Coding was done in order to conduct the discourse analysis. All interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and coded both for organisation and interpretation (Waitt, 2010). This was done using 
both descriptive and analytical codes (Cope, 2010; Waitt, 2010). Transcripts were coded 
descriptively (called manifest codes) based on elements of key research objectives. For example, 
participants’ perspectives on the causes or solutions to climate change were descriptive codes as 
were references to specific forms of political action (Cope, 2010), such as “radical activism” and 
“institutional political action.” When coding specifically for discourse analysis (called analytic 
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codes), codes were based around discourses, and used to represent personal or formative 
experiences (Cope, 2010). Key terms that emerged from the data included “neoliberal 
generation”, “individualism”, “mainstreaming” and “climate justice”. Contradictions or 
contestations to these discourses were also coded.  
4.9 Summary 
Overall, this study takes a post-structuralist approach to qualitative research. My positionality as 
the researcher, as an activist and a scholar placed both opportunities and limitations on my 
research. As a member of the studied community, I spoke to participants with ease and openness 
and was able to draw on my experiences to question theirs. Further, the academic privilege of my 
research participants meant there was little questioning of the academic framing of the “organic” 
process of activism. The full implications of my positionality will never be truly known but are 
considered throughout analysis in chapters 5 and 6. Semi-structured interviews allowed for 
participants to frame their thoughts in their own language and to discuss opinions openly and 
within context. Finally, through the coding process and subsequent discourse analysis, this study 
reveals the complexities, ambiguities and paradoxes in the discursive structures inherent in 
perceptions of both activism and neoliberalism discourse. The following chapter will provide a 
discourse analysis of data gathered around the first research objective which explores perceptions 





Chapter 5: Neoliberal discourse and perceptions of 
climate change 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer the research objective: how do members of Generation Zero 
perceive the causes and solutions to climate change? The purpose of this objective is to gain an 
understanding of the role of neoliberal discourse in forming perceptions of climate change and 
thus how these young activists may choose to address the issue of climate change. It will explore 
the implications of these perceptions on what members of Generation Zero deem possible and 
how their visions for the future are shaped through their actions.  
Participants were asked several basic questions around the causes and solutions to climate 
change. These were broad, open-ended questions and as a result each participant interpreted it 
slightly differently. Subsequently, I conducted Foucaldian discourse analysis on interview 
transcripts and have used quotes and references from these interviews to provide the evidence 
found within this chapter and Chapter 6. Given the complex and multi-faceted nature of issues, 
the results described in the following chapter are equally complex and often paradoxical.  
Participants were asked to describe what they saw as the causes of climate change. Many 
participants perceived the causes to manifest across differing scales, citing differences between 
the scientific causes of environmental changes and the human and emissions-producing activities 
and the “deeper” or “root” causes. As outlined in Chapter 3, the climate justice movement looks 
to the root causes of climate change and asks what systemically drives greenhouse gas emitting 
activities (Bond, 2010a; Dawson, 2010). These root causes include capitalism, neoliberal 
globalisation and associated consumerism, individualism and commodification: 
To be fair, the first thing came into my head was CO2 but I know that although it might 
look like in New Zealand that it’s CO2, it’s a lot easier in other places, from casing other 
places, to be reminded that it’s more fundamental things like corruption and power and 
access to resources (Participant D).  
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Several participants suggested that a lack of understanding amongst others of the connections 
between anthropogenic emissions causing activities and the underlying systems resulted from 
little knowledge about climate change, as Participant A highlights “the entry level one [cause of 
climate change] obviously is... emissions.” 
Moreover, through their activism, participants were found to be contributing to this discourse 
that makes climate change about carbon emissions. In particular, the need to reduce climate 
change to a simplified issue of emissions in order to gain widespread public support resonated 
with many participants: “the people [in Generation Zero] who want it to be accessible to a large 
number of people want it to be about CO2” (Participant D). The following section will discuss 
both the perspectives of research participants in relation to the causes of climate change, in 
particular when it is not reduced to an issue of emissions only.  
5.2 Systemic causes of climate change  
Initially, most participants discussed emissions producing activities such as deforestation, 
transport and agriculture as the primary causes of climate change. Participant H simply referred 
to “humans” and Participant E to “unnecessary human behaviour.” Nevertheless, many 
participants acknowledge further “systemic” “root” or “deeper” causes of climate change that 
underlie these activities. As Participant G noted, “I would rather talk on a deeper level.” Several 
participants identified economic and social systems as the cause of climate change, some of 
which take root in neoliberal discourse. This was directly identified by some participants and 
indirectly referred to by others. As shown in Table 1, the systemic causes of climate change 
referred to are diverse. Some participants recognise attributes of neoliberalism as a notable cause 
and there is resounding recognition of the underlying influence of broader political, economic 
and social systems on emissions.  
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Table 1: Systemic causes of climate change  
Neoliberal 
growth 
- “It [climate change] has been perpetuated by neoliberalism and 
these economic theories of growth and profit” (Participant C). 
Consumption 
and lifestyle 
- “Consumerist and consumption driven modern economies” 
(Participant F). 
-  “Our value of ‘your own,’ fulfilment of your own desires is the 
most important thing you can do in your lifestyle” (Participant A). 
Industrialisation - “Sudden advance in technology” (Participant G). 
- “It’s a product of the industrial revolution” (Participant G). 
- “There’s a disconnect between the way we think about growth and 
how we can grow into the world which I think is an idea from the 
time of the industrial revolution” (Participant G). 




- “There are a whole lot of interlinked problems in the world that are 
tied into the structure of our economies” (Participant F). 
-  “An urbanised society” (Participant C). 
- “The root cause [is] the way in which our society runs” (Participant 
C). 
- “How humans interact and their conceptualisations of their 
environment and whether they are part of the natural world or not” 
(Participant D). 
- “There is a disconnect between the way our entire society is 
organised and the reality of the world that we live in” (Participant 
G). 
- “A European Westernised background and from all the ideas that 





Larner (2000) refers to the interconnectedness of political and economic neoliberalism and wider 
social consequences. Evidently, this has been recognised by some participants, “there are a 
whole lot of interlinked problems in the world that are tied into the structure of our economies” 
(Participant F). Many of the statements made by members of Generation Zero also echo a 
climate justice narrative, which recognises the interconnectedness of economic systems and 
social behaviours. For example: 
 That mindset change is not even enough in itself because there is a feedback loop 
between the structures, the economic systems that we have in place that make people, in 
fact force people, to act the way that they do, in terms of the way businesses work, in 
terms of the way competition drives people to strive for more wealth and if they don’t 
strive for more wealth than they get pushed out of the market (Participant G). 
Through recognising the connections between social behaviours and economic systems, 
participants highlighted the “system” causes of climate change. As shown in Table 1, many 
participants, when referring to the system responsible for climate change, spoke on a number of 
different scales. Some participants referred to the system as external and somewhat monolithic 
(“it’s absolutely entrenched” (Participant G)), whilst others equated the system to ingrained 
human behaviours (“a culture of striving for more” (Participant I)). Participants also refer 
indirectly and directly to neoliberalism, capitalism and broader economic system as well, for 
example, modernity, urbanisation and consumerism. They recognise the complexity of the 
systems that are causing climate change and the interconnectedness of their developments, 
through a lack of differentiation between direct and indirect causes and effects.  
Some described their own personal inability and the inability of society to escape from the ideals 
and norms brought about by these systems. These were recognised to have negative social and 
environmental implications, including the perpetuation of climate change and our inability to act 
on the problem. As Participant I stated: 
The reason for me, the reason why it [climate change] has just continued to grow is that 
people are more comfortable with the lifestyles that we have now and there is a culture of 
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striving for more and more and more and pulling more out of the ground to satisfy that 
need for a supposedly better lifestyle. 
However, not all participants considered individualism, consumerism and other “undesirable” 
social characteristics to be directly correlated with our economic systems or neoliberal 
globalisation:  
If you blame the economic system you say that but also it’s individualistic values, it’s 
community values, it’s a whole string of values that got lumped onto us from the 
enlightenment period and from a European Westernised background.. not all of these are 
market values, they’re from the period of the 20th century to now.. emerged our values of 
‘your own’, fulfilment of your own desires is the most important thing you can do” 
(Participant A). 
The deep-seated and irreversible nature of neoliberalism in Aotearoa New Zealand (Larner, 
2000; Kelsey, 1999) means it has become difficult to distinguish where each set of ideas begins 
and ends. As referred to in Chapter 3, despite the entrenched nature of neoliberalism, it is also 
complex and paradoxical in its manifestations (Larner, 2000; Peck & Tickell, 2002). Section 5.2 
has shown a strong recognition of systemic causes of climate change, including neoliberalism, 
economic systems and values. However, the nature of these causes is complex. In the following 
sections, I will analyse the similarities and discrepancies in how members of Generation Zero 
envisage and seek to realise their goals given these perspectives.  
5.3 Solutions to climate change 
As discussed in Chapter 2, mainstream discourse around what should be done about climate 
change can be understood as centred on a post-political carbon consensus and the formation of 
international climate change policy through a number of prevalent neoliberal mechanisms such 
as carbon markets and a price on carbon. As might be expected, the majority of participants 
identified with characteristics of ‘third way’ politics although they did not name it as such. 
Conversely, some participants also referred to the need to make radical shifts in society. 
However, as will be explored in the following sections, they also recognised the reality of our 
neoliberalised society and the limitations this presented for radical change.  
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The variety of solutions to climate change offered by participants was considerably wider than 
the causes of climate change. This highlights further, the complexity and paradox inherent in the 
climate change issue. Many participants saw the relatively easy and tangible mechanisms for 
addressing climate change as important, however preferred to talk at length about the deeper 
societal changes that needed to occur. 
Table 2: Solutions to climate change referred to by members of Generation Zero 
Changing personal 
behaviours 
“Self-responsibility is the solution... being self-responsible and 
able to stand on their own two feet and to work purposefully 
towards something and being accountable” (Participant A). 
“Getting people to drive less and take public transport more, 
getting people to eat more locally these are all very [...] lifestyle 
changes come with a political manifestation as well” 
(Participant I).  
“Changing attitudes and stuff” (Participant C). 
Institutional politics  “I think in the midterm it’s about... politically voting for a party 
in New Zealand which appreciated guardianship but in the long 
term it’s about every political party representing a widely held 
cultural view that humans are guardians if that makes sense” 
(Participant D). 
“Climate change is such an international problem so it needs to 
be binding at the legal political level, international agreements. 
Yeah, and blanket rules of everyone because we are all it 
together” (Participant H). 
“Transport, energy production and I guess those are the easiest 
to lobby on... working towards decentralisation of food 
production and stuff. And food miles” (Participant C). 
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Shifting energy systems 
and reducing fossil fuel 
dependency 
“From a straight, scientific or technological point of view I’d 
say fossil fuels largely. I mean If we had develop[ment] based 
on energy sources that didn’t emit CO2 we would still have a lot 
of other problems but we wouldn’t have the climate change 
problem” (Participant F). 
“Fundamentally, transforming the energy systems, yeah so there 
are other parts of it too, with fossil fuels as the big kahuna, but 
yeah halting deforestation and sorting agricultural emissions 
needs to be part of it too” (Participant F). 
“Working on our deforestation and our plantation cycles of 
timber and working on... reducing the coal industry and beyond 
reducing general fossil fuel dependency” (Participant H).  
Economy based change “As far as addressing climate change on its own I can envisage a 
similar kind of economy that was at least in the short term... that 
wasn’t based on fossil fuels and therefore wouldn’t contribute to 
climate change” (Participant F). 
“You can have a monetary based economy with an entirely 
different radical mindset and that could provide the solution 
hypothetically” (Participant A). 
“When you think about actually applying to create solutions to 
climate change the current political climate... is not the 
necessary urgency or action to do that. The current global 
political climate isn’t going to do that. The current economic 
system as it has been unanimously criticised isn’t going to do 
that” (Participant A). 
Changing perceptions “It involves changing from the pursuit of wealth to other wealth, 
the pursuit of traditionally defined wealth to a human wealth, a 
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community wealth, a personal wealth, a friendship wealth” 
(Participant G). 
 “I’m saying that the whole frame in which we see the world is a 
frame which perpetuates the problem and... the solution is 
essentially getting out of the frame but how can you motivate 
people to get out of that frame, how can you change the political 
sphere to get outside of the frame, how can you change the 
consumer sphere to get outside of that frame” (Participant A). 
 
The following subsections break the comments shown in Table 2 into themes and discusses them 
in relation to some of the key points made in Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
5.3.1 Neoliberalism and individual/consumer responsibility 
Hayward (2012) suggests that the emphasis on individualistic action within environmental 
education is the result of neoliberal influences. Hayward uses market-based approaches and 
consumer choice as two key examples, “over the past thirty years we have grown accustomed to 
hearing that difficult, challenging problems require more efficient, market-based solutions, more 
personal responsibility, not more democracy” (Hayward, 2012, 5). Hayward (2012) advocates a 
shift towards fostering a sense of social justice and understanding of the importance of collective 
action within children and young people:  
Citizenship and environmental education too often fails to meet the needs of a new 
generation. We teach our children and our students to recycle and reduce waste while 
ignoring the way domestic violence and poverty are also pressing ecological concerns 
(Hayward, 2012, 4).  
In other words, Hayward (2012) suggests that ecological issues cannot be met without also 
addressing social issues, as the causes are interlinked. According to Hayward (2012), meeting 
these challenges requires collective action, not individualised action. Similarly, when asked what 
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solutions exist to the climate change issue, several participants discussed the role of the 
individual citizen as a part of the solution. However, according to Participant E: 
Individual action is a great place to start but it’s a really shitty place to end... I remember 
being really focussed on individual action before I joined any groups and I found it really 
really, really disempowering. It feels like everything you are doing for the planet is 
cutting two minutes off your shower and you’re like, this isn’t doing fuck all. 
Participant E sheds light on the idea that individualised action for environmental change has 
fallen out of favour with this particular group of young people. This is through recognition that 
individualised action does not encourage collective action, but rather discourages it. Political 
action to encourage policy change is seen as a way to make broad scale behaviour change more 
efficiently. Interestingly, Participant E also refers to the role of the citizen within politics:  
So like politics is, if you work really hard at it [citizen involvement in politics], you can, 
well you might be able to, have a massive impact as opposed to even if I biked every 
single day, you’re not going to be have a massive impact. 
Thus, according to Participant E the responsibility of action still lies within the individual to 
work hard and be effective within politics. The “working hard” attitude has had a noticeable 
impact on development of the neoliberal generation as they move through education and into 
employment (Nairn et al, 2012).  
Conversely, for Participant A consumers are perceived to have power to make change, however 
lack the knowledge and incentive to shift their choices or consume less: 
Consumers change the mindset you know but consumers aren’t changing the mindset 
because they are completely dislocated from the problems, you go buy a fizzy drink, you 
are completely disconnected from the massive spider web that was involved with the 
manufacturing and also there’s a lack of consumer incentive to make proper sacrifices 
(Participant A). 
So rather than opposing the perpetuation of neoliberalism through “consumer citizenship” as 
Hayward (2012) refers to, participants appear to oppose the lack of efficiency of acting as 
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conscious individuals. Lifestyle change is seen as something that can be encouraged through 
both political change and being part of collective action for market or incentive based behaviour 
change. The disempowering nature of lifestyle change that Participant E noted is made more 
empowering through the collective:  
People doing... political stuff will encourage them to make changes in their own lifestyle 
without us, without Generation Zero, forcing them to do it, and it will inspire others 
observing to make sacrifices and changes in their own lifestyle because they’ll start to see 
it as important and they’ll see others making sacrifices. We work in groups, we think in 
groups, we’re just a bunch of sheep essentially and the political engagement will 
encourage the lifestyle engagement (Participant A). 
Similarly, Participant B sees political action through shifting policy as important in creating large 
scale changes which will shift social norms and thus lifestyles: 
I think it’s ultimately a policy issue. And it’s a change of the social norms. So the 
solutions will be big dramatic changes in the way that you know, economies are run in 
terms of changing ideas of consumption and the reliance on economic growth (Participant 
B). 
However, Participant B hypothesises that it is the policy change itself that will make the change 
rather than collective action and a resulting shift in mindset. In other words, the role of political 
action in changing behaviour is through enforcing new norms which are greater in sum then any 
individual policy change. Further, Participant F suggests that citizens are essentially powerless to 
alter systems through personal behaviour. Citizens can only make the changes necessary through 
forcing or demanding that political elites make the changes needed, whatever they may be, to 
address climate change: 
I think ultimately citizens as individuals have very little ability to alter the trajectory 
we’re on... I don’t buy into that we can solve the problem by changing our own personal 
behaviour and changing the things that we buy and all that sort of thing. That plays a 
role... But ultimately I think citizens need to be exerting pressure on the power structures 
that exist in the world to force them to deal with the problem... (Participant F). 
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According to all the aforementioned participants, citizens have an important role in influencing 
government and business driven solutions. In order to address the material and tangible causes of 
climate change, such as emissions from agriculture and transport, the majority of participants 
privileged solutions such as the Emissions Trading Scheme, public and more efficient transport 
systems and improvements to food distribution systems. Firmly imbedded in their discourse was 
the role of “winning over” the political left and right as well as the central government. The role 
of citizens was thus presented as to engage with these politics. These ideas support the rhetoric 
and provide evidence for the relevance of ‘third way’ politics within mainstream climate change 
discourse. ‘Third way’ politics dictates that the role of citizens is within a “sub-politics.” Citizens 
can use pre-determined channels to influence a politics which uses globalised markets, economic 
development and growth to address climate change and the associated inequalities (Giddens, 
1998).  
Some participants were more actively involved in Generation Zero than others, who described 
themselves as “supporters”. Those more actively involved gave slightly different responses, for 
example the importance of engaging with ‘third way’ politics was felt more strongly by 
participants who were heavily involved in Generation Zero. Evidently, Generation Zero as an 
organisation focuses on political action through policy change. According to Generation Zero’s 
website what is required to solve climate change is “to show that they are committed to 
delivering hope for a positive future for today’s young people, political parties must commit to 
developing a Zero Carbon Action Plan for New Zealand” (Generation Zero, n.d.). Thus this 
support for ‘third way’ politics highlights the role that post-political consensus can have on 
constructing activist climate change discourse.  
 
The research presented in this sub-section suggests that the solution to climate change will 
essentially come from the individual changing their behaviour through a shifting “mindset,” 
starting with collective action for various policy changes. This is not in fitting with Hayward 
(2012)’s notion that the neoliberal generation view consumer choice and market-based solutions 
as most important to environmental citizenship. Nor is it completely in fitting with theories of a 
post-political carbon consensus that uphold that change must occur at the consensus of business 
and politics through mutually agreeable policy. Rather, research participants note that change 
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begins and ends with citizens and “mindset and values” change. Participants recognised the 
perils of individualised behaviour change and simply relying on technology or markets to solve 
their problems. They did not identify direct issues with market-based solutions or changes in 
behaviour. Rather they believe they are catalysts in the solution brought about by a change in 
“mindset and values.”  
5.3.2 Neoliberal ideology and mindset/values 
The general mindset of contemporary people is still stuck on the new, like I know climate 
activists who you know, talk about ‘let’s stop our emissions, let’s stop this’, but yet the 
moment smart phones start coming up you know young climate activists will all start 
buying smart phones because it’s like drilled into our mindset.. the new exciting things 
excite us (Participant A). 
Participant A further recognises the complexities and contradictions being faced by the 
neoliberal generation of activists. Neoliberalism and its ideals, so ingrained into our way of 
living, has its benefits. Literature in Chapter 3 presents the idea that neoliberalism, particularly in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, due to its rapid implementation, is ingrained and perceived as 
irreversible. This is particularly relevant to the neoliberal generation who may have grown to 
define their goals, aspirations and definitions of freedoms according to neoliberal discourse. 
Thus this presents a challenge for neoliberal generation of climate activists who, as this chapter 
suggests, are recognising the role that neoliberalism has played in creating climate change. They 
also recognise its role in the solutions that seem most “realistic” given our current circumstances.  
Participant A brings up an important dichotomy for the neoliberal generation, when 
neoliberalism is perceived to have brought about many lifestyle advantages which as educated, 
middle-class Pakeha, they have undoubtedly benefited from, to the detriment of others. 
Participant D suggests that benefiting from the “system” stifles critique or questioning of it: 
“Especially in New Zealand, being beneficiaries of the system you don’t criticize it as much. But 
also being inside it means you lose perspective” (Participant D). The Free Association (2010) 




Because an antagonistic relationship with capital is still a relationship with capital, it still 
involves defining ourselves in relation to capital. But we don’t want any relation with 
capital (or the state), antagonistic or otherwise. We want to destroy these relationships, 
just as we want to refuse definition. We want exodus, autonomy. And this is the paradox 
(The Free Association, 2010, 1028). 
 
Personal responsibility for behaviour is still perceived by participants as being important in 
addressing climate change. Thus citizens have the agency to shift their own behaviours and 
mindset away from individualistic values. However, mindset is perceived as something that can 
be changed by the individual and also something greater than the individual. It is suggested by 
Participant A that climate activists with all the knowledge available to them, should make the 
right personal choices but instead can be seen as hypocritical and unable to separate themselves 
from the values/systems that are both beneficial and causing environmental harm. For Participant 
A these values include, “being accountable, being self-responsible means being ethically and 
morally responsible for what you do in relationship to the world” (Participant A). This evidence 
represents the complexity in Participant G, A, Ds’ responses as they discuss the embedded 
systemic nature of neoliberalism/capitalism within the problem of climate change and the 
solutions, despite the risk of shifting critique onto their own behaviours.  
 
Similarly, Participant D suggests that the emissions reductions component of addressing climate 
change is secondary to creating incremental cultural change: 
In knowing that it’s [climate change causes] a psychological thing my work in 
Generation Zero is cultural, it’s not about emissions... they’re [other members of 
Generation Zero] like why aren’t you focussing on the emissions? Why are you never 
measuring success and emissions? And it’s because I believe in that psychological and a 
shared psyche... the stronger the collective, the stronger it is a culturally held assumption 
of how the world works and that culture is shared then that psychological belief becomes 
truer and truer for more people (Participant D). 
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For Participant D this transcends the need to reduce emissions quantitatively, in recognition of 
the need for a strong collective and systemic understanding of the interconnectedness of life. 
Participant D suggests that emissions reduction could be seen as a means to help people believe 
that it is possible to address climate change: 
It’s really symbiotic to be honest because the people who want it to be accessible to a 
large number of people want it to be about CO2 and I want to take people... to invite 
people to question the way their belief systems leads them into actual things and it’s 
really great that the people who I work with want to make it widely accessible 
(Participant D). 
Similarly, Participant I suggests that the solution is beyond the technical or measurable, “[The 
solution is] broadening the mindset to a collective consciousness that we are all just screwing 
each other over”. Participant G also echoes this sentiment, connecting systemic issues with 
values and mindset: 
But the kind of transition that we actually need to make is a much, much deeper one than 
that, and it involves a change in mindset and a change in what we value... that mindset 
change is not even enough in itself because there is a feedback loop between the 
structures, the economic systems that we have in place that... force people to act the way 
that they do... if they don’t strive for more wealth than they get pushed out of the market. 
Those are the kinds of systematic changes that need to happen as a result of changes in 
the way we value.  
It is clear there was diversity amongst all participants’ perspectives. Although it was recognised 
that a restructure of the economy and society was recognised as needed, it was variable as to how 
and what should take place. This highlights the complexity that the neoliberal generation faces 
coming into the future, at a crossroads where the old system is failing people and the 
environment, yet many of the “feasible” and “realistic” solutions presented are simply differing 
manifestations of the same system. How these complexities manifest within Generation Zero’s 




The solution is not to abolish the transport system, it’s not to abolish the economy, it is 
just to reinvent and re-imagine what an economy has to represent well if we are going to 
use it as an instrument... But that’s not necessarily a very pragmatic thing to say… So I 
guess in many ways what I’m saying is the solution is psychological and about 
conceptualisation because from there people understand the world differently and it 
changes (Participant D). 
This extract from an interview with Participant D again highlights complexity and paradox in the 
simultaneous intermingling of neoliberal ideology (psychological nature of change) with a desire 
for change and a shift away from current systemic processes. The need for pragmatism was a 
strong current felt throughout this interview and a number of others. For example, Participant A 
states “I don’t call myself an anti-capitalist because I like to think about things in the most 
pragmatic way where I can create like the incremental change that is necessary...” 
Those who suggested in their interviews that pragmatism provided the solution to climate change 
still acknowledged that the climate change issue has “deep” roots and thus requires a systemic 
and ideological shift from individualistic behaviours. Day (2004, 717) refers to “hegemony of 
hegemony” or the idea that reform tactics within the constraints of the nation-state has become 
the assumption. He also refers to direct action as a challenge to this assumption. Evidence 
analysed in this chapter has highlighted the interconnections of the reality of both assumptions 
and participants’ recognition for the need for both reform and revolution. However, for many 
interview participants the need for immediate change to occur was a large factor in their 
decisions on what solutions should be enacted. Thus, the immediate solutions needed were not to 
catalyse an ideological or systemic shift but market/incentive-based solutions. These 
market/incentive-based solutions being advocated are deemed to be pragmatic response that will 
be acceptable to the general public. Generation Zero bases their work on these solutions, the 
implications of which will be explored in Section 5.4.1. Meanwhile this section will explore how 
pragmatism can be effective political action. 
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The solutions labelled “realistic” “achievable” and those that underlie the work that these 
participants, as members of Generation Zero, work towards are grounded in scientific 
measurability, tangibility and rational change:  
There is the angle of let’s get into green business, green growth, green investment and 
green infrastructure, you know do carbon neutralising things, you know offset, all of that 
kind of stuff, so there’s like that kind of side to it but then there is like that kind of, and I 
think those things are really good and are really important and Generation Zero is really 
pro that kind of solution because it is very accessible to the mainstream... I’m not entirely 
sure that it is something that can solved through that alone and part of me thinks that we 
actually need a greater shift of paradigm and like our consciousness in the way society 
runs like you know... but I guess that’s a far scarier kind of goal or project and it’s the 
kind of thing that needs to be really incremental (Participant C). 
For some participants, culture change is expected to be complimentary to working as a collective 
or on political change: 
Like people saying the core of the problem is an individualistic culture or a lack of 
community... that’s highly abstract I mean climate change is hardly abstract at all, it’s 
pretty tangible and deliberate. You can’t get mass public support on ‘can we change our 
community dynamics across society in order to produce a culture of active citizenship’. 
It’s like how can you campaign on that? How can you mobilise people around that? You 
can’t but you can achieve that kind of culture by mobilising them around something 
tangible like climate change (Participant A). 
Evidently, to many of the participants it is important to garner popular public support for action 
on climate change. This pragmatism also impacts the way the climate change issue is framed. 
When the antagonist (as referred to in Chapter 3) is portrayed as “capital” or the related 
“mindset” the issue of ambiguity arises as it can only really be identified by its effects. However, 
it is also argued that an antagonistic framing of capitalism or neoliberalism is necessary to truly 
address climate change, despite the difficulties inherent in creating a tangible form and space for 
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capital (The Free Association, 2010). To place “capital” or the related “mindset” as the 
antagonist, will create spaces for greater creativity, innovation and possibility: 
 
Simplifications have an excess to them, which we might think of as their impossibilities. 
This is the cramping that we produce around a problematic. And it is in these cramped 
spaces that we can create new problematics, tracing a path between impossibilities . . . 
and so open up new possibilities (The Free Association, 2010, 1029).  
 
However, at the same time, solutions can become “saturated and diluted” by seeming impossible 
(The Free Association, 2010, 1023). Thus evidence produced in this chapter has demonstrated 
how participants recognise the intangibility of systemic change and so seek more ‘tangible’ 
solutions. Often neoliberal discourse is used to provide tangible and rational solutions. In order 
to address climate change it is not perceived as necessary to overhaul the wider neoliberal 
capitalist system. Participant responses indicate a belief that change in mindset and values can 
occur while maintaining most of the economic components of neoliberalism. How this manifests 
within the work Generation Zero does will be discussed in the following Section 5.5.1 and in 
Chapter 6.  
5.4.1 Pragmatism and Generation Zero  
Despite some of the previously mentioned views of participants that leans towards the 
recognition of the need for systemic change, concern for building public support, political 
feasibility and a focus on  addressing quantitative emissions has resulted in the intentional use of 
neoliberal discourse within the vision and focus of Generation Zero. Participant C recognises the 
pragmatism of Generation Zero as being a deliberate part of the strategy to grow a widespread 
movement: “I kind of was a bit attracted to its pragmatism” (Participant C). In doing so they are 
“trying to essentially sell the vision to the rest of the country of a better way forward, a better 
path for the future which will make it something people can buy into and aren’t afraid of” 
(Participant D). 
Generation Zero, through their marketing and public outreach, do not claim to be radical or 
revolutionary in their approach. Their approach is to find “workable solutions” (Generation Zero, 
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2011-2013). Solutions that are “workable” and achievable are seen as more accessible as they do 
not require a whole new imagination for the world. Thus these solutions are more likely to gain 
popular public backing:  
 
Generation Zero, for example, deliberately cuts out part [of the solutions needed for 
climate change], the particularly polarising parts of this, [from] its organisational purpose 
so that it can spread the net broader and get a wider range of people in and include more 
people [in Generation Zero’s activities]” (Participant G).  
 
As The Free Association recognises of social movements: “It’s difficult to start swimming in 
open water: it’s much easier to push off against something” (The Free Association, 2010, 1028). 
In other words, The Free Association (2010) highlights that it is easier to gain support for a 
movement that asks for change within existing paradigms when the alternative system is not 
widely understood. This supports Generation Zero’s use of neoliberal discourse within their 
work, as it is a framing of an issue that is easily relatable. On their website, Generation Zero used 
language that deliberately highlights the financial costs of climate change and thus the related 
injustices for youth and future generations as reasons for taking action. Further, the solutions 
offered to remedy these costs reflect pragmatism (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Excerpts from Generation Zero’s website describing their vision and goals.  
The consequences of failing to meet a target aren’t just bad for the climate – they’re 
bad for our wallets. At the moment, the Government is passing the buck for the failure 
to meet targets to the future (Generation Zero, n.d.). 
We cannot afford to wait for some magical techno fix, and nor do we need to. The 
barriers to taking action today are not technical. What is lacking is a clear sense of 
direction and urgency towards a zero carbon future, and the political will to 
implement the changes that are desperately needed (Generation Zero, n.d.). 
The first step towards solving the problem is for our society and our political parties 
to acknowledge what is required to deliver us hope for a positive future: a credible 
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climate plan with responsible targets, and a carbon pricing scheme that sees today’s 
bills being paid today (Generation Zero, n.d.). 
We are the generation to oversee the profound transformation to a zero carbon world. 
Generation Zero is committed to finding workable solutions to the problems we face 
(Generation Zero, n.d.). 
 
Generation Zero’s website often refers to intergenerational injustices and passing the buck- this 
is the idea that it is future generations that will have to pay the financial costs associated with 
climate change in the years to come. By working on this premise, Generation Zero actively uses 
the dominance of neoliberal discourse to leverage the issue of climate change. Building “political 
will” for a carbon price and other technical solutions is included as one of their intentions. The 
implications of this will be explored further in Chapter 6.   
5.5 Summary 
Overall, Chapter 5 highlights the complexities and paradoxes that arise when faced with the 
intersecting discourses of climate change and neoliberalism. Neoliberal discourse has contributed 
to the de-politicisation of the climate change issue. Generation Zero as an organisation has 
adopted this discourse as being key to their messaging and approach to climate change. 
Underlying this, members of Generation Zero expressed concern with our current economic 
system and a number of the values and societal norms that have evolved out of neoliberal 
discourse. However, many participants recognised that climate change could be addressed both 
on an emissions scale and at a greater scale- citing “deeper” or “core” issues that would need to 
be addressed. These core and deeper issues ranged across a spectrum from our neoliberal 
economic system, the industrial revolution to the values instilled by neoliberal discourse, to 
consumerism and the individualistic mindset we have become accustomed to.  
When asked to describe what would be the solutions to their self-identified climate change 
problems the responses sat along a similarly diverse spectrum. However, it is poignant to 
recognise the difficulties of being an advocate for future change in discourse whilst living within 
the prevalent neoliberal discourse. Thus many participants identified a need to make the causes 
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and solutions to climate change accessible and “mainstream” for reasons which shall be 
expanded on in Chapter 6. Keeping climate change “mainstream” involves maintaining the use 
of neoliberal discourse and therefore a post-political carbon consensus. Some characteristics of 
neoliberalism are desired in the solution, whilst others are recognised as being part of the 
problem. Hence, the question remains: Can the problem be solved with the same mindset or 





Chapter 6: Climate change mainstreaming versus 
politicisation 
6.1 Introduction 
As referred to in Chapter 1 and 2, radical political action can be defined within the context of the 
post-political carbon consensus as action that subverts or interrupts the consensus through 
providing “properly” political moments. Usually in the context of climate change, radical action 
is taken in recognition of an antagonist such as a fossil fuel extraction company or intends to 
undermine capitalist globalised economic systems as a root cause of the issue (Bond & Dorsey, 
2010; Chatterton et al, 2012). Conversely, institutional political action is engaged with channels 
set up by current institutions of the dominant hegemony, such as the nation state (Swyngedouw, 
2009). Institutional action includes campaigning for legislative change, voting, consultations or 
submissions and other formal participation means. This action forms a part of the consensual 
condition (Swyngedouw, 2009). Institutional political action does not intend to subvert systems 
but create momentum around managerial or technical alterations of the status quo (Swyngedouw, 
2009).   
However, actions of the institutional or radical nature both sit along a spectrum of action, as the 
reality of political action is complex and murky. Both terms are inadequate in describing the 
diverse contexts of political action on climate change and the different forms of actions that may 
be taken. As shown in the previous chapter, climate change can be framed in a number of 
different ways and thus a number of different tactics can be perceived to be effective action on 
climate change, depending on the perspective taken. Typically, climate justice advocates and 
those who aim to “politicise” climate change tend to engage with protest and non-violent direct 
action as means to achieve action on climate change. As Heynen (2010, 1235) suggests “direct 
action, like civil disobedience, like radical democracy, is a direct threat to the forces of order.” 
Those who advocate or partake in ‘third way’ politics as part of consensus-building may engage 
with demonstration on matters of technical or managerial significance or consultation processes.  
However, as McCarthy (2013, 24) states, “many forms of politics, categories and distinctions, 
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such as public versus private, economic versus cultural, or formal versus informal, are irrelevant 
at best and misleading at worst” and thus throughout this chapter it should be recognised that 
such labels undermine the diversity of actions that exist and the contribution that all forms of 
political action make to politics in general.  
This chapter will answer the research objectives: How do members of Generation Zero perceive 
the roles of radical and institutional political action in solving climate change?  And do the 
perceptions of members of Generation Zero reflect the arguments around the existence of a post-
political carbon consensus? If, so what are the implications of these perceptions on future spaces 
for radical action? 
The research objective outlined here will be answered through exploring the perspectives of 
Generation Zero members on different forms of political action and the implications that this has 
on the types of action participants felt comfortable engaging in. Given the neoliberal context 
outlined in the previous chapter, I will use discourse analysis to explore the consequences that 
this has on political action on climate change both in the present and in the future. I will provide 
evidence through quotes and excerpts from interview transcripts.   
6.2 Generation Zero: A path for action on climate change 
The solutions advocated by Generation Zero were described in Chapter 5. From this analysis it 
became clear that the organisation’s intention is to present a pragmatic set of solutions that are 
either based on neoliberal discourse or do not contest it (see Section 5.4). The issue is framed 
through the injustices of financial loss. By gaining large scale public support, Generation Zero 
seeks to harness momentum to shift voting patterns around climate change and “shift collective 
mindset” through policy change. This section will outline what members of Generation Zero that 
participated in this research felt the overall objectives of all the activities that Generation Zero 
engages in were. In other words, how they aim to achieve pragmatic outcomes as a part of the 
climate movement in Aotearoa New Zealand.  
When asked to describe what Generation Zero did, participants gave a variety of responses, 
however the majority of participants alluded to upholding the pragmatism of solutions offered 
through deliberately avoiding any activities that could be associated with “radicalism.” Clearly 
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members of Generation Zero carefully consider the image that the organisation is projecting 
within the wider public. Thus responses could be divided into the activities that Generation Zero 
engages in and how they spread their image into the media and general public shown in Table 4.  
Table 4: What does Generation Zero do and how do they create their own image/brand? 
What Generation Zero 
does.  
- “focusing on parts of the [climate change] picture” 
(Participant F). 
- “bring climate change into the public discourse” 
(Participant F). 
- “public awareness and movement building” (Participant 
F). 
- “We don’t challenge social structure” (Participant D). 
- “[We’re] trying to internally create a culture which... 
would alleviate injustices socially” (Participant D).  
- “[We want people to understand] you’re powerful in 
your local government, look you’re powerful in a 
national elections... before I think they have a sort of 
more holistic sense of agency if that makes sense” 
(Participant D). 
- “[Our work is] targeted at government to make political 
change in favour of long term cultural change which is 
sort of our theory of change” (Participant I). 
- “Non-partisan” (Participant H). 
- “Generation Zero likes to focus on the local effects of 
climate change... it doesn’t matter if we’re doing it to 
look out for our own skin” (Participant G). 
-  “[Generation Zero has] closer to a reformer kind of 
role” (Participant G). 
- “[We do things] in a playful way” (Participant F). 
How Generation Zero aim -  “I think we try very hard to not be as seen as the latest 
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to be perceived. wave of uni student anarchists” (Participant C). 
- “We tend to have a more creative image” (Participant C). 
- “Rallying people around identity so we chose a New 
Zealand identity rather than a global identity” 
(Participant D). 
- “[We’re] really trying to legitimise ourselves and yeah 
like a legitimate stakeholder and someone we should be 
listening to” (Participant H). 
 
According to participants, Generation Zero works within hegemonic and institutional politics to 
create consensus (non-partisan) and engage young people with these politics. Three key points 
can be drawn out from the information presented in Table 4.  
Firstly, Generation Zero aim to attract young people to the organisation through presenting an 
identity which is creative, locally relevant and actively avoids conflict or contestation. Creative 
and playful actions were seen as more socially acceptable and less ideologically polarising: “So 
doing things in a more playful way can even make people laugh as a means to get around that 
guilt defence mechanism and just get them thinking about it [climate change issues]” (Participant 
F). Radical action was seen by Participant F as being polarising and creating defensiveness. This 
response to radical action on climate change and others from participants will be discussed 
further in the remainder of the chapter. A number of participants also referred to Generation 
Zero’s focus on local climate change issues as a key part of gaining this support, as Participant G 
stated “we’re doing it to look out for our own skin.” Participant D suggested that Generation 
Zero are “rallying people around identity so we chose a New Zealand identity rather than a 
global identity.” This is an important aspect to the organisation’s focus as it highlights that 
climate change is perceived as an issue that is relevant to or could threaten their current 
lifestyles. Evidently, the identity that Generation Zero chose to portray is an important aspect to 
their goals of raising “public awareness and movement building” (Participant F).  The 




Second, there was widespread understanding amongst participants that Generation Zero 
approaches action on climate change pragmatically, as highlighted in Chapter 5. In this context, 
pragmatism was considered necessary in order to create legitimacy for Generation Zero. As 
Participant H highlighted: 
People will shove a stereotype on us... [we’re] really trying to legitimise ourselves... like 
a legitimate stakeholder and someone we should be listening to... in general there might 
not be a push to do radical action because that would sit in an extremist basket and take 
away some of that legitimacy. 
The responses in Table 4 reveal that there is a common focus on creating legitimacy in order to 
gain widespread public support. Many participants wanted to ensure that they were perceived as 
well-researched and were concerned about losing legitimacy through their youth or associations 
with student anarchists. Further, it appeared that to some participants “reformist type work” (F) 
effectively maintains legitimacy and creates incremental change. Action should not be 
ideologically polarising as “people get defensive and it’s like it is can be a challenge to people’s 
lifestyle and world view, and if it induces feelings of sort of guilt in you know normal people 
then that can be a bit of a knife edge” (Participant F). For Participants F and H actions that are 
polarising and create conflict undermine legitimacy. By avoiding defensiveness or conflict 
within responses from people, Participant F has highlighted the role of the post-political carbon 
consensus within Generation Zero’s group politics. As Participant D notes “We don’t challenge 
social structure.” The suggestion that some forms of action gain legitimacy and others do not is 
an important one and will be discussed further in the next section. 
 
Third, the internal culture and intentions of the group are highlighted by some participants. 
Participant D describes the role of internal politics and group culture in addressing the culture 
and mindset shift which many participants recognised as important to solving climate change. A 
large part of this is empowering youth who may have not been involved with environmental or 
political issues to understand their power within politics. Some participants spoke about the 
organisation as being a part of a “journey” that youth involved will go through, including 
learning the power of collectivism and charity, their power within politics and will explore the 
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issues of climate change with depth. In recognising that Generation Zero is just “one part [of the 
journey]” (Participant G), many participants referred to a further journey that members go 
through in understanding the role of politics beyond voting or being part of institutionalised 
process. The role of this journey within a politics of consensus and creating spaces for “properly” 
political moments will be described further in Section 6.3.  
Overall, Generation Zero as an organisation aims to create widespread support for pragmatic 
action on climate change, through creative and playful actions and intentionally avoiding conflict 
and polarity. According to Rancière, Swyngedouw, Žižek and others the definition of the 
“properly” political indicates that political action on climate change must incorporate conflict 
and polarity. The following section will explore the role of the “properly” political within the 
perspectives of members of Generation Zero given the context of pragmatic action on climate 
change.    
6.3 The political moment and Generation Zero 
During the interview process it was revealed that the majority of participants had an 
understanding of the role of the “properly” political in causing real shifts in society. This is the 
role of radical democratic politics in exposing and challenging the root systemic causes of 
climate change. There are “elements that are essential for true politics: antagonism, deep dissent, 
the space for the imagination of genuine alternatives, and so on” (McCarthy, 2013, 22). Thus 
throughout this research I have defined the “properly” political for participants as taking radical 
or direct action. Actions that directly confront or oppose climate change causing activities are 
referred to here as direct action. Forms of action that enable activists to work in a way that 
opposes the system and the activity that cause climate change, are seen by most participants as 
“radical” or revolutionary” (Participants G and A). Traditional means of political action that 
don’t engage with institutionally dictated political channels such as rallies, protests, occupations 
and blockades are categorised in this way.  They may be directed at the State, corporations or 
other representations of a systemic antagonist. Heynen (2010, 1234-1235) recognises that direct 
action comes from: 
an impatience with the normal political processes,  and a conviction of rightness which 
justifies  the methods used... Indeed, for over 150 years, non-violent civil-disobedient 
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direct action has been at the heart of revolutionary struggles to facilitate emanicipatory 
societal change... One historically obvious way we can subvert the status quo is by 
reasserting our project into the spaces of non-violent civil-disobedient direct action. 
Thus direct action is defined by an underlying desire to shift the status quo and rejection of 
traditional methods of institutional political engagement.  It manifests as any action that reflects 
these desires.  
Radical action and direct action were terms widely recognised across the group. However, I do 
recognise that the terms are not exhaustively transferable, for instance many actions may not be 
considered radical but can be direct. Swyngedouw (2009) and Žižek (2002) refer to the co-option 
of environmental activism and other expressions of resistance, noting that it is difficult to 
separate these activities from the demands of the system entirely. Thus radical actions and 
“properly” political moments are extremely difficult to achieve, particularly given the 
entrenchment of neoliberal discourse. McCarthy (2013) highlights this difficulty as one of the 
primary critiques of Swyngedouw’s post-political carbon consensus. He suggests that by viewing 
actions that engage with existing economic or political systems as not “properly” political denies 
the value of these opportunities. In recognition of McCarthy (2013)’s critique, contesting 
neoliberal or capitalist solutions is closer to the “properly” political than advocating technocratic, 
policy-based and neoliberal solutions to climate change, such as carbon market based 
mechanisms.  
For the purposes of this research, radical and/or direct action appeared to be the most appropriate 
terms. Initially to ensure that participants identified similar actions as direct or radical, they were 
asked to describe examples of radical or direct action. Participants named past and present 
actions both here in Aotearoa New Zealand and overseas, including some of the actions being 
organised in the United States around tar sands proposals and Greenpeace and Lucy Lawless’ 
occupation of an oil tanker were two examples: “Lucy Lawless she’s like quite into that [direct 
action] at the moment” (Participant H). “The tar sands protests in Washington DC in the US is an 
example where they had both they had a sort of a political focal point that had a sort of a time 
frame attached to it and they also went and got a lot of people” (Participant F).  
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“There is a place for it [radical activism] at the moment. The work that Greenpeace has 
done on oil drilling and the work that I think that CANA [Coal Action Network 
Aotearoa] is gearing up to do is some sort of direct action and it feels like those 
compliment more mainstream actions quite well” (Participant I).   
These actions and many of the other actions and movements were identified by participants, such 
as the anti-nuclear and anti-apartheid movements: “I know that we have that history of social 
movements when there is that incredibly broad level of support... like nuclear or whatever” 
(Participant E). These movements also represent the difficulty in achieving true political 
moments. Askanius and Uldam (2011, 75) highlighted: “Resistance is possible but only by 
breaking with the regulatory confinements appointed by the establishment can protesters avoid 
being co-opted by the neoliberal system and unwillingly end up contributing to these 
mechanisms of ‘greenwashing.’” Many of these movements engage with political institutions 
and institutionalised methods of participation, such as consultation. As Participant I notes, “I’m 
interested with we often talk about the background, the history New Zealand [social movements] 
has, nuclear free, giving women the vote, the Springbok tour and things like that... really those 
boil down to very simple issues... they were only a piece of legislation that had to be changed.” 
In other words, some participants recognise that it is difficult for a movement to completely 
contest a system, given our inherent participation in the system. As McCarthy (2013) highlights, 
by stating that society is in a truly post-political condition undermines the propensity of these 
movements in creating systemic change.  
Participants were asked to consider the role of different forms of political action in addressing 
climate change. They were asked to describe how relevant or effective they felt radical action 
was to climate change and the Aotearoa New Zealand context. Participants also considered what 
they felt were the opportunities and barriers for such forms of action on climate change in the 
future. Many felt that radical and direct actions had the potential to be an effective part of climate 
change action: 
- It provides a strong moral or values based goal for climate change action: “I feel really 
grateful for the radicals being there, so that will stop me from being swept up in 
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reforming so much that I lose track of actually what it is that we are trying to rearrange 
here” (Participant G). 
- Gaining media coverage and encouraging discussion on the issues: “It is one of the most 
effective means I think for getting things into the news” (Participant F).  
- Getting the government to recognise your opposition: “When they [government] don’t 
listen to your voice, they have to listen to your action” (Participant E).  
Conversely, others saw radical action as necessary and effective as the final step to take in 
order to prevent something from occurring: 
- When institutionalised/government mechanisms have failed. For example, one 
participant said: 
I am becoming more and more of the belief that massive, massive mandate 
creation for government action on climate change won’t come any other way then 
being a little bit radical in the classical terms of being visibly disruptive and 
unaccepting of what’s currently happening” (Participant D).  
- The climate change situation becomes urgent enough for people to be desperate for 
solutions to be enacted: “Direct action makes things move faster because it is right at the 
source. This is what needs to change, and changes it” (Participant H). 
- As a catalyst for further action: “It can inspire others to get involved” (Participant A), “[it 
can help create] a movement towards more people being active in the political 
community. When someone sees a group of people protesting they are more likely to 
think that they can do it as well” (Participant B), “the hard core radical stuff is really 
good to make a stand, to be visible, to be seen and in a cool way it can harness energy 
and really rally people” (Participant C).  
Some interview participants demonstrated understanding of the value of conflict and contestation 
of the wider economic system in action on climate change: “it propels the issues into the 
spotlight and that provides a platform for the debate to take place and the other voices put the 
case in different ways” (Participant F). They also spoke about the context in which this would be 
relevant “it kind of needs to be pursued opportunistically... I can see it fitting into an ecosystem 
of forms of action and different organisations” (Participant F). Generally, it was felt that 
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Aotearoa New Zealand was not in a place for widespread radical action currently, in part due to 
our neoliberal context:  
New Zealand society would get its back up quite a lot if you tried to start shutting down 
coal mines or something. Because there is that whole focus on the economy for a lot of 
people and the “not wanting to make a fuss” culture, it’s that whole chill out kind of thing 
(Participant E).  
Participant A felt that direct action was just generally an ineffective technique given the 
institutional political context: “direct action can stop it happening temporarily, like if you are 
stopping the drilling, good, how long can you do it for? Until what, the next Government comes 
into power, I don’t know.” Further Participant A noted that if direct action were to catalyse 
lifestyle change, then it would be an effective part of the solution: “Did it make people who are 
willing to accept radical action as a legitimate thing to do concerned about climate change and 
more willing to make their own contributions? Like did it [radical action] encourage them even 
just minor-ly to make minor lifestyle changes?” (Participant A). Participant A identifies a lack of 
relevance of the “properly” political as direct/radical action was not seen as conducive towards 
lifestyle change or institutionalised political change. 
Thus this section highlights a paradoxical approach to direct or radical action. Some participants, 
such as Participant D, see it as a necessary part of addressing climate change. However, other 
participants suggest that its place is on the fringes of the climate change movement unless it was 
to gain popular momentum or the right opportunity arose. Participant C states what the most 
common response from participants was: “there is a role for both types of protest.” However, in 
recognition of the role of radical or direct action, it is not seen as something that members of 
Generation Zero will engage in, for reasons which will be stated in the following section. Despite 
this paradox, members of Generation Zero are politically motivated and see climate change as a 
political issue, regardless of the role of the “properly” political. The next section will explore the 
place of the “properly” political within Generation Zero’s work and how this might be 
incorporated into a journey of understanding climate change that its members may take.  
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6.3.1 The politicisation journey and Generation Zero 
Many participants spoke about engaging in a personal “journey” towards understanding the role 
of radical or direct action in relation to climate change. Participant D highlights a shift from a 
rational to an emotional understanding as part of a journey of understanding and taking effective 
action on climate change: “emotion is like lighting a torch and people will follow that emotional 
torch and the longer that we stay rational and we say that rational is the only way to be heard, the 
longer we delay a climate movement.” For Participant D, radical and direct action is deemed 
emotional, whereas an institutionalised response is rational, thus it is a necessary journey for 
activists to make. However, as seen in the previous section, more participants see the role of 
direct action as being opportunistic (the last attempt) or only effective if it can be adopted across 
a widespread audience, rather than a necessary component of action on climate change. 
A number of participants that recognised that there were benefits to partaking in radical action 
also referred to a shift in attitude or perspective that needed to occur in order to gain widespread 
engagement with radical action. This shift to advocating and understanding radical action and 
thus the “properly” political can be termed “politicisation.”  According to Swyngedouw (2009, 
609): 
 Postpolitics refuses politicization in the classical Greek sense; that is, politics as the 
metaphorical universalization of particular demands, which aims at ‘more’ than the 
negotiation of interests. The consensual times we are currently living in have thus 
eliminated a genuine political space of disagreement. 
 
According to some research participants, politicisation was seen to occur for a number of 
reasons: 
- Frustration and anger that institutionally accepted methods of achieving political change 
are not effective: “[If I were going from being] a reformer to a radical it would look like 
trying to be a reformer for a while, it not working, getting really frustrated and becoming 
a radical” (Participant G). 
 
- Exposure to injustice that triggers an “emotional” response to the issue of climate change:  
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If they’re sheltered to real injustice, then they [members of Generation Zero] will 
be rattled by it, because most of them are sheltered from injustice in many ways 
and only entertain it academically, basically. And I think they would feel very 
emotionally rattled by seeing being exposed to injustice and that might lead them 
to feel called to take radical action... I would take radical action when my heart 
was breaking... and my heart would be broken by being exposed to someone else 
whose heart was breaking (Participant D). 
- There is such unrest in general that it becomes socially acceptable to engage in radical 
change: “I think we can see from the collision of economic and political crisis in the US 
that the more dire economic and political situation there is, the more appropriate it 
[radical action] is” (Participant I) 
 
- A deeper understanding of the issue of climate change and the issues connected with it: “I 
think enough people understand the seriousness of the problem already but more people 
need to understand the root causes of the problem” (Participant G). “I think direct action 
is a really important part of the climate movement but like lots of different people are 
kind of like [at] different points on their journey along that movement” (Participant E).  
Members of Generation Zero felt the organisation had a part to play in the journey of the young 
people involved: “Generation Zero really doesn’t offer the whole journey from the society we 
have today to a really really great society. It’s just one part of that” (Participant G). According to 
Participant D, the role of Generation Zero is “to activate the inactivated.” Similarly Participant E 
states “Generation Zero is [about] bringing people in... getting people interested and seeing ways 
that they can act politically on climate change.” 
However, participants discussed the external forces of “society” as being bigger factors that 
influenced whether radical or direct action would be appropriate:  
I don’t think we are ready for a wide scale radical action as like what you would see in 
Canada or the US, partly because of the political culture at the moment and also because 
we have a diverse culture that often a lot of people don’t have time to think about climate 
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change as an issue and I don’t think that its mainstream enough to drag people down that 
sort of path willingly (Participant I). 
Interestingly, it is the understanding of climate injustices that is said to be one of the biggest 
triggers, coupled with a deeper understanding of the issues connected to climate change. Thus 
the importance of climate justice (or similar) principles and the direct action that may be taken 
by advocates of these principles was understood by some participants. However, these individual 
subjectivities are diverse and complex across the organisation, it is difficult to ascertain the role 
that this identified politicisation journey has on what Generation Zero does and whether this is a 
consideration in the organisation’s strategy. 
It is pertinent that much of Generation Zero’s focus is on local issues of intergenerational 
injustice, framed by financial constraints. Yet many of its members felt that change needed to 
come from a shift in systems or mindset. Generation Zero’s focus does not, in my observation, 
highlight the same injustices or root causes referred to by some participants as necessary to shift 
activists towards an understanding of the role of radical or direct action. To act in dissent of the 
post-political carbon consensus often requires direct action that creates conflict or polarity. 
However, as referred to in Section 6.2, members of Generation Zero aim to actively reduce 
polarity and conflict around the climate change issue. Thus the consensual condition has created 
complexities and conflict between the need to deepen members of Generation Zero’s 
understanding of climate change in order to get widespread support for radical action and the 
entrenched commonsense nature of neoliberalism. This will be explored further in Section 6.5. 
For instance, Participant B states: “that’s one of those things that Greenpeace always gets 
labelled with, a group that is always resisting and not actually offering different benefits.” 
Radical action and dissent is seen as un-productive and those advocating such action have not yet 
provided the spaces for alternative imaginaries that are needed to counteract the economic and 
social benefits offered by the economic and political status quo.  
The process of politicisation, as defined by some participants, is about recognising and 
addressing the power imbalances inherent in the climate change issue. Yet as Chapter 2 
discusses, de-politicisation of climate change has been occurring as a result of neoliberal and 
policy based solutions used to legitimate and perpetuate neoliberal growth. Evidence from this 
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research shows that de-politicisation of climate change has occurred and has been advocated for 
by activists. This is notable through the role of citizen participation over technical and 
managerial matters. When asked what some of the top priorities should be for working on 
climate change in Aotearoa New Zealand, Participant H highlighted “working on the ETS to 
make it something that it is actually going to make a difference.” Similarly, other participants 
when asked what issues they would be working on stated “transport emissions in terms of private 
car usage... coal mining” (Participant B), “transport and energy production... I guess those are the 
easiest to lobby on” (Participant C). This also highlights the identification of carbon emissions as 
the ultimate and easiest antagonist. However, it should be noted that climate justice advocates 
often use issues of fossil fuel extraction to highlight social and environmental injustices and 
systemic causes of climate change (such as neoliberal globalisation). Although these issues still 
address carbon emissions, the antagonist that is recognised is broader and more systemic. This 
suggests that politicisation is about how the issue is addressed, as opposed to the actual emissions 
that are targeted. Thus politicisation occurs through the framing of issues. By reducing the issue 
to one of emissions, climate change is framed as an easier issue to lobby on and a generally more 
accessible issue. For the majority of participants, Generation Zero plays a role in the overall 
movement for climate action that was about introducing people to climate change issues and 
giving them accessible things to do: “We developed Generation Zero as a collective identity for a 
generation that would otherwise be marginalised by inaction and therefore gave them [the] 
impetus to reclaim their agency” (Participant D).  
However, framing climate change as an accessible issue may undermine the pursuit for systemic 
change in order to address justice issues and thus work to depoliticise the issue, counter to the 
broad intentions of many research participants. Section 6.3.2 will explore the role of Day’s 
concepts of a politics of action and a politics of demand and their relevance to the shift in 
perceptions that members of Generation Zero see as a part of a politicisation process.  
6.3.2 Politics of the act and Generation Zero  
As referred to in Chapter 2, Day (2004) refers to a “politics of demand” and a “politics of 
action,” terms which describe different approaches to social change through politics. Politics of 
demand reflects a post-political carbon consensus: 
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Every demand, in anticipating a response, perpetuates these structures, which exist 
precisely in anticipation of demands. This leads to a positive feedback loop, in which the 
ever- increasing depth and breadth of apparatuses of discipline and control create ever-
new sites of antagonism, which produce new demands, thereby increasing the quantity 
and intensity of discipline and control (Day, 2004, 734).  
Primarily, a politics of demand aims to solve a social or political issue in a way that perpetuates 
and maintains “the conditions of its own emergence” (Day, 2004, 724). A politics of demand is 
“limited in scope: it can change the content of structures of domination and exploitation, but it 
cannot change their form” (Day, 2004, 733). The current politics of Generation Zero reflects a 
politics of demand. Despite research participant’s recognition for the need to shift economic and 
social systems, their chosen paths of action are a restructure or management of current systems 
(see Chapter 5). As neoliberalism becomes increasingly entrenched (as referred to in Chapter 2) 
it is perceived to be more difficult or ineffective to engage with a politics of action or to create 
space for “properly” political moments. Members of Generation Zero suggest that it has become 
increasingly difficult to engage with the “properly” political on climate change because the 
solutions to climate change require widespread support from business and those across the 
political spectrum. Day (2004, 723) in observing new social movements argues, “that the 
dominant stream of the new social movements remains within a hegemonic conception of the 
political, and is only marginally and nascently aware of the possibilities  inherent in actions 
oriented neither to achieving state power nor to ameliorating its effect” (Day, 2004, 723).  
A politics of action provides what a political moment might contribute to the “ongoing effort to 
destabilize the hegemony of hegemony, by exploring the possibilities of non-hegemonic forms of 
radical social change” (Day, 2004, 717). This involves shifting responsibility for revolution or 
change away from the State and reliance on laws and bureaucracy to solve problems (Day, 
2004). Furthermore, Day (2004, 719) refers to “constructive direct action tactics that are being 
used in contemporary radical social movements, and link these to a shift from a counter-
hegemonic politics of demand to a non-hegemonic politics of the act.” Similarly, some members 
of Generation Zero see radical action as having a role in the shift or “journey” from a politics of 
demand to a politics of action. However, as shown in Chapter 5, the need for a non-hegemonic 
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politics to create radical social change to address climate change is not seen as necessary as 
climate change can be addressed using the existing social and economic structures. Thus far it 
has been established that members of Generation Zero may perpetuate a politics of demand. Yet 
a paradox exists that highlights the role of a politics of action within a politics of demand. 
Despite Day’s clearly defined concepts, members of Generation Zero do not fit neatly into one 
category or the other. Members instead represent a complex, interconnected politics influenced 
in part by the neoliberal context.  Section 6.4 will further explore the role of radical action and 
non-hegemonic politics in a neoliberal context. 
6.4 Radical action in a neoliberal context 
As mentioned in the previously, most (although not all) participants recognised a space for 
radical action. However, most participants were quick to point out the limitations and 
ineffectiveness of radical action in relation to the goal of creating a widespread climate change 
movement. When asked to describe the role of radical action on climate change in Aotearoa New 
Zealand, Participant A stated, “it’s not effective in one way because it is politically polarising 
and that we’ve already seen plenty of it before.” Further, Participant G also saw radical action as 
polarising, “it often doesn’t offer very concrete ways of making change in the here and now and 
it often polarises and puts a lot of people off being involved.” Similarly, some participants noted 
that radical action was ineffective as it was written off by the public as being “the radical left that 
has always been there and they just do radical left stuff so their arguments and their assumptions 
aren’t really politically legitimate” (Participant A). Thus radical/direct action is seen as being 
counter-productive to the intentions of Generation Zero which are to create a pragmatic 
mainstream climate change organisation.  Radical and direct action was not seen to be a part of a 
mainstream climate change organisation because of arguments outlined previously- it is seen as 
illegitimate and polarising, which in turn alienates the public from action on climate change. 
When some participants suggested that radical/direct action was alienating there were two 
possible explanations offered: 
- The neoliberal generation’s experience of dominant neoliberal discourse and influences 
perceptions of what is considered legitimate action on climate change.  
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- Radical action creates an “activist” and an “other” perception and thus differentiates the 
ideas of the activist as being unrealistic or fringe.  
 
Generation Zero members who participated in this research suggested that climate change 
should be “everyone’s issue,” not just those who understood the injustices or systemic causes 
of the issue. Thus actions that are seen as “radical” or “fringe” may drive the “political 
middle” or the general public away from seeing the issue as relevant to them: “It can polarise 
others against the solutions necessary” (Participant A).  The injustices of neoliberalism and 
other systemic causes of climate change are not seen as relevant to a widespread audience. 
Participant B states “I think that it is a lot more accessible when you don’t know that it’s a 
giant restructure that needs to occur.” 
Kelsey (1998) notes the relatively strong opposition to neoliberal policy changes in the early 
1990s, however there is little current day opposition to neoliberalism. For the neoliberal 
generation, neoliberalism as a dominant paradigm is somewhat inevitable and has resulted in a 
number of benefits (Nairn et al, 2012). Thus the connections between neoliberalism and 
economic injustices are not necessarily connected or contestable. As Participant C believes: 
I think in some ways it’s nice to know we’re not fighting against oppression, we are 
fighting against something that is everyone’s issue and so I think it’s very different, we 
don’t need to bring down patriarchy, we aren’t trying to bring down the ruling class...  
Similarly participant (G) sees the disruption of neoliberal or capital systems as itself resulting in 
injustice, with the loss of the status quo. It is unclear whether Participant G sees the injustices of 
the current system as being greater than those that will arise with radical change. 
I guess what I’m saying is that I associate the idea of radicalism with the idea of 
revolution and a revolution is a messy thing and in a revolution people go hungry and in a 
revolution people lose a lot of stuff you know their livelihoods and their clothes and 
things (Participant G). 
Thus without connecting the injustices of climate change and the injustices of neoliberalism, 
systemic causes remain invisible, giving little reason to take radical action on systemic causes. 
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Further, as noted in Chapter 2, the consensus systematically and purposefully marginalises 
opportunities for disruption or dissent against the system (Purcell, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2009). A 
post-political carbon consensus would actively work to discourage conflict by offering 
neoliberal, technological or governmental solutions that come from the top down, with limited 
technical involvement from the ground. Within the consensual condition, governance has 
actively discouraged the radical activities that are now seen by many participants as un-
productive or ineffective. For example, recently the Anadarko Amendment came before 
Parliament in an attempt to make protesting within the EEZ illegal and resulting in harsh 
penalties (Supplementary Order Paper 2013). This presents the idea that the current government 
in Aotearoa New Zealand no longer considers protest a legitimate act of civil society or a part of 
the right to free speech and democracy. Moreover, the responses from participants that suggest 
that society’s views of protest may have changed with the advent of different forms of 
participation. Participant I and Participant B felt that direct or radical action has lost its 
effectiveness, with Participant B citing recent movements: 
My views of this has actually changed quite a wee bit recently like with the assets sale 
protest, one of the biggest protests in absolutely years and the government not being 
responsive to it... I’m just kind of questioning how effective I think it is to protest, it is 
effective definitely from like a historical viewpoint (Participant B). 
Both politically and socially, dissent is being undermined. The role of Government in de-
legitimising protest and other forms of radical action provides support for the existence and 
perpetuation of a post-political carbon consensus. This, in turn, has influenced how some 
participants view radical action and its role in solving climate change. Section 6.4.1 will further 
explore these perspectives on radical action on climate change. In particular it will focus on 
participant perceptions that radical action alienates the general public.  
6.4.1 Radical action and the general public 
A number of participants, when asked to consider the impact of radical or direct action on 
climate change and the movement against climate change stated that they thought that radical or 
direct action was “alienating.” 
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Several participants stated that they would consider engaging with radical or direct action either 
now or in the future. However, the same participants also expressed concern for Generation 
Zero’s legitimacy. Similarly, one Participant C believed it was important for members of 
Generation Zero to engage with a protest that occurred outside of a mining company’s offices in 
Wellington however, it was in the organisation’s best interests to not attend as representatives of 
Generation Zero. As mentioned previously, the need to be perceived as “legitimate” stakeholders 
within a post-political carbon consensus remains paramount to members participating in this 
research. Participant E states: 
 I don’t know where it fits in terms of Generation Zero because I can imagine myself 
wanting to take direct action and then not for the good of the organisational brand or 
whatever because it’s going to limit more people getting involved because they see you 
as radical activists. 
A number of participants felt that radical or direct action created distinctive groupings of radical 
activists and environmentalists as opposed to “people” or the general public which undermines 
this legitimacy (see Table 5). 










I think the alienation from radicalism comes when the radical is 
attacking a system which a mainstream person sees as a part of their 
support network. I mean with the example of coal you know very 
simple... in engineering school people I knew had worked in coal 
mines and things [they’d say] ‘ah you dumb greenies a coal mines a 
good thing, I mean look at the clothes you are wearing, look at the 
bike you have, that was all made from energy from coal. I mean what 
are you talking about? It doesn’t make any sense...’ so yeah and that 
can be a very confronting thing (Participant G). 
From experience that I’ve had where radical action has been proposed 
it’s been met with blank faces, part of that is the stigma still involved 






about how effective it can be. It’s a long road to making that big and I 
don’t want to... lose the opportunity alienating a whole lot of people 
really early on (Participant I). 
One problem with direct action is that it will just get lumped in that 
box, in the far political left that the general public that oppose will just 
regard as that box that has always existed there and that they’re just 
doing political direct action because they just want to jump on the 
green bandwagon... they are just a bunch of greenies and that’s it you 
know and it’s easy to lump them away (Participant A). 
Generation Zero does not do or support direct action because 
Generation Zero is focussing on trying to get as much of the centre 
involved in action on climate change and therefore they can’t alienate 
the centre (Participant A).  
I think that would be quite alienating for a lot of young people if we 
started taking direct action, I think at the moment it needs to be 
around like making more people feel like, connect with the issue 
(Participant E). 
Saying radical puts a group into a box... you know can seem a little 
scary for people to be involved in something seen as radical action, so 








 I think those people [radicals] align closer to the philosophical than to 
the real as such and the people who vote are living in the real I think if 
that makes sense (Participant D). 
There is still the radical environmentalist box... I don’t really want to 
be seen as a Greenpeace protestor. That is immediately the flick that 
switches in peoples’ brains if you do anything, protest about the 








Yeah they [radical/direct activists] are so removed from what is 
considered normal they are hard to accept (Participant H). 
Actions like that that are more extreme, more radical can polarise... 
people get defensive and it’s like it is can be a challenge to people’s 
lifestyle and world view, and if it induces feelings of guilt in normal 
people (Participant F). 
A lot of people would just see the usual suspects who are kind of 
using every opportunity to march or whatever (Participant F).  
 
Some participants felt that the perceptions and values of the radical environmentalist or activist 
would be viewed as illegitimate by others and thus any engagement would be ineffective: “One 
problem with direct action is that it will just get lumped in that box... they are just a bunch of 
greenies and… you know… it’s easy to lump them away” (Participant A). Participant D refers to 
“people who vote” as “living in the real” and radical activists as “living in the philosophical,” 
making the grounds on which they engage too fundamentally different to be productive: “Yeah 
they [radical/direct activists] are so removed from what is considered normal they are hard to 
accept” (Participant H).  
Chatterton (2006) discusses the “activist” and “other” dichotomy often presented as problematic 
for movements:   
It is not as simple, as in this case, as activist versus lorry driver. We all display multiple, 
hybrid identities-being radical and conformist, activist and worker, purist and hypocrite, 
left and right. We also maintain different identities in different contexts... The key is to 
acknowledge and understand points of commonality and overlap (Chatterton, 2006, 269). 
 
Evidently, Chatterton (2006)’s discussion of the “activist” and the “other” highlights a 
dichotomy displayed within the attitudes of some research participants. The majority of research 
participants may represent hybrid identities and have shown complex understandings of the role 
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of different forms of political action, ranging from radical to institutional or reformist. Chatterton 
(2006)’s concept of hybrid identities highlights the paradox displayed within participants 
attitudes towards the “properly” political and the need to create momentum behind politically 
motivated action on climate change.  
 
Further, Chatterton (2006) recognises that there is no outside and no inside the system. As 
Participant A noted previously, activists can never be separate from the systems that they aim to 
change. This is somewhat contrary to the concept of the “properly” political moment which 
claims that to be “political” an act must be conducted without institutionalised motive or 
intervention. According to Chatterton (2006) this would be impossible given the inherent 
connection to our system. Chatterton (2006) highlights the need to create alternatives to 
capitalism within the system to “unpick” it. 
 
Chatterton (2006, 273) also refers to protests and “social confrontations” as “entry points for 
critical engagement.” However, given the role that assumptions play within these “contained, 
transient and heavily policed” (Chatterton, 2006, 273) confrontations they can result in 
unexplained differences. Routledge (1996) calls for the creation of a “third space for critical 
engagement” where people can engage with ideas of activism:  
The third space of critical engagement acts in a fluid, oscillatory fashion - 
operationalizing within and between resistance and research the traces, relays, 
trajectories, and interactions that interweave our personal and collective experiences. 
Relays may effect [sic] various communicative processes between individuals, research 
groups, etc. within and between the realms of academia and activism. Interactions may be 
effected [sic] through affinities and alliances, providing a feedback network of ideas, 
theories, empirical information, and research for mutual benefit (Routledge, 1996, 411-
412).  
Beyond the academic/activist context that Routledge (1996) referred to, for Chatterton (2006) 
third spaces within wider society can provide opportunities where “encounters can be extended, 
where activism and non-activism can blur, where commonality can develop and mature, where 
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experiences and critique can be shared, outside the pressures of policing and assumed social 
roles” (Chatterton, 2006, 273). Thus Chatterton (2006) supports the notion that spaces of 
confrontation can often lead to increased differences and misunderstandings. However, 
Chatterton (2006) states that these differences in values and assumptions need to be discussed, 
rather than avoided. This is particularly given the suggestion by some participants that Aoteaoroa 
New Zealand/society is not ready for widespread radical action on climate change. This may also 
be related to the idea that some participants don’t perceive those that engage in radical or direct 
action as being legitimate, and thus any potential interactions with people who are “living in the 
real”(Participant D) are jeopardised. Participant G suggests that: 
More friendly-to-the-establishment organizations which are more co-operative and offer 
more specific ways forward, those organisations get the conversations happening 
amongst a wider group of people and actually allow pathways for people to understand 
the perspective of radicals without having to be a radical themselves necessarily. 
Participant G contradicts Chatterton (2006)’s expanded notion of third spaces by highlighting 
that by taking reformist action and having an understanding of the need for radical action, the 
third space can encompass the ideas of both reformer and radical thought and engage people in 
the politicisation journey referred to in Section 6.3.1. 
This section has discussed how participants perceive the potential for radical action to be 
alienating for members of the public. Members of Generation Zero have overwhelmingly 
suggested that radical action can create barriers between the activist and the “other” and also 
limits space for discussion around action on climate change. Yet Participant G has highlighted 
that politicisation and alienation from action on climate change need not be mutually exclusive.  
Participant G was the only participant to suggest a role for “reformer” organisations such as 
Generation Zero in the politicisation journey referred to in Section 6.3.1. For the remainder of 
participants, the concept of alienation from action on climate change takes precedence over the 
need for a politicisation journey. Hence, the role of activists in creating the post-political 
consensus could be seen as advocating for neoliberal and policy-based solutions to climate 
change and through the active avoidance of situations of contestation. It appears the paradox 
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inherent between the process of politicisation and the threat of alienation exists as a result of the 
scale of the climate change issue and the complex contexts and perspectives that come into play. 
However, McCarthy (2013, 24) questions “whether contemporary environmental politics are 
really so lacking in antagonism, alternative visions, and other elements of ‘‘proper’’ politics as 
many analysts of the post-political condition claim.”  Based on evidence presented in this chapter 
it can be argued that agency and understanding of “politicisation” towards radical action exists 
and by describing the consensual condition as entrenched undermines the politicisation journey 
and the role that the “reformer” may play in this. In other words, McCarthy’s recognition of the 
complex reality of climate change politics reflects the perspectives of participants towards 
radical action. However, in the case of Generation Zero, the privileged objective is to make 
climate change an issue that can be related to by those that benefit from the system’s status quo. 
Some participants in this research labelled this “mainstreaming” of the climate change issue.  
6.5 Mainstreaming climate change 
Climate change is going to be an issue despite all of that [attempts to change social and 
economic structures] and therefore we have to act regardless of what of the social 
structures are and move people’s conceptualisations of climate change beyond a green 
issue and many other values including maximising our credibility as a movement because 
otherwise it will be an effort that has merely been polarised into a radical action 
(Participant D). 
The polarising nature of radical/direct action was seen as being the biggest reason to 
“mainstream” climate change: “One central problem with direct action is that it can be polarising 
and polarising politics is not the solution to climate change, it’s part of the solution” (Participant 
A). The majority of participants discussed making climate change a mainstream and accessible 
issue to people across society, including those that have a stake in or benefit hugely from the 
systems at the root of climate change. Most spoke in the context of the work that they do with 
Generation Zero: “Do you get there [to solving climate change] through direct action or do you 
get there through a much more wider appeal/focus and I think that the assumption is that 
Generation Zero has wider focus and appeal...” (Participant A). More specifically they spoke 
about the organisation’s intention to attract those that wouldn’t traditionally be involved with 
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environmental issues: “It [action on climate change] has to involve everybody” (Participant G).  
As Participant C highlights, ‘it’s [about] approachability, you don’t have to be really radical. 
And you know you look at the demographics of our meetings... there is a lot of nicely dressed 
law students.” For many of the members of Generation Zero, maintaining this overall goal is 
paramount to the actions and campaigns organised:  
The activities that we do, they’re all about building action and building positive action so 
when we run these campaigns we run these campaigns effectively to get people involved. 
We give people an opportunity to get involved and think about the issues. And if we 
don’t win it’s not actually the end of the world, the really important thing is that we have 
got people involved, they’re thinking about the issues, they’re being active and they’re 
learning those skills and that is building a general momentum and a general level of 
ambition and understanding  (Participant G). 
Thus some participants demonstrated high levels of concern for how Generation Zero’s brand is 
used. As Participant D explains, “we are... careful with reputation because that is the tool of 
reaching a large amount of people” and the organisation’s ability to attract a variety of sectors of 
society. Participant C believes there are benefits to being a youth-focused, pragmatic 
organisation, “using the fact that we are young, maybe more accessible and you know trying not 
to be too anarchistic...it [climate change] needs to be able to be accessible to the mainstream” 
(Participant C).  
However, Participant E questions the effectiveness of simply being an organisation that aims to 
grow its member base of atypical activists. Given that Participant E recognised the role of radical 
or direct action in meeting the challenges of climate change, this raises the question of how 
important this is in comparison to growing a large scale movement for institutional political 
change:  
I’ve got some friends who have been in and out of Generation Zero a little but they don’t 
want to be activists and they don’t like coming to protests... [can you] have an 
organisation that still caters to them fully or [do you] change how they see the issue so 
that it’s [action on climate change is seen as] more necessary? (Participant E). 
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In order to cater to youth who do not identify with activism or justice issues, Generation Zero has 
placed focus on making actions palatable and non-radical, what Participant I describes as “happy 
and cute stuff,” optimistic, playful and solutions-focussed. For example, Generation Zero held a 
satirical bake sale, aiming to sell 6 billion cupcakes to raise money for public transport spending. 
Generation Zero Wellington members also organised a dancing “flash mob” to raise awareness 
around sea level rise. Flash mobs have become an increasingly popular alternative amongst 
youth climate change organisations globally to highlight public support for a cause. These are 
often used as an alternative to protests and rallies which, according to Participant A, are losing 
their “acceptability” amongst the audiences Generation Zero hope to engage: 
So Generation Zero does flash mobs and large public displays in order to encourage... 
people [to get] involved to make them feel inspired and motivated and to try and facilitate 
them into a culture of actually contributing but also to boast discourse in society make 
people like ‘wow that is really interesting’, you know. Waving placards isn’t working 
anymore, weird public stunts does... it’s no-where near as acceptable behaviour and 
therefore they have less motivation to do it (Participant A). 
6.5.1 Mainstreaming climate change and a post-political carbon consensus 
Mainstreaming climate change amongst the “general public”, as mentioned previously in this 
chapter, plays a role in creating a post-political carbon consensus. Participants often refer to 
reaching people across the political spectrum in order to gain a consensual politics. Generation 
Zero as an organisation “try and mobilise large numbers of young people across the spectrum for 
action on climate change” (Participant A). Participant A goes on to suggest:  
If a Labour voter daughter of two National Party voting farmers starts getting involved 
with Generation Zero and starts doing stuff and they’re doing stuff in a very politically 
acceptable way that’s not alienating or confrontational their parents will get impacted 
from it no matter what.  
By purposefully avoiding polarising or controversial matters and endorsing solutions that 
maintain a systemic status quo, activism can contribute to a post-political carbon consensus by 
avoiding addressing the issues at the root of climate change. Consensus is built through 
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“mainstreaming climate change” and portraying climate change issues as concerns of 
management of the commons, such as the details of the ETS or spending of the transport budget. 
Through their marketing and approach to climate change causes, Generation Zero members do 
not address the ideological differences involved in the politics of climate change that can create 
conflict or contestation in favour of consensus. This can also be seen through the choice of 
political action members chose to organise, as protests and forms of radical action are seen as 
“polarising” or “alienating.” 
Further, Giddens (2008)’s ‘third way’ politics push government and business leadership to meet 
challenges that may arise from climate change. Yet ‘third way’ politics also reflects a deliberate 
“centre” politics and aims to achieve a form of “progress” that ensures that some level of status 
quo can be maintained, in spite of climate change. This is reflected in Generation Zero’s non-
partisan position and use of neoliberal narrative, such as the highlights of the financial costs of 
climate change on future generations. A statement from one participant clearly demonstrates the 
creation of the post-political carbon consensus and ‘third way’ politics that Generation Zero is 
entangled in: 
If all we do on climate change [are] things that alienate the centre and things don’t fit 
within their frame of what they see as acceptable then we won’t affect them. We’ll just 
polarise or we’ll keep it as an issue of the left when the solution to climate change is this 
being an issue of the whole political spectrum... it’s like why aren’t we jumping back and 
being like ‘ok guys how do we get to zero carbon in a business friendly way’, instead of  
‘how do we prove that they’re wrong and we’re right’... one central problem with direct 
action is that it can be polarising and polarising politics is not the solution to climate 
change. It’s part of the solution... (Participant A). 
Further, Generation Zero have in the past shown support for Pure Advantage, a business lobby 
group “formed in the belief that the private sector has an important role to play in creating a 
greener, wealthier New Zealand” (Pure Advantage, 2013). In 2012, Generation Zero publically 
announced their endorsement of Pure Advantage’s major report, Green Growth: Opportunities 
for New Zealand which highlights the business opportunities that can be found whist addressing 
climate change. The following statement from a press release from Generation Zero announces 
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this endorsement and highlights the perspectives on the climate change issue of Mr Chambers as 
spokesperson for Generation Zero:  
Generation Zero shares Pure Advantage’s desire for bipartisan agreement on an economic 
direction for New Zealand that creates sustainable wealth by genuinely addressing 
climate change and other challenges. “The old ‘environment versus economy’ argument 
is a false choice and out of touch with the realities of the 21st century,” said Mr 
Chambers [as a spokesperson for Generation Zero]. “For our generation future prosperity 
and wellbeing is locked in with how we deal with issues like climate change” (Generation 
Zero, 2012). 
Support for business lobby group Pure Advantage demonstrates a legitimisation of the post-
political carbon consensus, as these solutions also avoid ideological contestation and maintain a 
neoliberal status quo. According to Rancière (2010, 7), “the consensual state props itself up on 
global economic necessity presented as an intangible given.” Further, this demonstrates Day 
(2004)’s politics of demand, as it is perceived that the issue of climate change can be addressed if 
enough support can be gained, then institutional politics will address the issue of climate change 
and catalyse widespread lifestyle change: “Clearly, the fundamental fantasy of the politics of 
demand is that the currently hegemonic formation will recognize the validity of the claim 
presented to it, and respond in a way that produces an event of emancipation” (Day, 2004, 734). 
However, ‘emancipation’ is a constrained freedom given by dominant order, in the context of a 
politics of demand which does not challenge dominant hegemony. As mentioned earlier, Day 
(2004, 734) highlights that the overall intention of a politics of demand is to “reproduce the 
conditions of its own emergence.” Evidence provided in Chapter 5 shows that while Generation 
Zero recognises the need for a shift in “conditions,” their current political discourse suggests a 
perpetuation of the same conditions. Henceforth, for Generation Zero, and its members that 
participated in this research, mainstreaming climate change involves advocating solutions that 
are inherently non-radical and maintain a strong connection with ‘third way’ politics, thereby 




The ideas of politicisation of climate change and mainstreaming climate change can be seen as 
being paradoxical and in tension. Politicisation asks people to recognise the role of neoliberalism 
in causing climate change and the need for a systemic shift. Mainstreaming occurs when action 
on climate change appeals to a widespread audience, assumed to be benefiting from the systemic 
status quo. This chapter has shown that members of Generation Zero recognise the role of 
actions closer to the “properly” political, though it was acknowledged that it is highly difficult to 
produce a “properly” political moment. In addition, for members of Generation Zero 
participating in this research, the need to make climate change a mainstream issue was seen as an 
important part of the solution to climate change. This meant advocating for a post-political 
consensus and simultaneously removing opportunities for dissent and the “properly” political 
within the organisation.  
The theoretical framing presented by theorists such as Rancière, Swyngedouw and Mouffe 
privileges dissent as an element of proper democracy and implies that other forms of 
politicisation are of lesser value. Thus the questions remains, what is the value in activities that 
are not considered “properly” political? This research suggests that an awareness of the need to 
understand the role of radical action exists amongst research participants, however many (though 
not all) consider it counter-productive to making climate change a widespread political issue. In 
some respects this highlights that the post-political carbon consensus undermines opportunities 
for dissent. However, by simply disregarding the inherent understanding of the root causes of 
climate change held by many research participants undermines the value of their individual 
subjectivities and the opportunities that these may present for developing future alternative 
imaginaries. Further, in recognition of the spectrum of types of political action, it is necessary to 
consider the role of actions that are political in nature but not “properly” political and how they 
may contribute to shifting perspectives of or solving climate change. The value of political 
actions in relation to addressing climate change is accounted for within Swyngedouw’s post-
political carbon consensus. As previous chapters have also demonstrated, research participants 
have highlighted the complexities of working within the existing neoliberal framework and the 
recognition for change within the neoliberal systems as well as of greater systemic change.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has offered insight into how youth involved with Generation Zero view the issue of 
climate change and action on climate change. The overall objective of this research was to: 
Explore how members of Generation Zero perceive the climate change issue and the 
methods to addressing it, given the neoliberal context of Aotearoa New Zealand. 
To address this research objective the following questions were posed in relation to a case study 
of a youth action group Generation Zero. 
1. How do members of Generation Zero perceive the causes and solutions to climate change? 
2. How do members of Generation Zero perceive the roles of radical and institutional political 
action in solving climate change? 
3. Do the perceptions of members of Generation Zero reflect the arguments around the existence 
of a post-political carbon consensus? If, so what are the implications of these perceptions on 
future spaces for radical action? 
This research aimed to address the problem that anecdotal evidence suggests that radical action is 
becoming less relevant to activists as a result of the complexities of climate change and the 
dominance of neoliberal discourse. Through conducting semi-structured interviews with nine 
members of Generation Zero’s Wellington group, data obtained has allowed an understanding of 
how research participants perceive the issue of climate change and how this shapes their 
perspectives of what makes effective action on climate change. This research has explored what 
effects neoliberalism may have had on perspectives of climate change activism amongst the 
neoliberal generation particularly in regard to how they see radical action. Thus arguments 
around the existence of the post-political carbon consensus were explored in respect to the 
perspectives of these youth activists.  
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Chapter 2 and 3 describe the theories and context upon which this research was based. Using 
Swyngedouw’s (2007; 2010) theory of the post-political carbon consensus, and the role that 
neoliberalism is said to have within this, I have argued that activism now has a role in 
strengthening the post-political carbon consensus, as the consensual condition removes 
opportunities for dissent. Hayward (2012) and Nairn et al (2012) refer to the role of 
neoliberalism in also shaping the norms and values of this supposed neoliberal generation. In the 
context of climate change, advocates of the climate justice approach describe a growing 
movement around the work that recognises the importance of addressing the root systemic 
causes of climate change. The climate justice movement aims to approach climate change as an 
issue that requires the “properly” political. Žižek, Swyngedouw and Rancière’s concept of the 
“properly” political forms the basis for this research which sought to understand the relevance of 
the “properly” political within a neoliberal context for youth climate activists.  
Overall, these chapters drew together the impact that neoliberalism has had on both the 
neoliberal generation of youth and in perpetuating what some theorists refer to as the post-
political carbon consensus. Chapters 2 and 3 also highlight the global context of radical activism 
both on climate change and other issues, and questions the relevance that this has for Aotearoa 
New Zealand activism.  
Chapter 4 outlined the methods and approach used to collect and analyse data for this research. 
Through using Foucaldian discourse analysis, dominant discourses and how they impact “truths” 
could be ascertained.  
Chapter 5 suggested the perceived role of neoliberalism in climate change for members of 
Generation Zero. Research participants felt that neoliberalism and the associated values were a 
component of the causes of climate change. Moreover, it was strongly recognised by many 
participants that the causes of climate change were largely “systemic” and referred to economic 
systems, Western thought systems and industrialisation among others. Many of these sentiments 
echoed a climate justice approach to climate change and indicated that participants thought that 
systemic and societal shifts must occur to address climate change. Hence, when participants were 
asked to portray the solutions to climate change, many talked at length about changes in mindset 
and values (some associated with neoliberalism) as being important. However, I argue that the 
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complexities and dichotomies inherent in addressing climate change meant that many 
participants’ responses highlight the difficulties of addressing climate change in a neoliberal 
reality and some participants are managing their conflicting ideas and imaginaries. However, it 
was also noted by many participants that these solutions could be perceived as “inaccessible” by 
the general public. As members of Generation Zero, and as individuals, research participants also 
discussed “tangible” solutions to climate change. Such solutions were either neoliberal in nature 
or did not aim to shift the root causes of climate change. Participants also referred to aspects of 
‘third way’ politics, for instance campaigning for policy change, as relevant to causing greater 
mindset and value change in the long term. Overall, I have demonstrated that the active 
involvement in the post-political carbon consensus for members of Generation Zero was the 
result of a need to make solving the complex and systemic problem of climate change appear 
possible under the current paradigm. Yet, this simultaneously highlights that the post-political 
condition should not be considered absolute given the understanding of the need for systemic 
change identified by some participants.  
According to some theorists including Swyngedouw, Žižek, Rancière and Mouffe, the post-
political carbon consensus has disrupted opportunities for the “properly” political moment or 
dissent and as a result these moments are considered rare. In Chapter 6 I have explained the 
extent to which working within the post-political carbon consensus may have prevented or 
discouraged activities which may be considered “properly” political or radical for members of 
Generation Zero. Climate justice actions, while not always considered entirely “properly” 
political, represent an approach to climate change which aims to address the systemic causes and 
provide dissensus. As a relatively small movement in Aotearoa New Zealand, it was pertinent to 
analyse the relevance of climate justice to those taking political action on climate change through 
Generation Zero. Evidence showed that a number of research participants felt that radical action, 
such as that taken by advocates of climate justice, was an important part of addressing climate 
change. However, the entrenched and commonsense nature of the neoliberal condition meant that 
for many participants radical action was seen as alienating to others wanting to take action on 
climate change. Many participants felt that alienation of the “general public” would occur if 
action on climate change was seen to create a shift in the economic/social status quo, which 
many benefit from or accept as the only reality. In a similar vein to the ‘third way’ political 
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approach to climate change, some participants felt it was important to create large, wide-scale 
support for action on climate change in order to shift voting patterns or spur policy changes as an 
effective way of taking action on climate change. This further demonstrates that attributes of the 
post-political condition can suppress opportunities for the “properly” political through creating 
divides between the “people” and the “activist”. A number of participants felt that in order to 
“politicise” young people into taking radical action on climate change, they must truly 
understand the injustices of climate change and related systems, however for some this would be 
detrimental to a widespread mainstream climate movement. Overall, this research shows a 
general acceptance of dominant neoliberal discourse and a number of similarities to the post-
political condition meaning that action on climate change is perceived by many to be more 
effective if building widespread support around the solutions presented by the post-political 
carbon consensus.  
Through advocating for these solutions and deliberately being non-radical and palatable, I argue 
that Generation Zero aims to build widespread support for institutionally-led action on climate 
change. However despite this, many members of Generation Zero felt that change needed to 
come from a shift in economic or social systems and associated values. Once again this 
highlights the complexities and dichotomies of working within a neoliberal context, with 
conflicting imaginaries and realities. 
Overall, the research presented in this thesis acknowledges the impact that the entrenched nature 
of neoliberalism has had on this generation of youth climate change activists. While research 
participants recognised the role of neoliberalism and related values in creating the climate 
change issue, it is also forms a part of effective solutions, partially to the detriment of spaces for 
radical action. Through offering support to a post-political consensus and displaying aspects of 
‘third way’ political theory, research participants have identified the contextual difficulties of a 
politics for a new imagination beyond the current neoliberal hegemony with some participants 
recognising the need for this alternative trajectory.  
This research has contributed to the literature supporting the existence of a post-political carbon 
consensus by outlining the effect of neoliberalism on youth perspectives of the “properly” 
political. Moreover, it draws together crucial political theories and literature on the post political 
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consensus, activism and neoliberalism and makes a significant contribution to the literature 
overall. However, unlike the body of literature that supports the post-political condition, this 
research highlights a much more complex and paradoxical set of circumstances and potential 
spaces for contestation of social and economic systems. Further, this research highlights the 
paradoxical ideas around perceptions of the role of radical action to climate change, thus this 
does not suggest that radical action has become completely irrelevant but rather recognises the 
complexities of the neoliberal reality.  
7.1 Limitations of this research 
Throughout the process of this research, it became evident there were several limitations. These 
limitations exist primarily because of the limited resources and budget available whilst 
completing the thesis. Given these limitations, participants in this research were based only in 
Wellington and interviews were limited to nine members of the group. However, this also had 
benefits as it reduced the geographical factors that may have also influenced perspectives on 
activism, such as the political context that Wellington activists find themselves in. Future 
research could involve interviewing more members of Generation Zero and selecting participants 
in different areas of the country would have widened the breadth of responses. This may provide 
further insights and either diversified the assumptions that this research made or strengthened 
existing arguments.  
Further, this geographical homogeneity, coupled with age and ethnic homogeneity amongst 
research participants further limited the diversity of responses gained. All research participants 
were Pakeha New Zealanders and it can be assumed that this may have affected the data 
collected due to similar cultural norms and backgrounds. However, from what I have observed, 
Generation Zero both as a national level group and the group of participants in this research is 
made up of mostly Pakeha members, thus this make-up of participants mimics the general make-
up of the organisation. The lack of tikanga Māori or Māori world view within this research is 
also a limitation. This research neglects the voices of Māori or people of colour and the different 
perspectives that they may have offered as members of Generation Zero. However, in saying this 
it is should not be assumed that different ethnic backgrounds would give way to different 
perspectives on these issues. This limitation could be addressed by conducting further research 
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that incorporates activists of different ethnic backgrounds and trace the effect that this has on 
perspectives.  
Finally, choosing one case study group has meant that this research has provided an in-depth 
analysis of the perspectives of some of Generation Zero’s members and highlighted the paradox 
and complexity inherent within each individual’s perspectives. While this research set out to 
explore and analyse the role of activists within the post-political carbon consensus, which 
Generation Zero as an organisation clearly demonstrates, this raises further questions that should 
be asked more widely around youth, activism and the post-political carbon consensus. Further, 
perspectives on climate change are complex and ever-changing. In recognising this, it may have 
been beneficial to do follow up interviews in order to allow participants to expand on 
complicated points. Similarly, had there been more time and resources available, interviewing 
members of different groups would have broadened the usefulness of this research. Given the 
spectrum of other views existing within Aotearoa New Zealand, this research offers an insight 
into a few perspectives that raises important questions for future research.  
7.2 Recommendations for future study 
This research has shown that members of Generation Zero that participated in this research 
recognise the role of neoliberalism in causing climate change as well as the challenges of 
addressing climate change given entrenchment of neoliberal discourse. To enable future study in 
this area to occur the following recommendations are made:  
1. Ask further questions of participants that expand on the experiences and influences to 
their perspectives. Further research could explore the implications of past current events 
(such as the Urewera Terror Raids), social movements and personal influences (such as 
family and place of upbringing) have on shaping perspectives of climate change and 
political action.  
2. Use the position of activist-scholar to do participatory research. By discussing the 
research and forming questions and methods around the specific needs of research 
participants, research could provide practical and useful knowledge for conducting on the 
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ground activism and/or address the questions participants have surrounding their own 
work. 
3. Future research is needed that explores how neoliberalism has affected youth 
subjectivities and their understandings of activism, for example, career and other future 
ambitions. This would complement the work of Nairn et al (2012) and Hayward (2012) 
as it would contextualise neoliberalism within the lives of the activists, not just within the 
context of climate change.   
4. Future research on how activism has changed with the advent of neoliberalism in 
Aotearoa New Zealand is necessary. Comparing older activists views with those of young 
activists would enable an exploration of how neoliberalism and other factors have shifted 
views of political action. 
5. Future research that involves more diverse groups and a geographically larger selection 
of youth participants, potentially even involving young activists from other countries, is 
necessary to gain an understanding of the nature of activism and the post-political carbon 
consensus in a national or international context. This would put the context of Aotearoa 
New Zealand into perspective with the rest of the world and highlight the potential other 
impacts of our culture on climate change action. Diversity in groups with differing 
approaches, as well as geographically diverse groups, including youth working on 
climate justice issues, is also necessary to create a broad picture of perspectives on 
climate change. This may offer insight into the perspectives of youth that are acting to 
counter the post-political carbon consensus.  
7.3 Closing statement 
This research presents an overview of the perspectives of members of Generation Zero on the 
causes and solutions of climate change, as well as the role of different forms of political action in 
combating climate change. Research participants have presented a complex picture which does 
not entirely support the existence of a post-political carbon consensus. However, this study also 
acknowledges that the prominence of neoliberal policy in mainstream discourse around climate 
change has had some influence on perspectives of radical action, with some participants 
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suggesting that radical action on climate change was not as integral to climate change as with 
other movements and causes. Overall, I would like to acknowledge the need for diversity in 
action on climate change and the contribution that members of Generation Zero have made in 
bringing climate change to the attention of many. However, this research has highlighted a need 
for a wider understanding of the benefits of addressing the systemic causes of climate change 
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Generation Zero feel needs to be done in New Zealand (and globally) to address the causes of climate 
change, and the action they choose to take with Generation Zero both at present and in the future.  
No names will be used at all during the course of this research or within any of the publications released 
following this research. Participants may be distinguished by the extent of their commitment and 
involvement. This will be mitigated as far as possible by avoiding using material that may suggest any 
particular identity. Participants will be attributed with a pseudonym such as Participant 1, 2 or 3.  
This research will form the basis for my Masters thesis which will be submitted to the SGEES for 
marking. Following this it will be available for download at the Victoria University of Wellington library 
website and a hard copy will be kept in the library thesis depositary. It is hoped this research will be 
used in academic journal publications and academic conference presentations in the future. In order to 
disseminate this research to a wider audience, in particular the climate change action community at 
large, this research may form the basis of a number of articles, presentations and blog posts to be 
written for a lay audience 
Victoria University of Wellington has granted me ethics approval to conduct this research. 
What is involved? 
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Interviews will be conducted by myself at a mutually agreed location. They have been designed to be 50-
60 minutes long. Should you choose to participate in this study, your written consent will be requested 
prior to it commencing. 
Participation is entirely voluntary and you can decline to answer any questions, and/or withdraw from 
the interview at any time. You can also withdraw your opinions from the research up until the date of 
1/11/2012. 
You will be asked a list of questions relating to your experiences as a member of Generation Zero and 
your perspectives on the climate change issue. You do not have to answer all questions. 
The interview will be recorded and transcribed. These documents will be stored electronically in a 
password protected folder for five years after the completion of the project. After this time, files will be 
destroyed. 
Please contact myself or my supervisor, Dr Sophie Bond, if you have any questions or would like to know 
further information regarding this research. 
Principal Investigator: 
Emma Moon 





Dr Sophie Bond 
School of Geography, Environment and Earth Science – Victoria University of Wellington 
sophie.bond@vuw.ac.nz 
Ph: 04 463 5217 
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Title of project: Climate change and political action: youth perspectives in Aotearoa New Zealand 
•I have read and understood the attached ‘Information sheet for interviews.’ I have had an opportunity 
to ask any questions I may have about the study and about participating in the interview and have had 
them answered to my satisfaction. 
•I agree to participate in the interview and understand that I may withdraw myself (or any information I 
have provided) from this project by 01/11/2012 without having to give reasons. 
•I understand that the interview will be audio recorded and transcribed, and that only the researcher 
and their supervisor will have access to this material. Any information I provide will be kept confidential 
to the researcher and her supervisor. Statements I make may be used in the thesis or resulting 
publications, but a pseudonym will be used so I am not identified. 
•I understand that all written material and audio recordings of interviews will be stored in a locked filing 
cabinet or as password protected electronic documents and then destroyed after 5 years. 
•I understand that the data I provide will only be used for the purposes of a thesis and any articles 
published from the thesis. No information will be released to others without my written consent. 
 
I __________________________________ (full name) hereby consent to 





□ I would like to receive a summary of the research findings:  Yes / No (Please circle) 
If yes, please an provide email address: 
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Appendix Three: Interview Guide 
1. What is your role in Generation Zero and how long have you been involved? 
2. Can you describe for me the activities that Generation Zero are involved in? And how 
would you describe this as action on climate change? 
3. Have you been involved with any other environmental groups? If so, which ones?  
4. Why did you choose to become involved in these environmental groups and 
climate/environmental action? 
5. What do you think are the causes of climate change? 
 (Prompt: economic system, politics, human activity, psychology, scientific) 
6. What do you think are some of the solutions to climate change?  
(Prompt: policy based, international law, systemic, individual, community, business) 
7. Name what you believe to be the top three priorities for addressing climate change 
8. What do you believe to be the role of citizens within political action on climate change in 
general?  
9. What do you believe to be the role of citizens within political action in a country like New 
Zealand on climate change?  
(Explain what radical action is in the context of this research) 
10. What do you believe to be the effectiveness of radical action as a role for citizens within 
political action in a country like New Zealand?  
(Prompt: Legality, public perception of the issue, policy based solutions and the impact that this 
can have) 
11. What do you believe to be the role of radical action in relation to climate change as a young 
person and a member of Generation Zero? 
 (Prompt: How comfortable would you be with engaging in radical action? identify constraints 
and potential future opportunites, the aims and ambitions of the organisation) 
12. What barriers exist for radical action on climate change in New Zealand?  
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(Prompt: Are there reasons that people would not engage, use or advocate action?) 
13. Are there any other comments you would like to add? 
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